CVE-2026-7058 Overview
A command injection vulnerability has been identified in 666ghj MiroFish versions up to 0.1.2. The vulnerability exists in the SimulationIPCClient.send_command function within the backend/app/services/simulation_ipc.py file, which is part of the Inter-Process Communication (IPC) component. This weakness allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary commands through insufficient input sanitization, potentially leading to unauthorized command execution on affected systems. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and the project maintainers were notified through an issue report but have not yet responded.
Critical Impact
Remote attackers can exploit this command injection vulnerability to execute arbitrary system commands, potentially compromising server integrity, data confidentiality, and system availability.
Affected Products
- MiroFish up to version 0.1.2
- MiroFish backend IPC services using simulation_ipc.py
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-04-26 - CVE-2026-7058 published to NVD
- 2026-04-29 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-7058
Vulnerability Analysis
This command injection vulnerability (CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component) affects the MiroFish application's inter-process communication mechanism. The vulnerable function SimulationIPCClient.send_command fails to properly sanitize user-controlled input before passing it to system command execution routines. Attackers can exploit this weakness remotely over the network without requiring authentication or user interaction.
The vulnerability enables attackers to inject shell metacharacters or command separators that break out of the intended command context and execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the application process.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper input validation in the SimulationIPCClient.send_command function located in backend/app/services/simulation_ipc.py. The function accepts external input and incorporates it into system commands without adequate sanitization or escaping of shell special characters. This allows malicious input containing command separators (such as ;, |, &&, or backticks) to be interpreted as additional commands by the underlying shell.
Attack Vector
The attack can be launched remotely over the network. An attacker can send specially crafted requests to the MiroFish backend service that include malicious command strings. When the vulnerable send_command function processes this input, the injected commands are executed on the target system. The attack requires no authentication and no user interaction, making it particularly dangerous for internet-facing deployments.
The vulnerability can be exploited by crafting IPC messages that include shell metacharacters within command parameters. For technical details and proof-of-concept information, refer to GitHub MiroFish Issue #488 and the VulDB vulnerability entry.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-7058
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected process spawning from the MiroFish application process, particularly shell interpreters like /bin/sh or /bin/bash
- Unusual outbound network connections originating from the backend service
- IPC messages containing shell metacharacters such as ;, |, &&, ||, or backtick characters
- Anomalous entries in application logs showing malformed or suspicious command parameters
Detection Strategies
- Implement network intrusion detection rules to identify IPC requests containing common command injection patterns
- Deploy application-level logging to capture all inputs to the SimulationIPCClient.send_command function
- Monitor for unusual child processes spawned by the MiroFish backend service
- Use file integrity monitoring on critical system files and directories that could be targeted post-exploitation
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable verbose logging in the MiroFish application to capture detailed IPC communication
- Configure SIEM alerts for patterns indicative of command injection attempts in application logs
- Monitor system call activity from the MiroFish process for unexpected command execution
- Review network traffic for anomalous patterns in communications with the IPC service
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-7058
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict network access to the MiroFish IPC service to trusted hosts only using firewall rules
- Implement input validation on all data passed to the SimulationIPCClient.send_command function
- Consider disabling or isolating the affected IPC functionality until a patch is available
- Monitor the MiroFish GitHub repository for security updates
Patch Information
As of the last NVD update on 2026-04-29, no official patch has been released by the maintainers. The project was notified of the vulnerability through GitHub Issue #488 but has not responded. Users should monitor the repository for updates and apply patches immediately when available.
Workarounds
- Implement network segmentation to isolate MiroFish deployments from untrusted networks
- Deploy a web application firewall (WAF) or reverse proxy with rules to filter command injection patterns
- Apply strict input validation and sanitization at the application boundary before data reaches the IPC service
- Consider running the MiroFish service in a containerized environment with restricted capabilities to limit the impact of potential exploitation
# Example: Restrict network access to the MiroFish service
# Allow only trusted internal hosts
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport <MIROFISH_PORT> -s 192.168.1.0/24 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport <MIROFISH_PORT> -j DROP
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
