CVE-2026-35464: pyLoad Download Manager RCE Vulnerability

CVE-2026-35464 Overview

CVE-2026-35464 is an insecure deserialization vulnerability affecting pyLoad, a free and open-source download manager written in Python. This vulnerability represents a bypass of the incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33509, which had introduced an ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS set to prevent non-admin users from modifying security-critical configuration options. However, the storage_folder option was not included in this protected set, allowing attackers with SETTINGS and ADD permissions to exploit a dangerous path traversal and deserialization attack chain.

Critical Impact
Attackers with low-privileged user accounts can achieve arbitrary code execution by redirecting downloads to the Flask filesystem session store and planting a malicious pickle payload.

Affected Products

pyLoad versions prior to commit c4cf995a2803bdbe388addfc2b0f323277efc0e1

Discovery Timeline

2026-04-07 - CVE-2026-35464 published to NVD
2026-04-08 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-35464

Vulnerability Analysis

This vulnerability exploits a gap in the security controls implemented to fix CVE-2026-33509. The original fix added an ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS set designed to block non-admin users from modifying security-critical configuration options. However, this protection was incomplete as it failed to include the storage_folder option within the restricted set.

The attack is possible because the Flask session directory resides outside both PKGDIR and userdir, effectively bypassing the existing path restriction mechanisms. This architectural oversight enables a multi-stage attack where an authenticated user with SETTINGS and ADD permissions can manipulate the download storage location to target the Flask session store.

The core issue relates to CWE-502 (Deserialization of Untrusted Data). Flask's filesystem-based session storage uses Python's pickle serialization format, which is known to be unsafe when processing untrusted data. By controlling where downloaded files are stored, an attacker can effectively inject arbitrary pickle payloads into the session directory with predictable filenames.

Root Cause

The root cause is the incomplete implementation of admin-only configuration restrictions. The storage_folder configuration option was not added to the ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS set, allowing lower-privileged users to modify this critical path setting. Combined with Flask's use of pickle for session serialization and the session directory being outside the protected path boundaries, this creates an exploitable deserialization vulnerability.

Attack Vector

The attack requires network access and an authenticated user account with SETTINGS and ADD permissions. The exploitation flow involves:

Modifying the storage_folder configuration to point to Flask's filesystem session store directory
Initiating a download that plants a malicious pickle payload as a session file with a predictable filename
Sending an HTTP request with a crafted session cookie that references the planted malicious session file
When Flask processes the request, it deserializes the malicious pickle payload, achieving arbitrary code execution

The security patch addresses this by expanding the protected configuration options:

python

         :param value: new config value
         :param section: 'plugin' or 'core
         """
+        try:
+            try:
+                user_info = flask.g.user_info
+            except AttributeError:
+                user_info = flask.session
+
+        # Attempt to access outside an active Flask request
+        except RuntimeError:
+            user_info = {"role": Role.ADMIN}
+        is_admin = user_info.get("role") == Role.ADMIN
 
-        ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS = {
+        ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS = {
+            ("general", "storage_folder"),
+            ("log", "syslog_host"),
+            ("log", "syslog_port"),
+            ("proxy", "password"),
+            ("proxy", "username"),
             ("reconnect", "script"),
             ("webui", "host"),
-            ("webui", "use_ssl"),
             ("webui", "ssl_cert"),
             ("webui", "ssl_key"),
-            ("log", "syslog_host"),
-            ("log", "syslog_port"),
-            ("proxy", "username"),
-            ("proxy", "password"),

Source: GitHub Commit Update

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-35464

Indicators of Compromise

Unexpected modifications to the storage_folder configuration option by non-admin users
Downloaded files appearing in Flask session storage directories
Unusual session files with non-standard naming patterns in the session store
Evidence of pickle deserialization errors or unexpected code execution in application logs

Detection Strategies

Monitor configuration changes to the storage_folder setting, especially from users without admin privileges
Implement file integrity monitoring on Flask session storage directories
Review audit logs for users with SETTINGS and ADD permissions making configuration changes
Deploy application-level logging to track all configuration modifications

Monitoring Recommendations

Enable verbose logging for pyLoad configuration changes and correlate with user permission levels
Set up alerts for any file write operations targeting the Flask session directory from the download process
Monitor for anomalous HTTP requests with session cookies referencing newly created session files

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-35464

Immediate Actions Required

Update pyLoad to a version containing commit c4cf995a2803bdbe388addfc2b0f323277efc0e1 or later
Review user permissions and restrict SETTINGS and ADD privileges to trusted users only
Audit configuration logs for any suspicious modifications to the storage_folder option
Consider temporarily disabling the ability for non-admin users to modify configuration settings

Patch Information

The vulnerability is fixed in commit c4cf995a2803bdbe388addfc2b0f323277efc0e1. The patch expands the ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS set (renamed to ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS) to include the storage_folder option along with additional sensitive configuration parameters. Organizations should apply this fix by updating to the latest version of pyLoad from the official repository.

For detailed patch information, see the GitHub Commit Update and the related security advisories: GHSA-4744-96p5-mp2j and GHSA-r7mc-x6x7-cqxx.

Workarounds

Restrict user permissions to ensure only fully trusted administrators have SETTINGS permissions
Implement network segmentation to limit access to the pyLoad administrative interface
Configure file system permissions to prevent the download process from writing to Flask session directories
Consider switching Flask to use a database-backed session store instead of filesystem sessions

bash

# Configuration example
# Restrict pyLoad to trusted network interfaces only
# In pyLoad configuration, ensure webui host binding is restricted:
# webui.host = 127.0.0.1

# Set restrictive file permissions on session directory
chmod 700 /path/to/flask/sessions
chown pyload:pyload /path/to/flask/sessions