CVE-2026-27615 Overview
ADB Explorer, a fluent UI application for Android Debug Bridge (ADB) on Windows, contains a critical vulnerability that allows remote code execution through UNC path injection. In versions prior to Beta 0.9.26022, the application allows the ManualAdbPath settings variable to be configured with a Universal Naming Convention (UNC) path in the application's settings file (App.txt). This design flaw enables attackers to redirect the ADB binary execution path to a remote network resource under their control, effectively granting them full control over the binary executed by the application.
Critical Impact
An attacker can achieve remote code execution on a victim's machine by convincing them to run a crafted shortcut pointing to a malicious settings file, executing arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running the application.
Affected Products
- ADB Explorer versions prior to Beta 0.9.26022
- Windows systems running vulnerable ADB Explorer versions
- Systems where users can be socially engineered to execute malicious shortcuts
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-02-25 - CVE CVE-2026-27615 published to NVD
- 2026-02-25 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-27615
Vulnerability Analysis
This vulnerability stems from improper validation of file paths in the ADB Explorer application's configuration handling. The ManualAdbPath setting, which specifies the location of the ADB binary to be executed, accepts UNC paths without proper validation or sanitization. UNC paths follow the format \\server\share\path and allow Windows applications to access files on remote network shares.
When ADB Explorer loads its configuration from App.txt, it does not verify whether the specified binary path is local or remote. This oversight allows an attacker to craft a malicious settings file that points ManualAdbPath to an attacker-controlled SMB share containing a malicious executable masquerading as the ADB binary.
The attack scenario involves distributing an archive file containing both a shortcut to ADB Explorer and a crafted App.txt configuration file. When the victim extracts and executes the shortcut, the application loads the malicious configuration and subsequently executes the attacker's binary from the remote share instead of the legitimate ADB tool.
Root Cause
The root cause is classified under CWE-40 (Path Traversal: '\UNC\share\name' - Windows UNC Share). The application fails to validate that the ManualAdbPath configuration value points to a local file system path. By accepting UNC paths without restriction, the application inadvertently allows external network resources to be specified as executable targets. This lack of input validation on critical path configuration enables the exploitation chain.
Attack Vector
The attack vector is local, requiring user interaction to execute. The exploitation flow involves:
- Preparation: The attacker creates a malicious executable and hosts it on an SMB network share they control
- Configuration Crafting: A malicious App.txt settings file is created with ManualAdbPath pointing to the UNC path of the attacker's binary (e.g., \\attacker-server\share\adb.exe)
- Delivery: The attacker packages the malicious settings file with a shortcut to ADB Explorer in an archive and distributes it to potential victims
- Execution: When the victim extracts the archive and runs the shortcut, ADB Explorer loads the malicious configuration
- Code Execution: The application attempts to run what it believes is the ADB binary, but instead executes the attacker's malicious code with the victim's user privileges
The vulnerability enables remote code execution despite requiring local user interaction for the initial trigger.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-27615
Indicators of Compromise
- Presence of App.txt configuration files containing UNC paths in the ManualAdbPath setting
- Network connections to unexpected SMB shares when ADB Explorer is executed
- Suspicious shortcut files (.lnk) pointing to ADB Explorer with custom configuration paths
- Unexpected executable downloads from remote network shares during ADB Explorer operation
Detection Strategies
- Monitor for ADB Explorer processes spawning network connections to external SMB shares
- Implement file integrity monitoring on ADB Explorer configuration files to detect unauthorized modifications
- Alert on the creation or modification of App.txt files containing UNC path patterns (\\*\*)
- Deploy endpoint detection rules to identify shortcut files that reference custom configuration directories
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable Windows Security Event logging for SMB connections (Event ID 5140, 5145)
- Configure SIEM rules to correlate ADB Explorer process execution with subsequent SMB traffic
- Implement application whitelisting to prevent execution of binaries from network shares
- Monitor for archive files containing both .lnk shortcuts and App.txt configuration files
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-27615
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade ADB Explorer to version Beta 0.9.26022 or later immediately
- Review existing App.txt configuration files for any UNC path entries in the ManualAdbPath setting
- Educate users about the risks of running shortcuts from untrusted archive files
- Implement group policy restrictions to block execution of binaries from UNC paths where feasible
Patch Information
The vulnerability has been addressed in ADB Explorer version Beta 0.9.26022. The fix implements proper validation of the ManualAdbPath configuration setting to reject UNC paths, ensuring only local file system paths are accepted for the ADB binary location.
For detailed information about the security fix, refer to the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-3f27-jp2g-hwhr.
Workarounds
- Avoid running ADB Explorer from shortcuts received in archive files from untrusted sources
- Manually verify the contents of App.txt configuration files before launching the application
- Configure Windows Firewall to block outbound SMB connections to untrusted networks
- Use application control policies to restrict ADB Explorer from loading external configuration files
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

