CVE-2026-25858: Macrozheng Mall Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-25858 Overview

CVE-2026-25858 is a critical authentication bypass vulnerability affecting macrozheng mall version 1.0.3 and prior. The vulnerability resides in the mall-portal password reset workflow, which allows an unauthenticated attacker to reset arbitrary user account passwords using only a victim's telephone number. This flaw enables complete remote account takeover of any user with a known or guessable telephone number.

The password reset flow contains two fundamental security failures: it exposes the one-time password (OTP) directly in the API response, and it validates password reset requests solely by comparing the provided OTP to a value stored by telephone number without verifying user identity or ownership of the telephone number.

Critical Impact

Unauthenticated attackers can take over any user account by exploiting the exposed OTP in the password reset API response, requiring only knowledge of the victim's telephone number.

Affected Products

• macrozheng mall version 1.0.3
• macrozheng mall versions prior to 1.0.3
• mall-portal component (password reset workflow)

Discovery Timeline

• 2026-02-07 - CVE-2026-25858 published to NVD
• 2026-02-09 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-25858

Vulnerability Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-640 (Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password). The flaw stems from insecure implementation of the password reset functionality in the mall-portal component.

When a user initiates a password reset request, the application generates a one-time password (OTP) and stores it server-side, associated with the provided telephone number. The critical security failure occurs because the API returns this OTP directly in the response body, making it trivially accessible to anyone who can initiate a password reset request.

The subsequent password reset validation only checks whether the submitted OTP matches the stored value for the given telephone number. There is no additional verification step to confirm that the requestor actually owns or has access to the telephone number in question.

Root Cause

The root cause of this vulnerability is a broken authentication design in the password reset mechanism. The implementation violates fundamental security principles by:

1. Returning sensitive authentication tokens (OTP) in plaintext API responses instead of transmitting them through a secure out-of-band channel (SMS, email)
2. Failing to implement proper identity verification before allowing password changes
3. Trusting client-provided data (telephone number) without validation of ownership

This represents a classic example of a weak password recovery mechanism where the security of the entire authentication system can be bypassed through the password reset flow.

Attack Vector

The attack can be executed remotely over the network without requiring any prior authentication or user interaction. An attacker follows this sequence:

1. The attacker identifies a target user's telephone number (which may be publicly available or guessable)
2. The attacker initiates a password reset request to the mall-portal API, providing the victim's telephone number
3. The API responds with the generated OTP embedded in the response body
4. The attacker extracts the OTP from the API response
5. The attacker submits a password reset completion request with the victim's telephone number, the captured OTP, and a new attacker-controlled password
6. The application validates only that the OTP matches the stored value and resets the password
7. The attacker now has full access to the victim's account

This attack requires no special tools or techniques—only the ability to make HTTP requests to the vulnerable API endpoint. For additional technical details, see the VulnCheck Advisory on Macrozheng Mall and the related GitHub Issue #946.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-25858

Indicators of Compromise

• Unusual volume of password reset requests originating from single IP addresses or targeting multiple accounts
• Password reset completion requests where the reset initiation and completion occur from different IP addresses or geographical locations
• Rapid succession of password reset requests for the same telephone number
• User reports of unauthorized password changes or account access

Detection Strategies

• Implement logging and alerting on password reset API endpoints to detect abnormal request patterns
• Monitor for password reset completions that occur within seconds of initiation, indicating automated exploitation
• Deploy web application firewall (WAF) rules to rate-limit password reset requests by IP address and telephone number
• Analyze API response payloads in security logs to detect OTP exposure if detailed logging is enabled

Monitoring Recommendations

• Enable detailed access logging on all authentication-related API endpoints
• Set up real-time alerts for multiple failed or successful password resets targeting different accounts from the same source
• Implement user notification systems that alert account holders when password reset requests are initiated
• Review access logs for patterns consistent with credential harvesting or account enumeration

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-25858

Immediate Actions Required

• Disable the vulnerable password reset functionality until a patch is applied or workaround is implemented
• Audit recent password reset activity for signs of exploitation
• Force password resets for accounts that may have been compromised through this vulnerability
• Implement network-level controls to restrict access to the password reset API endpoints

Patch Information

At the time of publication, no official vendor patch has been released. Organizations should monitor the Macrozheng Official Website and the GitHub Issue #946 for updates on security fixes.

Organizations running affected versions should implement the workarounds below and upgrade to a patched version as soon as one becomes available.

Workarounds

• Remove or disable the OTP from API responses entirely—OTPs should only be transmitted via secure out-of-band channels (SMS or email to the registered number/address)
• Implement additional identity verification steps such as security questions or email confirmation before allowing password changes
• Add rate limiting on password reset endpoints to prevent automated exploitation
• Consider implementing CAPTCHA or similar challenge-response mechanisms on password reset forms
• Deploy application-layer firewall rules to block requests to vulnerable endpoints from untrusted sources

For custom deployments, modify the password reset API implementation to ensure OTPs are never included in HTTP responses. The OTP should be sent exclusively through the registered communication channel (SMS/email) and the API should return only a success/failure status.