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CVE Vulnerability Database
Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-25068

CVE-2026-25068: alsa-lib Buffer Overflow Vulnerability

CVE-2026-25068 is a heap-based buffer overflow in alsa-lib versions 1.2.2 to 1.2.15.2 that allows crafted topology files to trigger out-of-bounds writes. This post covers technical details, affected versions, and mitigations.

Published:

CVE-2026-25068 Overview

A heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability has been identified in alsa-lib, the Advanced Linux Sound Architecture library, affecting versions 1.2.2 through 1.2.15.2. The vulnerability exists in the topology mixer control decoder, specifically in the tplg_decode_control_mixer1() function. This function reads the num_channels field from untrusted .tplg topology data and uses it as a loop bound without proper validation against the fixed-size channel array (SND_TPLG_MAX_CHAN). When a crafted topology file with an excessive num_channels value is processed, out-of-bounds heap writes occur, potentially leading to application crashes.

Critical Impact

A maliciously crafted topology file can trigger heap corruption through out-of-bounds writes, causing denial of service conditions in applications utilizing alsa-lib for audio processing.

Affected Products

  • alsa-lib versions 1.2.2 through 1.2.15.2
  • Systems processing untrusted .tplg topology files
  • Linux audio applications utilizing affected alsa-lib versions

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-01-29 - CVE CVE-2026-25068 published to NVD
  • 2026-01-29 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-25068

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability stems from improper validation of array index (CWE-129) in the topology mixer control decoder. The tplg_decode_control_mixer1() function processes mixer control data from .tplg topology files, which can be user-supplied or obtained from untrusted sources. When parsing channel information, the function allocates a channel map structure and iterates based on the num_channels value read directly from the input data.

The fixed-size channel array within the map structure has a maximum capacity defined by SND_TPLG_MAX_CHAN. However, prior to the security fix, no boundary check ensured that num_channels did not exceed this limit. An attacker can craft a malicious topology file specifying an artificially high num_channels value, causing the subsequent loop to write beyond the allocated heap buffer boundaries.

Root Cause

The root cause is insufficient input validation when processing untrusted topology data. The num_channels field is read from external input and directly used as a loop iteration bound without verifying it falls within the acceptable range defined by SND_TPLG_MAX_CHAN and SND_SOC_TPLG_MAX_CHAN. This allows attackers to control the number of write operations performed on a fixed-size heap buffer.

Attack Vector

This vulnerability requires local access and user interaction, as an attacker must convince a user or application to load a maliciously crafted .tplg topology file. The attack scenario involves:

  1. Creating a specially crafted topology file with an excessive num_channels value
  2. Having the target system or application process the malicious file using alsa-lib
  3. The vulnerable function performs out-of-bounds heap writes during channel data processing
  4. Heap corruption leads to application crash (denial of service)
c
// Security patch from commit 5f7fe33
 	if (mc->num_channels > 0) {
 		map = tplg_calloc(heap, sizeof(*map));
 		map->num_channels = mc->num_channels;
+		if (map->num_channels > SND_TPLG_MAX_CHAN ||
+		    map->num_channels > SND_SOC_TPLG_MAX_CHAN) {
+			snd_error(TOPOLOGY, "mixer: unexpected channel count %d", map->num_channels);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 		for (i = 0; i < map->num_channels; i++) {
 			map->channel[i].reg = mc->channel[i].reg;
 			map->channel[i].shift = mc->channel[i].shift;

Source: GitHub Commit 5f7fe33

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-25068

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected crashes in audio applications or daemons with heap corruption signatures
  • Core dumps containing alsa-lib topology parsing functions in the stack trace
  • Presence of suspicious or malformed .tplg files with abnormally high channel count values
  • Application logs showing topology parsing errors or memory allocation failures

Detection Strategies

  • Monitor for crashes in processes linked against alsa-lib with heap corruption indicators
  • Implement file integrity monitoring for topology files in system audio configuration directories
  • Deploy static analysis tools to identify .tplg files with num_channels values exceeding SND_TPLG_MAX_CHAN
  • Use memory sanitizers (AddressSanitizer) during development and testing to detect heap overflows

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable crash reporting and core dump collection for audio-related services
  • Monitor system logs for alsa-lib topology parsing errors and warnings
  • Implement application-level logging for topology file loading operations
  • Track file access patterns to detect unusual topology file modifications or introductions

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-25068

Immediate Actions Required

  • Update alsa-lib to a version containing commit 5f7fe33 or later
  • Audit systems for potentially malicious .tplg topology files from untrusted sources
  • Restrict access to topology file directories to trusted users only
  • Consider disabling topology loading functionality if not required for system operation

Patch Information

The vulnerability has been addressed in commit 5f7fe33002d2d98d84f72e381ec2cccc0d5d3d40 which adds boundary validation for the channel mixer count. The fix introduces checks ensuring map->num_channels does not exceed either SND_TPLG_MAX_CHAN or SND_SOC_TPLG_MAX_CHAN before proceeding with channel data processing. For detailed patch information, refer to the GitHub security commit and the VulnCheck security advisory.

Workarounds

  • Restrict topology file processing to trusted, pre-validated files only
  • Implement application-level validation of topology files before passing to alsa-lib
  • Use access controls to prevent untrusted users from modifying or adding topology files
  • Deploy application sandboxing to limit the impact of potential exploitation
bash
# Configuration example - Restrict topology file permissions
# Ensure only root can modify topology configuration directories
chmod 755 /usr/share/alsa/topology
chown root:root /usr/share/alsa/topology
# Validate alsa-lib version includes the security fix
pkg-config --modversion alsa
# Check if version is greater than 1.2.15.2 or contains the patch

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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