CVE-2026-24910: Bun Trusted Dependencies Spoofing Flaw

CVE-2026-24910 Overview

CVE-2026-24910 is a trust boundary vulnerability in Bun, the JavaScript runtime and package manager, affecting versions prior to 1.3.5. The flaw allows a non-npm package to spoof entries in the default trusted dependencies list, also known as the trust allow list. An attacker can exploit this when a package referenced via file, link, git, or github protocols shares a name with a trusted npm package. The vulnerability is classified under CWE-348: Use of Less Trusted Source.

Critical Impact
Spoofed trusted dependencies can execute lifecycle scripts during installation, enabling supply chain compromise on developer machines and build infrastructure.

Affected Products

Bun runtime and package manager versions before 1.3.5
Development environments using Bun for dependency resolution
CI/CD pipelines executing bun install against untrusted manifests

Discovery Timeline

2026-01-27 - CVE-2026-24910 published to NVD
2026-04-15 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-24910

Vulnerability Analysis

Bun maintains a default trusted dependencies list that automatically permits postinstall and other lifecycle scripts to execute for well-known packages. The trust check matches against the package name without sufficiently validating the package source. When a manifest declares a dependency using a non-registry specifier such as file:, link:, git:, or github:, and that dependency carries a name identical to a trusted npm package, Bun treats it as trusted. This allows arbitrary local or remote code referenced by these protocols to inherit the trust posture intended only for verified registry packages.

The issue is tracked alongside a broader disclosure of JavaScript package manager weaknesses. Further context is available in the Bun 1.3.5 release notes and the Koi.ai PackageGate disclosure.

Root Cause

The root cause is reliance on the package name alone as the trust identifier. The trust comparison does not bind the allow list entry to a specific registry origin or integrity hash. Any specifier that resolves to a matching name satisfies the check.

Attack Vector

An attacker authors a package.json that references a malicious source such as git+https://attacker.example/pkg and sets the dependency name to match an entry on Bun's trust allow list. When a developer runs bun install, the malicious package's lifecycle scripts execute without prompting. Exploitation requires local interaction with the manifest, consistent with the local attack vector classification.

No verified proof-of-concept code is publicly available. See the SC World coverage for additional reporting on the disclosure cluster.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-24910

Indicators of Compromise

Unexpected child processes spawned by bun or bun install during dependency installation
package.json entries that reference file:, link:, git:, or github: sources using names of popular npm packages
Outbound network connections from build hosts to non-registry git endpoints during install operations

Detection Strategies

Audit lockfiles and manifests for dependency names that conflict with well-known registry packages but resolve to non-registry specifiers
Inspect Bun installation logs for lifecycle script execution tied to dependencies that should not be on the trust list
Compare resolved dependency origins against an internal allow list of approved registries

Monitoring Recommendations

Enable process telemetry on developer workstations and CI runners to capture script execution chains rooted in bun
Forward package manager logs to a centralized analytics platform for retroactive hunting
Alert on git or HTTPS fetches performed by package managers to domains outside approved infrastructure

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-24910

Immediate Actions Required

Upgrade Bun to version 1.3.5 or later on all developer workstations, build servers, and container images
Review recent installs for manifests that reference non-registry dependencies sharing names with trusted npm packages
Rotate credentials and tokens accessible from build environments if suspicious installs are identified

Patch Information

The vendor fix ships in Bun 1.3.5. The release tightens the trust allow list matching so that non-npm specifiers no longer inherit trust based on name alone. Release details are published in the Bun v1.3.5 announcement.

Workarounds

Set the trusted dependencies list explicitly in package.json using the trustedDependencies field and remove reliance on Bun defaults
Run bun install --ignore-scripts in untrusted contexts to suppress lifecycle script execution
Pin dependencies to registry sources and reject manifests containing file:, link:, git:, or github: specifiers in code review

bash

# Configuration example
bun install --ignore-scripts