CVE-2026-24222: NVIDIA NeMoClaw Information Disclosure

CVE-2026-24222 Overview

NVIDIA NeMoClaw contains a vulnerability in the sandbox environment initialization component that enables remote attackers to exploit improper access control through prompt injection attacks. By crafting malicious prompt-injected content, an attacker can manipulate the NeMoClaw agent to read and exfiltrate host environment variables that are not properly restricted during the sandbox creation process. This information disclosure vulnerability poses significant risk to organizations deploying AI agent frameworks, as environment variables often contain sensitive credentials, API keys, and configuration data.

Critical Impact

Remote attackers can exfiltrate sensitive host environment variables including potential API keys, credentials, and configuration secrets through prompt injection attacks targeting the AI agent's sandbox initialization.

Affected Products

• NVIDIA NeMoClaw (sandbox environment initialization component)

Discovery Timeline

• 2026-04-28 - CVE CVE-2026-24222 published to NVD
• 2026-04-28 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-24222

Vulnerability Analysis

This vulnerability falls under CWE-497 (Exposure of Sensitive System Information to an Unauthorized Control Sphere), highlighting a critical gap in the isolation between the AI agent sandbox and the host system. The core issue stems from the sandbox environment initialization component failing to properly restrict access to host environment variables when the sandbox is created.

In AI agent frameworks like NeMoClaw, sandboxes are designed to provide isolated execution environments where agents can safely perform tasks without accessing sensitive host resources. However, this vulnerability demonstrates that the boundary between the sandbox and host system is insufficiently enforced during initialization, allowing carefully crafted prompts to bypass these restrictions.

The network-accessible nature of this vulnerability, combined with the lack of required authentication or user interaction, significantly expands the potential attack surface. Organizations running NeMoClaw agents that process external input are particularly at risk, as the prompt injection attack can be embedded within seemingly benign content that the agent is instructed to process.

Root Cause

The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the improper access control implementation within NeMoClaw's sandbox environment initialization component. During sandbox creation, the component fails to adequately filter or restrict which host environment variables are accessible to the sandboxed agent. This oversight allows the agent, when manipulated through prompt injection, to access and retrieve environment variables from the host system that should be isolated from the sandbox environment.

Attack Vector

The attack leverages prompt injection techniques to manipulate the NeMoClaw agent into performing unintended actions. An attacker crafts malicious content containing embedded instructions that, when processed by the agent, cause it to:

1. Access the host system's environment variables during or after sandbox initialization
2. Read sensitive values such as API keys, database credentials, or configuration secrets
3. Exfiltrate this information back to the attacker through the agent's normal communication channels

The attack is particularly concerning because it exploits the trust relationship between the agent and the sandbox environment. Since the agent operates with certain permissions during sandbox initialization, the improper access controls allow prompt-injected content to abuse these permissions to access restricted resources.

For detailed technical information, refer to the NVIDIA Support Article.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-24222

Indicators of Compromise

• Unusual agent queries or commands attempting to access environment variables or system configuration
• Unexpected outbound data transfers from NeMoClaw agent processes containing configuration-like data patterns
• Agent logs showing attempts to read system paths or environment configuration files
• Anomalous prompt patterns containing instructions to enumerate or display system information

Detection Strategies

• Monitor NeMoClaw agent logs for prompt patterns that include system information retrieval commands or environment variable access attempts
• Implement content filtering on agent inputs to detect and block known prompt injection patterns
• Deploy network monitoring to identify unusual data exfiltration patterns from AI agent services
• Enable verbose logging on sandbox initialization to track environment variable access attempts

Monitoring Recommendations

• Establish baseline behavior for NeMoClaw agent sandbox initialization and alert on deviations
• Monitor for unusual API calls or network requests originating from agent sandbox processes
• Implement real-time alerting on environment variable access attempts from sandboxed processes
• Review agent conversation logs for suspicious prompt patterns that may indicate injection attempts

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-24222

Immediate Actions Required

• Review and audit all environment variables accessible to NeMoClaw sandbox environments
• Implement strict input validation and sanitization for all content processed by NeMoClaw agents
• Remove or rotate any sensitive credentials stored in environment variables that may have been exposed
• Consider temporarily restricting network access to NeMoClaw instances until patches are applied

Patch Information

Organizations should consult the official NVIDIA Support Article for the latest patch information and security updates for NeMoClaw. Apply vendor-provided patches as soon as they become available and verify that updates are successfully deployed across all affected systems.

Workarounds

• Implement environment variable isolation by using separate credential management systems instead of host environment variables
• Deploy prompt filtering and content inspection layers before input reaches NeMoClaw agents
• Restrict sandbox network access to limit potential exfiltration channels
• Use secrets management solutions such as HashiCorp Vault or AWS Secrets Manager instead of environment variables for sensitive data

# Example: Audit environment variables accessible to NeMoClaw processes
# Review and remove sensitive variables from sandbox-accessible scope
env | grep -i "api\|key\|secret\|password\|token" > /tmp/sensitive_env_audit.txt
# Implement least-privilege environment variable access for agent processes