CVE-2026-2118: UTT HiPER 810 RCE Vulnerability

CVE-2026-2118 Overview

A command injection vulnerability has been identified in the UTT HiPER 810 router firmware version 1.7.4-141218. The vulnerability exists in the sub_4407D4 function within the /goform/formReleaseConnect endpoint of the rehttpd web server component. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by manipulating the Isp_Name parameter to inject and execute arbitrary operating system commands on the affected device.

Critical Impact

This command injection vulnerability allows remote authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system of the UTT HiPER 810 router, potentially leading to complete device compromise, network infiltration, and persistent backdoor access.

Affected Products

• UTT HiPER 810 firmware version 1.7.4-141218
• UTT HiPER 810 devices running the rehttpd web server component
• Network environments utilizing vulnerable UTT HiPER 810 routers

Discovery Timeline

• 2026-02-08 - CVE-2026-2118 published to NVD
• 2026-02-09 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-2118

Vulnerability Analysis

This vulnerability is classified as CWE-74 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component), commonly known as injection. The affected component is the web-based management interface of the UTT HiPER 810 router, specifically the rehttpd HTTP daemon.

The vulnerability resides in the sub_4407D4 function which processes requests to the /goform/formReleaseConnect endpoint. The function fails to properly sanitize or validate the Isp_Name parameter before passing it to a system command execution context. This lack of input validation allows an attacker to craft malicious input containing shell metacharacters or command separators that will be interpreted and executed by the underlying operating system.

While exploitation requires authenticated access with high privileges, the network-accessible nature of the attack surface and the severity of complete command execution make this a significant security concern for organizations deploying these devices.

Root Cause

The root cause of this vulnerability is improper input validation in the sub_4407D4 function. The Isp_Name parameter received from HTTP POST requests to /goform/formReleaseConnect is passed directly to a command execution context without adequate sanitization. The firmware fails to implement proper input filtering to remove or escape shell metacharacters such as semicolons, pipes, backticks, and other command injection payloads.

Attack Vector

The attack is executed remotely over the network against the router's web management interface. An authenticated attacker with high-level privileges can send a crafted HTTP request to the /goform/formReleaseConnect endpoint with a maliciously constructed Isp_Name parameter value containing command injection sequences.

The vulnerability allows chaining of commands using common shell operators. Successful exploitation grants the attacker the ability to execute commands with the privileges of the web server process, typically root on embedded devices. This can lead to data exfiltration, configuration modification, installation of persistent backdoors, or using the compromised device as a pivot point for further network attacks.

The exploit has been publicly disclosed and proof-of-concept documentation is available via GitHub CVE Documentation.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-2118

Indicators of Compromise

• Unusual HTTP POST requests to /goform/formReleaseConnect containing shell metacharacters in the Isp_Name parameter
• Unexpected outbound network connections originating from the UTT HiPER 810 device
• Unusual process execution or system commands running on the router
• Modifications to router configuration files or firmware
• Presence of unauthorized files or scripts in the router's filesystem

Detection Strategies

• Implement deep packet inspection (DPI) on traffic destined for the router's management interface to identify command injection patterns
• Monitor HTTP request logs for suspicious payloads containing shell metacharacters such as ;, |, $(), and backticks in the Isp_Name parameter
• Deploy network intrusion detection systems (IDS) with signatures targeting command injection attempts against UTT devices
• Enable logging on the router and forward logs to a centralized SIEM for analysis

Monitoring Recommendations

• Configure alerts for any access to the /goform/formReleaseConnect endpoint from untrusted sources
• Monitor for changes to device configuration or unexpected reboots
• Track administrative login attempts and sessions for anomalous behavior
• Implement network traffic baselining to detect unusual communication patterns from the router

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-2118

Immediate Actions Required

• Restrict access to the router's web management interface to trusted IP addresses only
• Implement network segmentation to isolate management interfaces from general network traffic
• Disable remote management access if not required for operations
• Review administrative accounts and ensure strong authentication mechanisms are in place
• Monitor for any signs of compromise on affected devices

Patch Information

At the time of publication, no official patch information is available from UTT Technologies. Organizations should monitor VulDB #344693 and the vendor's official channels for security updates. The vulnerability details have been documented on GitHub for reference.

Workarounds

• Implement access control lists (ACLs) to restrict management interface access to specific trusted IP addresses
• Deploy a web application firewall (WAF) in front of the management interface to filter command injection attempts
• Use VPN connections for administrative access instead of exposing the management interface directly
• Consider replacing affected devices with alternative solutions if patches are not made available

# Example: Restrict management interface access using firewall rules
# Block external access to management port (adjust port as needed)
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -s 192.168.1.0/24 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j DROP

# Alternative: Use network ACL to limit management access
# Only allow management from specific admin workstation
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -s 192.168.1.100 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -j DROP