CVE-2025-7389 Overview
A vulnerability in the AdminServer component of Progress OpenEdge grants authenticated users OS-level access to the server through the adopted authority of the AdminServer process itself. The delegated authority of the AdminServer could allow users the ability to read arbitrary files on the host system through the misuse of the setFile() and openFile() methods exposed through the RMI interface. Misuse was limited only by OS-level authority of the AdminServer's elevated privileges granted and the user's access to these methods enabled through RMI.
Critical Impact
Authenticated attackers can read arbitrary files on the host system, potentially exposing sensitive configuration files, credentials, database contents, and other confidential data stored on the server.
Affected Products
- Progress OpenEdge AdminServer (all supported platforms)
- Systems exposing AdminServer RMI interface to authenticated users
- Environments with elevated AdminServer process privileges
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-04-14 - CVE-2025-7389 published to NVD
- 2026-04-14 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2025-7389
Vulnerability Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-552 (Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties), representing a significant information disclosure risk. The AdminServer component in Progress OpenEdge exposes Java RMI (Remote Method Invocation) methods that were intended for legitimate administrative operations but can be abused to read arbitrary files from the underlying operating system.
The core issue stems from the AdminServer process running with elevated privileges on the host system. When authenticated users invoke the setFile() and openFile() methods through the RMI interface, these operations execute with the AdminServer's privilege level rather than the user's actual permissions. This privilege inheritance model creates a dangerous scenario where an authenticated user with limited actual permissions can leverage the AdminServer's elevated context to access files they should not be able to read.
The vulnerability requires network access and authenticated user credentials to exploit, but once these prerequisites are met, the attacker gains read access to any file accessible to the AdminServer process. Given that administrative services typically run with high privileges, this often translates to system-wide file read capabilities.
Root Cause
The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the exposure of file system operations (setFile() and openFile() methods) through the RMI interface without adequate access control validation. The AdminServer failed to verify whether the authenticated user should have permission to access the requested files, instead relying solely on the process's own elevated privileges to perform file operations. This architectural flaw allowed authenticated users to inherit the AdminServer's file system access capabilities through RMI method calls.
Attack Vector
The attack vector involves an authenticated user connecting to the AdminServer's RMI interface over the network. The attacker leverages their authenticated session to invoke the setFile() method to specify a target file path, followed by openFile() to retrieve the contents of that file. The AdminServer processes these requests using its own elevated privileges, bypassing any file system permissions that would normally restrict the authenticated user's access.
The vulnerability is exploited through the following mechanism:
- Attacker authenticates to the OpenEdge AdminServer using valid credentials
- Attacker connects to the RMI registry and obtains a reference to the AdminServer remote object
- Attacker invokes setFile() with a path to a sensitive file (e.g., /etc/shadow, configuration files, or application secrets)
- Attacker calls openFile() to retrieve and read the file contents
- The AdminServer executes these operations with its elevated privileges, returning data the user should not access
Detection Methods for CVE-2025-7389
Indicators of Compromise
- Unusual RMI connections to AdminServer from unexpected network locations or user accounts
- Log entries showing setFile() or openFile() method invocations targeting sensitive system files
- Access attempts to files outside normal application directories (e.g., /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, Windows SAM files)
- Spike in AdminServer RMI activity from authenticated sessions that typically have limited operations
Detection Strategies
- Monitor AdminServer logs for file access operations targeting sensitive system paths
- Implement network detection rules to identify RMI traffic patterns associated with file enumeration
- Deploy file integrity monitoring (FIM) on critical system files to detect unauthorized read attempts
- Enable verbose logging on AdminServer components to capture method invocation details
Monitoring Recommendations
- Configure SIEM rules to alert on AdminServer file access operations outside normal working directories
- Establish baseline RMI activity patterns and alert on deviations indicating potential exploitation
- Monitor for authentication attempts followed by unusual file system query patterns
- Implement user behavior analytics (UBA) to detect authenticated users accessing files inconsistent with their role
How to Mitigate CVE-2025-7389
Immediate Actions Required
- Apply the security update from Progress that removes the exploitable setFile() and openFile() methods from the RMI interface
- Audit AdminServer access logs to identify any potential past exploitation attempts
- Review user accounts with AdminServer authentication privileges and remove unnecessary access
- Implement network segmentation to restrict AdminServer RMI access to trusted administrative networks only
Patch Information
Progress has released a security update that removes the vulnerable setFile() and openFile() methods from the RMI interface, eliminating access through RMI or downstream of the RMI registry. Detailed patch information and download links are available in the Progress Security Update Announcement.
Organizations should prioritize applying this update to all affected OpenEdge AdminServer installations. The patch completely removes the exploitable methods rather than adding additional access controls, providing a definitive remediation.
Workarounds
- Restrict network access to the AdminServer RMI interface using firewall rules to limit exposure to trusted IP addresses only
- Run the AdminServer process with minimal required privileges to limit the scope of accessible files if exploitation occurs
- Implement additional authentication layers such as VPN requirements before AdminServer access is permitted
- Monitor and audit all AdminServer RMI connections until the patch can be applied
Administrators should review the AdminServer's running privilege level and consider running it with reduced permissions where operationally feasible. Network-level controls should be implemented immediately to restrict RMI interface access while patching is scheduled.
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.


