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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2025-68783

CVE-2025-68783: Linux Kernel Buffer Overflow Vulnerability

CVE-2025-68783 is a buffer overflow flaw in the Linux kernel's ALSA USB mixer driver that allows unchecked meter packet indices to write past array boundaries. This article covers technical details, affected versions, and mitigation.

Updated:

CVE-2025-68783 Overview

CVE-2025-68783 is an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the Linux kernel's Advanced Linux Sound Architecture (ALSA) USB mixer driver for the Tascam US-16x08 device. The flaw exists in get_meter_levels_from_urb(), which parses 64-byte meter packets sent by the device. The function derives a channel index directly from the meter packet using MUB2(meter_urb, s) - 1 and uses it to index per-channel arrays without range validation. A malicious or malformed USB device can supply a negative or out-of-range channel value, causing the driver to write past the end of meter_level[], comp_level[], or master_level[] arrays in struct snd_us16x08_meter_store.

Critical Impact

A crafted or compromised USB audio device can trigger kernel memory corruption, potentially leading to denial of service or local privilege escalation on systems with the us16x08 driver loaded.

Affected Products

  • Linux kernel versions containing the unpatched snd-usb-us16x08 ALSA mixer driver
  • Systems using Tascam US-16x08 USB audio mixers with the affected kernel driver
  • Distributions shipping mainline Linux kernel prior to the fix commits

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-01-13 - CVE-2025-68783 published to NVD
  • 2026-04-15 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-68783

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability resides in the ALSA USB mixer driver for the Tascam US-16x08, specifically in get_meter_levels_from_urb(). This function processes 64-byte meter packets streamed from the device over USB. Each packet encodes channel-level metering data, and the driver writes parsed values into three per-channel arrays inside struct snd_us16x08_meter_store: meter_level[], comp_level[], and master_level[].

The driver computes the destination channel index by extracting a byte from the packet using the MUB2() macro and subtracting one. The result is then used as a direct array subscript. Because the channel index originates from attacker-controlled USB data and is not validated against the size of the target arrays, a malformed packet can drive the index negative or beyond SND_US16X08_MAX_CHANNELS. The kernel then performs writes outside the intended buffer.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing input validation on data received from a USB device. The function trusts that the device-supplied channel index falls within expected bounds and omits checks for negative values or values exceeding SND_US16X08_MAX_CHANNELS and ARRAY_SIZE(master_level). This is a classic out-of-bounds write [CWE-787] caused by improper bounds checking on externally supplied indices.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires the affected driver to be loaded and a USB device that the kernel binds to the snd-usb-us16x08 driver. An attacker with physical access can present a rogue USB device that masquerades as a Tascam US-16x08 and emits crafted meter packets containing out-of-range channel indices. A compromised legitimate device with malicious firmware can achieve the same result. The corrupted memory adjacent to the meter arrays determines the impact, which ranges from kernel panic to controlled memory overwrite.

No public proof-of-concept code is available. The vulnerability manifests during URB completion handling. See the upstream kernel commits referenced below for the exact patched logic.

Detection Methods for CVE-2025-68783

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected kernel oops, panic, or KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds reports referencing get_meter_levels_from_urb or the snd-usb-us16x08 module
  • Kernel log entries showing the snd-usb-us16x08 driver binding to an unexpected or newly attached USB device
  • Sudden audio subsystem instability on hosts that do not normally use Tascam US-16x08 hardware

Detection Strategies

  • Monitor dmesg and the kernel ring buffer for crashes or memory-sanitizer warnings inside the ALSA USB mixer code path
  • Enable KASAN (Kernel Address Sanitizer) on test and development systems to catch out-of-bounds writes in the driver during fuzz testing
  • Inventory hosts running kernels predating the fix commits and flag those with the snd-usb-us16x08 module loaded or auto-loadable

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Audit USB device connection events using udev logs and centralize them in your SIEM for correlation with kernel faults
  • Track loaded kernel modules across the fleet and alert when snd-usb-us16x08 loads on systems where USB audio hardware is not expected
  • Forward kernel crash dumps and kdump artifacts to a central log store for analysis of driver-related faults

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-68783

Immediate Actions Required

  • Apply the upstream Linux kernel patches that introduce the local channel variable and validate it against SND_US16X08_MAX_CHANNELS and ARRAY_SIZE(master_level) before any array write
  • Update to a distribution kernel package that incorporates the fix once released by your vendor
  • On systems that do not require Tascam US-16x08 support, blacklist the snd-usb-us16x08 module to prevent automatic loading
  • Restrict physical and administrative access to USB ports on sensitive hosts to reduce exposure to rogue USB devices

Patch Information

The fix is available in multiple stable branches. Refer to the upstream commits: Kernel commit 2168866396bd, Kernel commit 2f21a7cbaaa9, Kernel commit 53461710a95e, Kernel commit 5526c1c6ba1d, Kernel commit a8ad320efb66, Kernel commit cde47f4ccad6, and Kernel commit eaa95228b8a5. The patches introduce a validated channel variable and reject negative or out-of-range indices before updating any metering array.

Workarounds

  • Blacklist the driver by adding blacklist snd_usb_us16x08 to /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist-us16x08.conf on hosts that do not need the device
  • Enforce USB device allowlisting through tools such as USBGuard to block untrusted devices from binding to kernel drivers
  • Disable USB ports in firmware on high-value endpoints where removable audio hardware is not required
bash
# Configuration example
# Prevent the vulnerable driver from auto-loading
echo "blacklist snd_usb_us16x08" | sudo tee /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist-us16x08.conf
sudo modprobe -r snd_usb_us16x08 2>/dev/null || true

# Verify the module is no longer loaded
lsmod | grep -i us16x08 || echo "snd_usb_us16x08 not loaded"

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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