CVE-2025-52541 Overview
A DLL hijacking vulnerability has been identified in AMD Vivado, a hardware design and synthesis tool used for FPGA and SoC development. This vulnerability allows a local attacker to achieve privilege escalation, potentially resulting in arbitrary code execution on affected systems. The flaw stems from improper control of the search path used to locate DLL files (CWE-427), enabling attackers to plant malicious DLLs that get loaded by the application with elevated privileges.
Critical Impact
Local attackers can exploit this DLL hijacking vulnerability to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code, potentially compromising the integrity of development environments and intellectual property.
Affected Products
- AMD Vivado Design Suite (specific versions not disclosed)
- Systems running Vivado on Windows operating systems
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-02-11 - CVE-2025-52541 published to NVD
- 2026-02-11 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2025-52541
Vulnerability Analysis
This vulnerability is classified as Uncontrolled Search Path Element (CWE-427), a common weakness in Windows applications where the software searches for DLL files in directories that may be under attacker control. When Vivado launches or loads certain components, it attempts to locate required DLL files using a predictable search order that includes directories where a local attacker may have write access.
The local attack vector requires the attacker to have existing access to the target system, but only low privileges are needed to exploit this vulnerability. User interaction is required, meaning a legitimate user must launch or interact with Vivado for the malicious DLL to be loaded. Once triggered, the vulnerability can lead to complete compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected system.
Root Cause
The root cause lies in the improper handling of the DLL search path within Vivado. Windows applications that do not explicitly specify full paths for required DLLs rely on the system's default search order, which typically includes the current working directory and directories in the system PATH environment variable. If Vivado is launched from a directory where an attacker has placed a malicious DLL with the same name as a legitimate dependency, the malicious DLL gets loaded and executed with the privileges of the Vivado process.
Attack Vector
The attack vector is local, requiring the attacker to have some level of access to the target system. The exploitation process typically involves:
- Reconnaissance: The attacker identifies which DLLs Vivado attempts to load and from which locations
- Payload Placement: A malicious DLL with the same name as a missing or later-loaded legitimate DLL is placed in a location that takes precedence in the search order (such as the application's working directory)
- Trigger: The attacker waits for or entices a legitimate user to launch Vivado, causing the malicious DLL to be loaded
- Execution: The malicious code executes with the privileges of the Vivado process, potentially escalating to higher privileges if Vivado runs with elevated permissions
The vulnerability does not currently have known public exploits available, and it is not listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
Detection Methods for CVE-2025-52541
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected DLL files appearing in Vivado installation directories or common working directories
- DLL files with legitimate names but unusual file hashes, sizes, or modification timestamps
- Process execution anomalies where Vivado spawns unexpected child processes
- Network connections originating from Vivado processes to unknown external destinations
Detection Strategies
- Monitor file system activity in Vivado installation directories and common project paths for unexpected DLL creations
- Implement application allowlisting to prevent unauthorized DLLs from being loaded by Vivado
- Use endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to detect DLL side-loading behaviors
- Deploy SentinelOne agents configured to monitor for DLL hijacking attack patterns
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable Windows Sysmon logging for DLL load events (Event ID 7) targeting Vivado processes
- Configure alerts for DLL loads from unusual paths or with unsigned binaries
- Review Vivado process behavior for anomalous code execution or privilege escalation attempts
- Audit user permissions on directories within the DLL search path
How to Mitigate CVE-2025-52541
Immediate Actions Required
- Review the AMD Security Bulletin AMD-SB-8013 for official guidance and patches
- Restrict write access to Vivado installation directories and common working directories
- Run Vivado with least-privilege principles, avoiding elevated permissions when possible
- Implement application control policies to prevent unauthorized DLL loading
Patch Information
AMD has published security bulletin AMD-SB-8013 addressing this vulnerability. Organizations should consult the AMD Security Bulletin for specific patch availability and installation instructions for affected Vivado versions.
Workarounds
- Configure strict NTFS permissions to prevent unauthorized users from writing DLLs to application directories
- Use Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) or AppLocker to restrict DLL loading to signed and trusted binaries only
- Ensure Vivado is always launched from its official installation directory rather than from user-controlled locations
- Implement the SafeDllSearchMode registry setting and review application manifest configurations
- Consider running Vivado in isolated virtual environments for sensitive development work
Administrators can implement DLL search order hardening through Windows Group Policy:
# Enable SafeDllSearchMode to prioritize system directories
Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager" -Name "SafeDllSearchMode" -Value 1 -Type DWord
# Verify the setting
Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager" -Name "SafeDllSearchMode"
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

