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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2025-52541

CVE-2025-52541: Vivado DLL Hijacking Vulnerability

CVE-2025-52541 is a DLL hijacking vulnerability in Vivado that enables local attackers to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation.

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CVE-2025-52541 Overview

CVE-2025-52541 is a DLL hijacking vulnerability in AMD Vivado that allows a local, authenticated attacker to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code. The flaw is categorized under [CWE-427] (Uncontrolled Search Path Element), where the application loads Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) without fully qualifying their paths. An attacker who can place a malicious DLL in a location searched by Vivado can hijack the loading process. Successful exploitation requires user interaction and yields high impact to confidentiality, integrity, and availability. AMD documented the issue in AMD Security Bulletin SB-8013.

Critical Impact

A local attacker with low privileges can achieve arbitrary code execution in the context of the Vivado process, enabling full privilege escalation on the affected host.

Affected Products

  • AMD Vivado (see AMD Security Bulletin SB-8013 for specific versions)
  • AMD Xilinx design tools distributed with Vivado
  • Windows installations of Vivado where DLL search paths include user-writable directories

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-02-11 - CVE-2025-52541 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-52541

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability stems from insecure DLL loading behavior in Vivado. When the application starts, it resolves dependent libraries by walking the Windows DLL search order. If a required DLL is not fully qualified by path, Windows may load a library from the current working directory, the application directory, or other writable locations before reaching the intended system location.

A local attacker plants a malicious DLL with a matching name in a directory that Vivado searches before the legitimate library. When Vivado loads the library, the attacker's code executes in the same security context as the Vivado process. Because engineering workstations often run Vivado with elevated privileges, this yields a direct privilege escalation path.

The issue requires user interaction, meaning the victim must launch Vivado or open a related project file after the malicious DLL is staged. Attack complexity is low, and no network access is required.

Root Cause

The root cause is an uncontrolled search path element [CWE-427]. Vivado invokes library loading APIs without pinning the fully qualified path of the target DLL and without applying restrictive search directives such as LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32 or SetDefaultDllDirectories. This behavior permits substitution of legitimate libraries with attacker-supplied binaries.

Attack Vector

Exploitation proceeds locally. An attacker with an unprivileged account writes a crafted DLL to a directory in Vivado's DLL search order, such as the current working directory of a project file or an application subdirectory with weak Access Control Lists (ACLs). When a user launches Vivado, the malicious DLL loads and runs attacker-controlled code. The technical mechanism is described in AMD Security Bulletin SB-8013. No proof-of-concept exploit is publicly available at the time of publication.

Detection Methods for CVE-2025-52541

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected DLL files present in Vivado installation directories or in directories containing Vivado project files (.xpr).
  • DLLs with names matching known Vivado dependencies but with unusual sizes, unsigned binaries, or non-AMD/Xilinx publishers.
  • Vivado process (vivado.exe) loading modules from user-writable paths rather than the installation directory.

Detection Strategies

  • Monitor process image loads for vivado.exe and related executables, alerting when DLLs load from user profile paths, temporary directories, or project folders.
  • Baseline the legitimate module list for Vivado and flag deviations, including unsigned or newly introduced DLLs.
  • Correlate file-write events for .dll files in engineering workstation project directories with subsequent Vivado process launches.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable Windows Sysmon Event ID 7 (Image Loaded) with filters for Vivado-related processes to capture DLL load telemetry.
  • Forward endpoint image-load and file-creation telemetry to a centralized data lake for retrospective hunting against known Vivado DLL names.
  • Audit ACLs on Vivado installation and project directories, alerting when non-administrative users gain write access.

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-52541

Immediate Actions Required

  • Apply the vendor update referenced in AMD Security Bulletin SB-8013 as soon as it is available for your Vivado version.
  • Restrict write permissions on Vivado installation directories and any directory from which Vivado is launched.
  • Enforce application allowlisting on engineering workstations to block execution of untrusted DLLs.

Patch Information

AMD has published guidance and fixed versions in AMD Security Bulletin SB-8013. Administrators should identify their installed Vivado release, consult the bulletin for the corresponding fixed version, and deploy the update across all affected hosts. Verify successful upgrade by confirming the Vivado version string after patching.

Workarounds

  • Launch Vivado only from trusted directories that unprivileged users cannot write to, avoiding network shares and user download folders.
  • Remove write permissions for standard users on all directories in the Vivado DLL search path, including any custom project directories.
  • Where feasible, run Vivado under a dedicated low-privilege account to limit the impact of successful DLL hijacking.
bash
# Example: audit and harden ACLs on a Vivado project directory (PowerShell)
Get-Acl 'C:\Xilinx\Vivado' | Format-List
icacls 'C:\Xilinx\Vivado' /inheritance:r
icacls 'C:\Xilinx\Vivado' /grant:r 'Administrators:(OI)(CI)F' 'SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)F' 'Users:(OI)(CI)RX'

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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