CVE-2024-8775: Ansible Vault Information Disclosure Flaw

CVE-2024-8775 Overview

A vulnerability has been identified in Ansible where sensitive information stored in Ansible Vault files can be exposed in plaintext during the execution of a playbook. This occurs when using tasks such as include_vars to load vaulted variables without setting the no_log: true parameter, resulting in sensitive data being printed in the playbook output or logs. This can lead to the unintentional disclosure of secrets like passwords or API keys, compromising security and potentially allowing unauthorized access or actions.

Critical Impact

Sensitive credentials including passwords, API keys, and other secrets stored in Ansible Vault can be inadvertently exposed in plaintext through playbook logs, potentially leading to unauthorized access to protected systems and services.

Affected Products

• Ansible Core (all versions prior to patched releases)
• Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform
• Debian Linux distributions with Ansible packages

Discovery Timeline

• 2024-09-14 - CVE-2024-8775 published to NVD
• 2025-11-03 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2024-8775

Vulnerability Analysis

This vulnerability is classified as CWE-532 (Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File). The core issue lies in how Ansible handles the display and logging of variables loaded from encrypted Vault files. When a playbook uses tasks like include_vars to load vaulted variables, Ansible will decrypt the contents at runtime to make them usable. However, without explicit configuration to suppress output, the decrypted values may appear in task output, debug logs, or standard playbook execution results.

The vulnerability requires local access to execute, meaning an attacker would need the ability to view playbook execution logs or terminal output. The impact is focused on confidentiality—sensitive data can be exposed without affecting system integrity or availability. Organizations using Ansible for infrastructure automation frequently store database credentials, cloud provider API keys, SSH private keys, and other sensitive configuration data in Vault files, making this exposure particularly dangerous.

Root Cause

The root cause stems from a design decision in Ansible where vaulted variable contents are not automatically treated as sensitive for logging purposes. When variables are loaded via include_vars or similar mechanisms, Ansible does not inherit or infer that the source was an encrypted Vault file. This means the no_log protection must be explicitly set by the playbook author on each task that handles sensitive data. Without this explicit protection, the standard Ansible output behavior will display variable values during task execution, diff output, and in verbose logging modes.

Attack Vector

The attack vector requires local access to systems where Ansible playbooks are executed. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability through several scenarios:

1. Log File Access: Accessing Ansible Tower/AWX job logs, CI/CD pipeline outputs, or system log files where playbook execution is recorded
2. Screen Observation: Viewing terminal output during playbook execution, particularly in shared environments or recorded sessions
3. Log Aggregation Systems: Extracting secrets from centralized logging platforms (ELK, Splunk, etc.) where Ansible output may be collected
4. CI/CD Artifacts: Accessing build logs from Jenkins, GitLab CI, GitHub Actions, or other automation platforms that execute Ansible playbooks

Since the vulnerability does not require any user interaction and has low attack complexity once local access is obtained, organizations with insufficient log access controls are at elevated risk.

Detection Methods for CVE-2024-8775

Indicators of Compromise

• Unusual access patterns to Ansible Tower/AWX job logs or log storage locations
• Queries against log aggregation systems specifically targeting Ansible playbook output
• Unauthorized access to CI/CD build artifacts containing Ansible execution logs
• Evidence of credential harvesting activities following potential log exposure

Detection Strategies

• Audit all Ansible playbooks for tasks using include_vars, vars_files, or similar modules that load Vault-encrypted content without no_log: true
• Implement log monitoring for patterns matching common secret formats (API keys, tokens, passwords) in Ansible output destinations
• Review access logs for Ansible Tower/AWX to identify unauthorized viewing of job execution details
• Deploy static analysis tools to scan playbook repositories for missing no_log directives on sensitive tasks

Monitoring Recommendations

• Enable access auditing on all systems and services where Ansible playbook logs are stored
• Configure alerts for bulk downloads or unusual access patterns to log aggregation systems
• Implement regular scanning of centralized logs for exposed credential patterns
• Monitor for credential abuse that may indicate secrets were harvested from exposed logs

How to Mitigate CVE-2024-8775

Immediate Actions Required

• Review and update all Ansible playbooks to include no_log: true on tasks that handle Vault-encrypted variables
• Audit existing log files for potential past exposure of sensitive data and rotate any potentially compromised credentials
• Restrict access to Ansible Tower/AWX job logs and CI/CD pipeline outputs to authorized personnel only
• Apply available security patches from Red Hat, Debian, or upstream Ansible

Patch Information

Red Hat has released multiple security advisories addressing this vulnerability. Organizations should apply the appropriate patches based on their deployment:

• Red Hat Security Advisory RHSA-2024:8969
• Red Hat Security Advisory RHSA-2024:9894
• Red Hat Security Advisory RHSA-2024:10762
• Red Hat Security Advisory RHSA-2025:1249

Debian users should refer to the Debian LTS Security Announcement for applicable package updates.

Workarounds

• Add no_log: true to all tasks that load or process Vault-encrypted variables using include_vars, set_fact, or similar modules
• Use ANSIBLE_NO_LOG=true environment variable to suppress logging globally during sensitive playbook executions (note: this may impact troubleshooting)
• Implement output callback plugins that filter sensitive data patterns before logging
• Ensure CI/CD pipelines redirect Ansible output to secured, access-controlled locations rather than public build artifacts

# Secure configuration example for loading Vault variables
- name: Load encrypted database credentials
  include_vars:
    file: vault/database_credentials.yml
  no_log: true

- name: Configure application with secure credentials
  template:
    src: app_config.j2
    dest: /etc/myapp/config.yml
  no_log: true