CVE-2024-55020: Weintek Easyweb RCE Vulnerability

CVE-2024-55020 Overview

CVE-2024-55020 is a command injection vulnerability affecting the DHCP activation feature of the Weintek cMT-3072XH2 Human-Machine Interface (HMI). The flaw resides in easyweb Web Version v2.1.53 running on firmware v20231011. Attackers can inject arbitrary operating system commands through the DHCP activation interface and execute them with root privileges. The vulnerability is reachable over the network without authentication or user interaction, making the affected industrial control panel a high-value target in operational technology (OT) environments. Weintek HMIs are widely deployed in factory automation, building management, and process control systems, so successful exploitation can cascade into broader industrial network compromise.

Critical Impact
Unauthenticated attackers can execute arbitrary commands as root on the HMI, gaining full control of the device and a foothold into OT networks.

Affected Products

Weintek easyweb Web Version v2.1.53
Weintek cMT-3072XH2 firmware version 20231011
Weintek cMT-3072XH2 HMI hardware

Discovery Timeline

2026-03-03 - CVE-2024-55020 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
2026-03-04 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2024-55020

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability is classified under [CWE-20] Improper Input Validation. The DHCP activation feature in the easyweb web management interface accepts user-supplied input and passes it to an underlying operating system shell without adequate sanitization or argument quoting. An attacker can inject shell metacharacters such as ;, &&, |, or backticks into a DHCP-related parameter to break out of the intended command context. The injected payload executes within the HMI's web service process, which runs as root on the embedded Linux firmware. This enables full command-line access to the HMI, including the ability to read configuration data, modify control logic, pivot to PLCs, or install persistent implants. Because the attack vector is network-based and requires no authentication, any actor with reachability to the HMI's web interface can exploit the issue.

Root Cause

The root cause is the construction of a shell command string that concatenates untrusted input from the DHCP activation request into a system call. The firmware does not enforce an allowlist of characters, nor does it use safer parameterized execution APIs that separate the command from its arguments. Embedded HMI firmware frequently invokes utilities such as udhcpc, ifconfig, or ip from CGI handlers; injecting metacharacters into the arguments of these calls allows arbitrary command execution.

Attack Vector

An attacker reaches the easyweb HTTP interface over the network and submits a crafted DHCP activation request with shell metacharacters embedded in a request parameter. The web backend interpolates the value into a shell command and executes it as root. No credentials, tokens, or user interaction are required. See the GitHub Gist Code Example and the Notion Document Security Overview for the published technical writeup.

Detection Methods for CVE-2024-55020

Indicators of Compromise

HTTP requests to the easyweb interface containing shell metacharacters (;, |, &, backticks, $()) within DHCP-related parameters.
Unexpected child processes spawned by the HMI web service, such as sh, wget, curl, nc, or busybox invocations.
Outbound connections from the HMI to unknown IP addresses, particularly on non-industrial ports.
New or modified files in writable firmware directories (for example /tmp, /var) following a DHCP configuration change.

Detection Strategies

Inspect web server and reverse proxy logs for DHCP activation requests containing non-alphanumeric characters in network configuration fields.
Apply network intrusion detection signatures that flag command injection patterns directed at Weintek HMI HTTP endpoints.
Baseline normal HMI process trees and alert on deviations such as shell or download utility execution.

Monitoring Recommendations

Capture and retain full HTTP request bodies sent to the HMI management interface for forensic review.
Monitor north-south and east-west traffic between the IT network and OT segments for anomalous flows originating from HMIs.
Alert on any administrative configuration changes to DHCP settings on production HMIs outside change windows.

How to Mitigate CVE-2024-55020

Immediate Actions Required

Remove the easyweb management interface from any network reachable by untrusted users, including the corporate LAN and the internet.
Place the cMT-3072XH2 behind a firewall that restricts HTTP access to a small set of authorized engineering workstations.
Audit recent DHCP activation requests and HMI process activity for signs of exploitation.
Rotate any credentials, certificates, or shared secrets stored on the HMI if compromise is suspected.

Patch Information

No vendor advisory or fixed firmware version is referenced in the published CVE record. Operators should contact Weintek directly to obtain remediation guidance and updated firmware for the cMT-3072XH2 platform. Continue monitoring the NVD entry for CVE-2024-55020 for updates.

Workarounds

Enforce strict network segmentation between IT and OT zones following the Purdue Model, isolating HMIs in Level 2.
Require VPN or jump-host access for any administrative interaction with the HMI web interface.
Disable the DHCP activation feature where feasible and configure network parameters statically.
Deploy an industrial protocol-aware firewall or IPS in front of the HMI to drop requests containing shell metacharacters.

bash

# Example: restrict HMI web interface to a single engineering workstation
# Replace 10.0.10.25 with the authorized admin host and eth1 with the OT-facing interface
iptables -A INPUT -i eth1 -p tcp --dport 80 -s 10.0.10.25 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -i eth1 -p tcp --dport 80 -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -i eth1 -p tcp --dport 443 -s 10.0.10.25 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -i eth1 -p tcp --dport 443 -j DROP