CVE-2024-27869 Overview
CVE-2024-27869 is a privacy vulnerability affecting Apple iOS, iPadOS, and macOS. The flaw allows an application to record the screen without triggering the visual indicator that normally alerts users to active screen capture. Apple addressed the issue with improved checks in iOS 18, iPadOS 18, and macOS Sequoia 15.
The vulnerability requires local access and user interaction, limiting remote exploitation. However, a malicious app installed on the device can silently capture sensitive on-screen content including credentials, messages, and financial data. The issue is tracked under [CWE-22] and an additional NVD-CWE-noinfo classification.
Critical Impact
A malicious app can silently record screen contents on affected Apple devices without notifying the user, enabling covert capture of sensitive information displayed on-screen.
Affected Products
- Apple iOS (versions prior to iOS 18)
- Apple iPadOS (versions prior to iPadOS 18)
- Apple macOS (versions prior to macOS Sequoia 15)
Discovery Timeline
- 2024-09-17 - CVE-2024-27869 published to NVD
- 2025-11-04 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2024-27869
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability resides in the screen recording subsystem of Apple operating systems. Apple platforms display a visible indicator, such as a colored status bar or menu bar icon, whenever an application captures screen contents. This indicator is a core privacy control designed to inform users of active screen capture.
The flaw allowed an application to invoke screen recording functionality without engaging the indicator logic. As a result, users had no visual cue that their screen was being captured. Apple's advisory describes the fix as the addition of improved checks, indicating a missing or insufficient validation step in the path that activates the recording indicator.
The issue is local in nature and requires user interaction, typically the installation and launch of an untrusted application. Successful exploitation yields high confidentiality impact, though integrity and availability are not affected.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper validation in the screen capture pipeline. The operating system failed to consistently associate active screen recording sessions with the user-facing indicator. This decoupling allowed an app to bypass the privacy notification while still receiving screen frame data.
Attack Vector
An attacker must first deliver a malicious application to the victim's device, typically through sideloading, an untrusted developer profile, or a deceptive App Store submission. Once launched, the app invokes the screen recording APIs in a manner that avoids triggering the indicator. The app then exfiltrates captured frames to an attacker-controlled endpoint.
This vulnerability is particularly relevant in scenarios involving spyware, surveillanceware, and targeted attacks against high-value individuals. Detailed technical discussion is available in the Full Disclosure Mailing List Post #32 and Full Disclosure Mailing List Post #33.
Detection Methods for CVE-2024-27869
Indicators of Compromise
- Applications invoking CGDisplayStream, ScreenCaptureKit, or ReplayKit APIs without a corresponding visible indicator in system logs
- Unexpected outbound network traffic from third-party apps containing large data payloads consistent with image or video frames
- Apps requesting screen recording entitlements that do not align with their stated functionality
- Background processes maintaining persistent capture sessions on macOS systems running versions prior to Sequoia 15
Detection Strategies
- Audit installed applications for those declaring screen recording entitlements in their Info.plist and validate legitimacy against vendor claims
- Review macOS Unified Logs for TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) subsystem entries related to screen capture authorization
- Correlate process activity with network egress to identify apps performing capture and exfiltration simultaneously
- Inspect Mobile Device Management (MDM) telemetry for installation of unsigned or untrusted developer-profile applications
Monitoring Recommendations
- Deploy MDM policies that block installation of apps from untrusted developers and require App Store provenance
- Monitor endpoints for OS version compliance and flag devices running iOS, iPadOS, or macOS versions earlier than the patched releases
- Centralize macOS endpoint telemetry into a SIEM platform for behavioral analysis of capture-related API usage
- Establish baselines for legitimate screen recording activity and alert on deviations
How to Mitigate CVE-2024-27869
Immediate Actions Required
- Update all Apple devices to iOS 18, iPadOS 18, or macOS Sequoia 15 or later immediately
- Audit installed third-party applications and remove any that lack a clear, legitimate need for screen recording access
- Revoke screen recording permissions for non-essential apps under System Settings > Privacy & Security > Screen & System Audio Recording on macOS
- Enforce MDM policies that restrict sideloaded applications and untrusted developer certificates
Patch Information
Apple released fixes in iOS 18, iPadOS 18, and macOS Sequoia 15. Detailed patch information is available in Apple Support Article #121238 and Apple Support Article #121250. The fix introduces improved checks in the screen recording subsystem to ensure the user-facing indicator activates whenever a capture session begins.
Workarounds
- Avoid installing applications from sources outside the official App Store on iOS and iPadOS
- On macOS, deny screen recording permission to any application that does not have a documented business need
- Use Lockdown Mode on iOS and iPadOS for high-risk users to reduce attack surface
- Conduct periodic privacy permission audits across managed Apple fleets
# Verify macOS version meets the patched baseline
sw_vers -productVersion
# List apps with screen recording permission on macOS
sudo sqlite3 "/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db" \
"SELECT client FROM access WHERE service='kTCCServiceScreenCapture';"
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

