CVE-2024-1740 Overview
A critical authorization bypass vulnerability exists in lunary-ai/lunary version 1.0.1 that allows users who have been removed from an organization to continue accessing and manipulating data using previously issued authorization tokens. The Lunary web application communicates with the server using an 'Authorization' token stored in the browser, which fails to properly invalidate when a user is removed from the organization. This improper authorization mechanism enables removed users to perform unauthorized actions including reading, creating, modifying, and deleting logs, as well as accessing project and external user details without valid permissions.
Critical Impact
Removed organization members can maintain persistent unauthorized access to sensitive logs and project data, potentially leading to data breaches, compliance violations, and unauthorized modifications to audit trails.
Affected Products
- Lunary lunary version 1.0.1
- Lunary AI/ML observability platform
- Self-hosted and cloud deployments of affected Lunary versions
Discovery Timeline
- 2024-04-10 - CVE-2024-1740 published to NVD
- 2025-01-10 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2024-1740
Vulnerability Analysis
This vulnerability represents a classic Broken Access Control flaw (CWE-863) where the authorization mechanism fails to account for changes in user membership status. When a user is removed from a Lunary organization, their existing authorization tokens remain valid and can be reused to perform privileged operations. The application does not implement proper token invalidation or real-time permission verification against the current organization membership state.
The impact is significant because the Lunary platform is designed for LLM observability, meaning the compromised data could include sensitive AI model interactions, prompts, completions, and operational logs. An attacker exploiting this vulnerability could exfiltrate proprietary AI development data, tamper with logs to cover tracks or manipulate audit trails, and gain visibility into organizational AI initiatives they should no longer have access to.
Root Cause
The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the improper implementation of authorization token lifecycle management. The application's authentication system issues long-lived authorization tokens that are not properly invalidated or re-validated when user permissions change. Specifically, the authorization middleware does not perform real-time checks against the current organization membership database before granting access to protected resources. This creates a window where stale tokens retain their original privileges indefinitely.
Attack Vector
An attacker who was previously a legitimate member of a Lunary organization can exploit this vulnerability by:
- Capturing their authorization token before being removed from the organization (stored in browser localStorage or intercepted via browser developer tools)
- Being removed from the organization by an administrator
- Using the captured token in subsequent API requests to the Lunary backend
- Performing unauthorized operations on logs, projects, and user data as if they were still an active member
The attack requires no special tools beyond standard HTTP request capabilities. The attacker simply needs to preserve their token and include it in the Authorization header of API requests after their access has been revoked.
Detection Methods for CVE-2024-1740
Indicators of Compromise
- API requests from removed users identified by correlating user removal events with subsequent authenticated API activity
- Authorization tokens being used from unexpected IP addresses or geographic locations after user deprovisioning
- Anomalous access patterns to logs or project data from accounts that should have been deactivated
- Multiple failed re-authentication attempts followed by successful API access using cached tokens
Detection Strategies
- Implement logging correlation between user management events (removals, permission changes) and subsequent API access patterns
- Deploy anomaly detection to identify API activity from users whose organization membership has changed
- Monitor for authorization tokens that have abnormally long active lifespans compared to user session expectations
- Create alerts for data access or modification operations performed by users no longer listed in organization membership
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable comprehensive audit logging for all authorization-related events including token issuance, validation, and user membership changes
- Implement real-time monitoring of API access patterns with correlation to identity management systems
- Configure alerting thresholds for detecting access from revoked user accounts within reasonable detection windows
- Regularly audit active sessions and tokens against current organization membership rosters
How to Mitigate CVE-2024-1740
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Lunary to a patched version that includes the fix from commit c57cd50fa0477fd2a2efe60810c0099eebd66f54
- Force invalidation of all existing authorization tokens and require re-authentication for all active users
- Audit access logs to identify any potentially unauthorized access from removed users
- Review organization membership history and correlate with recent data access patterns
Patch Information
The vulnerability has been addressed by the Lunary development team. The fix is available in the GitHub commit c57cd50. Organizations running affected versions should update to the latest release that incorporates this security fix. The patch implements proper token invalidation upon user removal from organizations. Additional details about the vulnerability disclosure can be found in the Huntr bounty report.
Workarounds
- Implement network-level access controls to restrict API access to known-good IP ranges until patching is complete
- Deploy a reverse proxy or API gateway that performs additional authorization checks against a current membership database
- Establish a manual process to invalidate all sessions when users are removed from organizations
- Consider implementing short-lived tokens with frequent re-authentication requirements as a temporary measure
# Example: Force token invalidation for a specific organization
# Check your Lunary deployment documentation for specific commands
# Review recent user removal events
grep "user_removed" /var/log/lunary/audit.log | tail -50
# Identify potentially compromised sessions (example query)
# SELECT * FROM sessions WHERE user_id IN (
# SELECT user_id FROM org_removals WHERE removed_at > NOW() - INTERVAL '30 days'
# ) AND last_activity > removed_at;
# Restart services after applying patches
systemctl restart lunary-api
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

