CVE-2020-6007: Philips Hue Bridge V2 RCE Vulnerability

CVE-2020-6007 Overview

CVE-2020-6007 is a heap-based buffer overflow in the Philips Hue Bridge model 2.X firmware. The flaw resides in the Zigbee Cluster Library (ZCL) string handling code executed during the device commissioning phase. An attacker within Zigbee radio range can send an over-length ZCL string to trigger memory corruption and achieve remote code execution on the bridge. Successful exploitation gives the attacker control over the Hue Bridge and a foothold on the target's IP network. The vulnerability affects Philips Hue Bridge V2 firmware versions up to and including 1935144020. It is tracked under [CWE-122] Heap-based Buffer Overflow and [CWE-787] Out-of-bounds Write.

Critical Impact
Remote code execution on the Philips Hue Bridge over Zigbee, enabling lateral movement from an IoT lighting device into the victim's home or enterprise network.

Affected Products

Philips Hue Bridge V2 (hardware)
Philips Hue Bridge V2 firmware versions up to and including 1935144020
Hue ecosystems relying on the vulnerable bridge for Zigbee-to-IP translation

Discovery Timeline

2020-01-23 - CVE-2020-6007 published to NVD
2024-11-21 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2020-6007

Vulnerability Analysis

The Philips Hue Bridge acts as a gateway between Zigbee-connected bulbs and the IP network. During commissioning, the bridge parses ZCL frames sent by joining devices. The vulnerable parser copies a ZCL string field into a fixed-size heap buffer without validating the declared length against the destination size.

When the supplied string exceeds the buffer, the write spills onto adjacent heap metadata and objects. An attacker who controls a malicious Zigbee device on an adjacent radio segment can shape the overflow contents to hijack control flow on the bridge's processor. The result is arbitrary code execution in the context of the bridge firmware, which sits inside the user's trusted network.

The bug is classified under [CWE-122] (Heap-based Buffer Overflow) and [CWE-787] (Out-of-bounds Write). Exploitation requires user interaction, because the victim must initiate commissioning of the rogue bulb, typically after the attacker manipulates the legitimate bulb's behavior to encourage a reset.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing length validation in the ZCL string-handling routine. The firmware trusts the length field embedded in attacker-controlled Zigbee traffic and copies the payload into a smaller heap allocation. This violates safe-copy invariants and corrupts heap chunks beyond the buffer boundary.

Attack Vector

The attack vector is adjacent network (Zigbee radio range). The attacker first compromises a nearby Hue-compatible bulb, then uses it to advertise crafted ZCL commissioning data to the targeted bridge. Refer to the Check Point Research write-up for the full exploitation chain.

// No verified public exploit code is available for CVE-2020-6007.
// See Check Point Research for the technical analysis of the
// ZCL string handler and heap overflow primitive.

Detection Methods for CVE-2020-6007

Indicators of Compromise

Hue Bridge devices running firmware at or below version 1935144020 that have not received the vendor update
Unexpected Zigbee re-commissioning events for bulbs that previously functioned normally
Outbound connections from the Hue Bridge IP address to unfamiliar internet hosts or scanning of internal subnets

Detection Strategies

Inventory IoT assets and flag Philips Hue Bridge V2 devices reporting vulnerable firmware versions
Monitor network segments hosting IoT devices for anomalous east-west traffic originating from the bridge
Correlate Zigbee bulb misbehavior reports from end users with subsequent commissioning activity on the bridge

Monitoring Recommendations

Forward DHCP, DNS, and NetFlow telemetry from IoT VLANs into a centralized analytics platform for behavioral baselining
Alert on the Hue Bridge initiating connections to non-Philips cloud endpoints or to internal management interfaces
Track firmware version reporting from the Hue cloud API or local API to confirm patch deployment

How to Mitigate CVE-2020-6007

Immediate Actions Required

Confirm the Hue Bridge has automatic firmware updates enabled and is running a version newer than 1935144020
Isolate Hue Bridge devices on a dedicated IoT VLAN with no routing to sensitive corporate or personal subnets
Investigate any Hue bulb that recently exhibited unexpected color, brightness, or availability changes

Patch Information

Philips released firmware later than version 1935144020 that fixes the ZCL string handling defect. Apply the update through the Hue mobile application or confirm via the bridge web interface. See the Philips Hue Bridge release notes for current firmware information.

Workarounds

Disable Zigbee commissioning when not actively pairing new devices to reduce exposure to crafted commissioning traffic
Place the Hue Bridge behind a firewall policy that restricts inbound and outbound traffic to required Philips services only
Decommission Hue Bridge V2 hardware that can no longer receive vendor updates

bash

# Verify the bridge firmware version via the local Hue API
curl -s http://<hue-bridge-ip>/api/<username>/config \
  | jq '{name, swversion, apiversion, modelid}'

# Expected: swversion greater than 1935144020