CVE-2026-32982 Overview
CVE-2026-32982 is an information disclosure vulnerability affecting OpenClaw, a Node.js application, in versions prior to 2026.3.13. The vulnerability exists in the fetchRemoteMedia function, which exposes sensitive Telegram bot tokens in error messages. When media downloads fail, the original Telegram file URLs—containing embedded bot tokens—are included in MediaFetchError strings and subsequently leaked to application logs and error surfaces.
This vulnerability falls under CWE-532 (Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File), representing a significant security concern for organizations using OpenClaw with Telegram bot integrations. Attackers who gain access to logs or error outputs can extract valid bot tokens, potentially leading to unauthorized bot control and further exploitation of connected systems.
Critical Impact
Exposed Telegram bot tokens can allow attackers to impersonate bots, access private channels, exfiltrate data, and potentially pivot to other connected services. This information disclosure can serve as a stepping stone for more severe attacks against the affected infrastructure.
Affected Products
- OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.3.13
- OpenClaw Node.js deployments with Telegram bot integration
- Systems using OpenClaw's fetchRemoteMedia function for Telegram media handling
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-03-31 - CVE-2026-32982 published to NVD
- 2026-04-02 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-32982
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability is rooted in improper error handling within OpenClaw's media fetching subsystem. When the application attempts to download remote media from Telegram servers and encounters a failure, the error handling logic constructs a MediaFetchError that includes the full Telegram file URL. These URLs inherently contain the bot token as part of the Telegram Bot API URL structure (e.g., https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/getFile).
The problematic code path occurs in src/telegram/bot/delivery.resolve-media.ts, where failed media fetch operations propagate the raw URL through the error chain. This results in bot tokens being written to:
- Application logs
- Error response bodies
- Monitoring and alerting systems
- Debugging outputs
Root Cause
The root cause is insufficient sanitization of sensitive data before inclusion in error messages. The fetchRemoteMedia function and associated transport layer did not strip or redact bot tokens from URLs before embedding them in exception messages. The error handling design prioritized debugging convenience over security, treating the full URL as useful diagnostic information without considering the credential exposure implications.
Attack Vector
This vulnerability is exploitable over the network without requiring authentication or user interaction. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability through several scenarios:
- Log File Access: Gaining read access to application logs through separate vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, or insider access
- Error Response Harvesting: Triggering media download failures and observing error responses if they are exposed to clients
- Monitoring System Compromise: Accessing centralized logging platforms (e.g., ELK stack, Splunk) where error messages are aggregated
Once a bot token is extracted, an attacker can:
- Send messages as the bot
- Read messages in channels where the bot has access
- Download files shared with the bot
- Modify bot settings and webhooks
The patch addresses this by introducing fallback handling mechanisms that avoid exposing raw Telegram URLs in error surfaces:
return true;
}
+export function shouldRetryTelegramIpv4Fallback(err: unknown): boolean {
+ return shouldRetryWithIpv4Fallback(err);
+}
+
// Prefer wrapped fetch when available to normalize AbortSignal across runtimes.
export type TelegramTransport = {
fetch: typeof fetch;
sourceFetch: typeof fetch;
pinnedDispatcherPolicy?: PinnedDispatcherPolicy;
+ fallbackPinnedDispatcherPolicy?: PinnedDispatcherPolicy;
};
export function resolveTelegramTransport(
Source: GitHub Commit Update
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-32982
Indicators of Compromise
- Presence of Telegram bot API URLs containing tokens in application logs (pattern: api.telegram.org/bot[A-Za-z0-9:_-]+/)
- Unusual or unauthorized API calls using your organization's Telegram bot tokens
- Evidence of log file access or exfiltration from affected OpenClaw deployments
- Unexpected bot behavior or messages originating from compromised bot tokens
Detection Strategies
- Implement log scanning rules to detect Telegram bot token patterns in error logs and alert on matches
- Monitor Telegram bot API usage for anomalous activity such as unexpected IP addresses or unusual request volumes
- Enable file integrity monitoring on OpenClaw log directories to detect unauthorized access
- Review application error handling paths for credential exposure in stack traces and error messages
Monitoring Recommendations
- Configure SIEM rules to alert on regex patterns matching Telegram bot tokens in log streams
- Implement rate limiting and anomaly detection on Telegram bot API endpoints
- Establish baseline bot activity metrics and alert on deviations
- Regularly audit log retention and access controls to minimize exposure windows
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-32982
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade OpenClaw to version 2026.3.13 or later immediately
- Rotate all Telegram bot tokens that may have been exposed in logs prior to patching
- Audit existing logs for exposed tokens and securely purge affected log entries
- Review access controls on log storage systems to limit potential exposure
Patch Information
The vulnerability has been addressed in OpenClaw version 2026.3.13. The security fix is available through the GitHub Commit Update with commit hash 7a53eb7ea8295b08be137e231c9a98c1a79b5cd5. Additional details are available in the GitHub Security Advisory.
The patch modifies the transport layer in src/telegram/fetch.ts and src/telegram/bot/delivery.resolve-media.ts to implement IPv4 fallback retry logic and improved error handling that prevents token leakage.
Workarounds
- Implement log sanitization filters to redact Telegram bot token patterns before log persistence
- Configure error handling middleware to strip sensitive URL parameters from error messages
- Restrict log file access to essential personnel only using file system permissions
- Consider proxying Telegram API requests through an intermediary service that handles tokens server-side
# Example log sanitization filter for rsyslog
# Add to /etc/rsyslog.d/openclaw-sanitize.conf
:msg, regex, "api\\.telegram\\.org/bot[A-Za-z0-9:_-]+/" ~
# This drops log messages containing Telegram bot URLs
# Alternatively, use sed-based replacement in log processing pipelines
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.


