CVE-2024-41817: ImageMagick AppImage RCE Vulnerability

CVE-2024-41817 Overview

CVE-2024-41817 is an Uncontrolled Search Path Element vulnerability (CWE-427) affecting the AppImage version of ImageMagick, a widely-used open-source software suite for editing and manipulating digital images. The vulnerability arises from improper handling of environment variables MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH and LD_LIBRARY_PATH, which may include empty path elements during execution. This flaw enables attackers to achieve arbitrary code execution by placing malicious configuration files or shared libraries in the current working directory where ImageMagick is executed.

Critical Impact

Local attackers with low privileges can execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running ImageMagick by exploiting empty path elements in environment variables, potentially leading to complete system compromise.

Affected Products

• ImageMagick AppImage versions prior to 7.11-36
• Linux systems running vulnerable ImageMagick AppImage distributions
• Any system executing ImageMagick AppImage from untrusted directories

Discovery Timeline

• July 29, 2024 - CVE-2024-41817 published to NVD
• November 20, 2025 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2024-41817

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability exists in the AppRun script that launches the ImageMagick AppImage. When constructing environment variable paths, the script incorrectly appended colons before checking if the existing environment variables had values. This resulted in empty path elements being included in MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, MAGICK_HOME, MANPATH, and INFOPATH.

In Unix-like systems, an empty path element (represented by a leading, trailing, or double colon in a path variable) is interpreted as the current working directory (.). This means when ImageMagick searches for configuration files or shared libraries, it would also search the current working directory, allowing an attacker to inject malicious files.

The vulnerable code used constructs like "$HERE/usr:${MAGICK_HOME:+:$MAGICK_HOME}" which would result in a trailing colon (empty path) when MAGICK_HOME was not set.

Root Cause

The root cause is improper shell parameter expansion in the AppRun script. The original code unconditionally placed colons in the path strings before the conditional expansion operator (${VAR:+:$VAR}), which should only add the colon separator when the variable has a value. When environment variables like MAGICK_HOME or MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH were unset or empty, this resulted in trailing or embedded empty path elements that the system interprets as the current working directory.

Attack Vector

The attack requires local access and low privileges. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by:

1. Identifying a directory where a user is likely to execute the ImageMagick AppImage
2. Placing a malicious shared library (.so file) or ImageMagick configuration file in that directory
3. Waiting for a victim to execute the ImageMagick AppImage from that directory
4. The malicious code executes with the victim's privileges when ImageMagick loads the attacker-controlled file

The security patch corrects this by removing the unconditional colons:

 
HERE="$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${0}")")"
 
-export MAGICK_HOME="$HERE/usr:${MAGICK_HOME:+:$MAGICK_HOME}" # https://imagemagick.org/QuickStart.txt
-export MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH=$(readlink -f "$HERE/usr/lib/ImageMagick-7.1.1/config-Q16"):$(readlink -f "$HERE/usr/lib/ImageMagick-7.1.1/config-Q16HDRI"):$(readlink -f "$HERE/usr/share/ImageMagick-7"):$(readlink -f "$HERE/usr/etc/ImageMagick-7"):${MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH:+:$MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH} # Wildcards don't work
+export MAGICK_HOME="$HERE/usr${MAGICK_HOME:+:$MAGICK_HOME}" # https://imagemagick.org/QuickStart.txt
+export MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH=$(readlink -f "$HERE/usr/lib/ImageMagick-7.1.1/config-Q16"):$(readlink -f "$HERE/usr/lib/ImageMagick-7.1.1/config-Q16HDRI"):$(readlink -f "$HERE/usr/share/ImageMagick-7"):$(readlink -f "$HERE/usr/etc/ImageMagick-7")${MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH:+:$MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH} # Wildcards don't work
 
export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$(readlink -f "$HERE/usr/lib")${LD_LIBRARY_PATH:+:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH}
export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=${HERE}/usr/lib/ImageMagick-7.1.1/modules-Q16HDRI/coders${LD_LIBRARY_PATH:+:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH}
 
if [ "$1" == "man" ] ; then
-  export MANPATH="$HERE/usr/share/man:${MANPATH:+:$MANPATH}" ; exec "$@" ; exit $?
+  export MANPATH="$HERE/usr/share/man${MANPATH:+:$MANPATH}" ; exec "$@" ; exit $?
elif [ "$1" == "info" ] ; then
-  export INFOPATH="$HERE/usr/share/info:${INFOPATH:+:$INFOPATH}" ; exec "$@" ; exit $?
+  export INFOPATH="$HERE/usr/share/info${INFOPATH:+:$INFOPATH}" ; exec "$@" ; exit $?
fi
 
if [ -n "$APPIMAGE" ] ; then

Source: GitHub ImageMagick Commit

Detection Methods for CVE-2024-41817

Indicators of Compromise

• Unexpected .so (shared library) files in directories where ImageMagick AppImage is commonly executed
• Suspicious ImageMagick configuration files (policy.xml, delegates.xml, colors.xml) in user-writable directories
• Unusual process behavior or network connections spawned from ImageMagick processes
• File system modifications in common working directories coinciding with ImageMagick execution

Detection Strategies

• Monitor for the creation of .so files or ImageMagick configuration files in temporary directories, download folders, or other user-writable locations
• Implement file integrity monitoring on directories where ImageMagick is frequently executed
• Use endpoint detection to track library loading patterns and flag shared libraries loaded from current working directories
• Audit LD_LIBRARY_PATH and MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH environment variables for empty path elements during ImageMagick execution

Monitoring Recommendations

• Enable process monitoring with SentinelOne to detect anomalous library loads during ImageMagick execution
• Configure alerts for new executable content (.so files) appearing in non-standard directories
• Monitor for privilege escalation attempts following ImageMagick process execution
• Track file creation events in directories commonly used for image processing workflows

How to Mitigate CVE-2024-41817

Immediate Actions Required

• Upgrade ImageMagick AppImage to version 7.11-36 or later immediately
• Avoid executing ImageMagick AppImage from untrusted directories or directories containing user-uploaded content
• Audit systems for unauthorized .so files or configuration files in common working directories
• Consider using the standard package manager installation of ImageMagick rather than the AppImage format until patched

Patch Information

The vulnerability is fixed in ImageMagick version 7.11-36. The fix is available in the official commit which corrects the environment variable path construction to eliminate empty path elements. Organizations should update to the patched version immediately. For detailed information, refer to the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-8rxc-922v-phg8.

Workarounds

• Execute ImageMagick AppImage only from trusted directories with restricted write permissions
• Set MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH and LD_LIBRARY_PATH explicitly before running ImageMagick to override the vulnerable defaults
• Use standard package-installed ImageMagick instead of the AppImage version
• Implement directory-level access controls to prevent unauthorized file placement in ImageMagick execution directories

# Explicitly set safe paths before running ImageMagick AppImage
export MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH="/usr/lib/ImageMagick-7/config"
export LD_LIBRARY_PATH="/usr/lib"
# Run ImageMagick from a safe directory
cd /opt/imagemagick && ./ImageMagick.AppImage convert input.png output.jpg