CVE-2024-39936 Overview
CVE-2024-39936 is a Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition vulnerability discovered in the HTTP/2 implementation within the Qt framework. The vulnerability occurs when security-relevant decisions about an established connection are made prematurely, before the encrypted() signal has been emitted and properly processed. This timing issue creates a window where applications may operate under the assumption that a secure connection is established when encryption has not yet been verified.
Critical Impact
Applications using Qt's HTTP/2 implementation may make security-critical decisions before TLS encryption is properly established, potentially exposing sensitive data transmitted over what the application believes is a secure connection.
Affected Products
- Qt versions before 5.15.18
- Qt versions 6.x before 6.2.13
- Qt versions 6.3.x through 6.5.x before 6.5.7
- Qt versions 6.6.x through 6.7.x before 6.7.3
Discovery Timeline
- 2024-07-04 - CVE-2024-39936 published to NVD
- 2025-11-29 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2024-39936
Vulnerability Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-367 (Time-of-Check Time-of-Use Race Condition). The core issue lies in the HTTP/2 implementation where the timing of security-critical operations is not properly synchronized with the TLS handshake completion. When an application establishes an HTTP/2 connection, it relies on Qt's signal mechanism to determine when the connection is securely encrypted. However, the code path that makes security decisions can execute before the encrypted() signal is emitted, creating a race condition.
The vulnerability affects network-based communications and requires the attacker to be in a position to intercept or observe network traffic. While the attack complexity is high due to the timing-dependent nature of the race condition, successful exploitation could lead to exposure of confidential information that the application intended to transmit over an encrypted channel.
Root Cause
The root cause is a synchronization flaw in Qt's HTTP/2 implementation where security-sensitive code paths do not properly wait for the TLS encryption confirmation. The encrypted() signal, which indicates that the secure connection is fully established, is emitted asynchronously. Application code that depends on this signal to make security decisions may execute prematurely if the signal connection and processing are not properly ordered. This creates a TOCTOU vulnerability where the security state is checked (or assumed) at one point in time but has changed by the time the operation depending on that state executes.
Attack Vector
The attack vector is network-based, requiring an attacker to have a position allowing them to observe or intercept network communications between the vulnerable Qt application and its intended server. An attacker could potentially exploit this vulnerability through man-in-the-middle positioning during the critical window between connection initiation and encryption signal processing. The attack does not require user interaction or elevated privileges, but the high complexity comes from the need to precisely time the attack to coincide with the race condition window.
The vulnerability primarily impacts confidentiality, as sensitive data intended for encrypted transmission could be exposed during the window where the application incorrectly assumes the connection is secure.
Detection Methods for CVE-2024-39936
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected plaintext data transmission from applications expected to use encrypted HTTP/2 connections
- Network traffic anomalies showing HTTP/2 connections being established without proper TLS encryption verification
- Application logs indicating premature data transmission before encrypted() signal confirmation
Detection Strategies
- Monitor Qt-based applications for HTTP/2 connection patterns, specifically looking for data transmission timing relative to TLS handshake completion
- Implement network-level monitoring to detect unencrypted data flows from applications that should be using encrypted HTTP/2
- Review application code that handles Qt's encrypted() signal to ensure proper synchronization
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable detailed logging for TLS handshake events in Qt applications
- Deploy network traffic analysis to identify timing anomalies in HTTP/2 connection establishment
- Monitor for Qt version information in application inventories to identify vulnerable deployments
How to Mitigate CVE-2024-39936
Immediate Actions Required
- Update Qt to a patched version: 5.15.18 or later, 6.2.13 or later, 6.5.7 or later, or 6.7.3 or later
- Review applications using Qt's HTTP/2 functionality to ensure they properly handle the encrypted() signal before transmitting sensitive data
- Rebuild and redeploy applications using updated Qt libraries
- Conduct security testing on updated applications to verify the race condition is resolved
Patch Information
The Qt Project has released patches addressing this vulnerability across all affected version branches. The fix is available through the Qt Project Code Review. The patch corrects the signal timing issue to ensure that security-relevant decisions are not made until after the encrypted() signal has been properly emitted and processed.
Linux distributions have also backported fixes, with Debian releasing an update as documented in the Debian LTS Announcement.
Workarounds
- Implement application-level checks to explicitly verify TLS encryption status before transmitting sensitive data
- Add synchronization logic in application code to ensure the encrypted() signal is received and processed before proceeding with security-sensitive operations
- Consider using alternative HTTP client implementations if immediate Qt upgrades are not feasible
- Deploy network-level encryption (VPN or other tunneling) as an additional layer of protection for sensitive communications
# Verify Qt version to check if update is needed
qmake --version
# Or check via pkg-config
pkg-config --modversion Qt5Core
pkg-config --modversion Qt6Core
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.


