CVE-2024-22253 Overview
CVE-2024-22253 is a use-after-free vulnerability affecting VMware ESXi, Workstation, and Fusion products within the UHCI (Universal Host Controller Interface) USB controller component. A malicious actor with local administrative privileges on a virtual machine may exploit this issue to execute code as the virtual machine's VMX process running on the host. The impact varies by product: on ESXi, exploitation is contained within the VMX sandbox, while on Workstation and Fusion, successful exploitation may lead to code execution on the machine where Workstation or Fusion is installed.
Critical Impact
This vulnerability enables VM escape scenarios on Workstation and Fusion, allowing attackers with VM admin access to execute arbitrary code on the host system. Organizations running desktop virtualization products should prioritize patching immediately.
Affected Products
- VMware ESXi 7.0 (all update versions through Update 3o)
- VMware ESXi 8.0 (through Update 2)
- VMware Workstation (affected versions)
- VMware Fusion (affected versions on macOS)
- VMware Cloud Foundation
Discovery Timeline
- 2024-03-05 - CVE-2024-22253 published to NVD
- 2025-05-07 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2024-22253
Vulnerability Analysis
This use-after-free vulnerability (CWE-416) exists in the UHCI USB controller emulation code used by VMware's virtualization products. Use-after-free vulnerabilities occur when a program continues to use a memory pointer after the memory it references has been freed, potentially allowing an attacker to manipulate the freed memory location and achieve code execution.
The UHCI controller is part of the USB emulation stack that allows virtual machines to interact with virtual USB devices. When the vulnerability is triggered, the VMX process (which manages VM execution on the host) improperly handles memory operations related to USB controller management, creating an exploitable condition.
The exploitation requires local administrative privileges within a guest virtual machine, which significantly limits the attack surface. However, in multi-tenant environments or scenarios where VM administrators are not fully trusted, this vulnerability represents a serious VM escape risk.
Root Cause
The root cause is a use-after-free condition in the UHCI USB controller emulation code. The vulnerability stems from improper memory lifecycle management where a memory object is freed but a reference to that object is retained and subsequently accessed. This class of vulnerability typically occurs when:
- A USB controller object or related data structure is allocated
- The object is freed during certain USB operations
- A dangling pointer to the freed memory is later dereferenced
- An attacker can control the contents of the reallocated memory region
Attack Vector
The attack vector requires local access with administrative privileges on a guest virtual machine. An attacker would need to:
- Gain administrative access to a virtual machine running on the vulnerable hypervisor
- Interact with the UHCI USB controller through specific USB operations
- Trigger the use-after-free condition by manipulating USB device operations
- Achieve code execution in the context of the VMX process on the host
On ESXi, the VMX process runs within a sandbox that limits the impact of successful exploitation. However, on Workstation and Fusion deployments, the VMX process has broader access to the host system, making successful exploitation significantly more dangerous as it could lead to full host compromise.
The vulnerability is exploited through manipulation of the virtual USB controller interface. Technical details can be found in the VMware Security Advisory VMSA-2024-0006.
Detection Methods for CVE-2024-22253
Indicators of Compromise
- Unusual memory access patterns or crashes in VMX processes related to USB operations
- Unexpected USB device attachment or detachment events within virtual machines
- VMX process crashes or abnormal terminations potentially indicating exploitation attempts
- Suspicious administrative activity within guest VMs targeting USB controller configuration
Detection Strategies
- Monitor VMX process behavior for memory corruption indicators or unexpected code execution paths
- Implement host-based intrusion detection to identify suspicious VMX process activities
- Enable detailed logging for USB device operations within virtualization environments
- Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions on hypervisor hosts to detect post-exploitation activity
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable VMware vSphere audit logging and monitor for unusual USB-related operations
- Configure alerting for VMX process crashes or abnormal terminations
- Monitor for privilege escalation attempts following VM administrative access
- Review guest VM administrative access logs for unusual patterns
How to Mitigate CVE-2024-22253
Immediate Actions Required
- Apply the security patches provided by VMware as outlined in VMSA-2024-0006
- Review and restrict administrative access to virtual machines to only trusted administrators
- Consider disabling USB controller passthrough if not required for VM operations
- Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement if exploitation occurs
Patch Information
VMware has released security patches addressing this vulnerability. Organizations should consult the VMware Security Advisory VMSA-2024-0006 for specific patch versions and download links.
Affected product versions and their corresponding patches:
- ESXi 7.0: Apply the latest Update 3 patch
- ESXi 8.0: Apply the latest Update 2 patch or newer
- Workstation: Update to the patched version specified in the advisory
- Fusion: Update to the patched version specified in the advisory
- Cloud Foundation: Follow the VMware guidance for Cloud Foundation deployments
Workarounds
- Remove or disable UHCI USB controller from virtual machines where USB functionality is not required
- Restrict administrative privileges within guest VMs to minimize the attack surface
- On ESXi, the VMX sandbox provides some containment; ensure sandbox configurations are not weakened
- Consider migrating critical workloads to patched hosts while awaiting maintenance windows for remaining systems
# Example: Disable USB controller on a VM using VMware CLI (adjust for your environment)
# This removes the UHCI USB controller from the VM configuration
vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms # List all VMs to get VM ID
vim-cmd vmsvc/device.diskremove <vmid> --device usb # Consult VMware documentation for exact syntax
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
