CVE-2023-4586: Red Hat Data Grid Info Disclosure Flaw

CVE-2023-4586 Overview

A critical security vulnerability has been identified in the Hot Rod client used with Red Hat Data Grid and Infinispan. This vulnerability stems from the Hot Rod client's failure to enable hostname validation when establishing TLS connections. This security misconfiguration creates an opportunity for attackers to perform man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, potentially intercepting and manipulating sensitive data transmitted between client and server.

Critical Impact

Attackers on the network path can intercept TLS connections and potentially access or modify sensitive data in transit due to missing hostname validation in the Hot Rod client.

Affected Products

• Red Hat Data Grid 8.0.0
• Infinispan Hot Rod Client
• Applications using Hot Rod client for Infinispan cluster communication

Discovery Timeline

• 2023-10-04 - CVE-2023-4586 published to NVD
• 2023-12-04 - Red Hat releases security advisory RHSA-2023:7676
• 2024-11-21 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2023-4586

Vulnerability Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation) and CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation). The security flaw exists in the Hot Rod client's TLS implementation, where hostname verification is not performed during the TLS handshake process.

When a TLS connection is established, proper certificate validation includes verifying that the certificate is issued by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA), the certificate has not expired, and critically, that the hostname in the certificate matches the server being connected to. The Hot Rod client omits this final hostname verification step, which is essential for preventing MITM attacks.

Without hostname validation, an attacker who can intercept network traffic could present their own valid certificate (obtained from any CA for any domain they control) and the client would accept it, believing it is communicating with the legitimate server. This allows the attacker to decrypt, inspect, and potentially modify all traffic between the client and server.

Root Cause

The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the improper TLS configuration within the Hot Rod client implementation. The client fails to enable hostname verification when establishing secure connections, meaning it accepts any valid certificate regardless of whether the certificate's Common Name (CN) or Subject Alternative Name (SAN) matches the intended server hostname. This implementation oversight violates secure TLS best practices and leaves connections vulnerable to interception.

Attack Vector

This vulnerability can be exploited via a network-based attack where an adversary positions themselves between the Hot Rod client and the Infinispan/Data Grid server. The attack requires the ability to intercept and redirect network traffic (such as through ARP spoofing, DNS hijacking, or compromised network infrastructure).

When a Hot Rod client attempts to connect to a legitimate server over TLS, the attacker intercepts the connection and presents their own certificate. Because the client does not verify that the certificate's hostname matches the intended destination, it accepts the attacker's certificate and establishes a TLS session with the attacker instead of the legitimate server. The attacker can then establish a separate connection to the real server, effectively proxying and potentially modifying all communications.

The attack scenario typically unfolds as follows: an attacker on the same network segment or with control over routing infrastructure intercepts the TLS handshake, presents a valid certificate for a domain they control, and the vulnerable Hot Rod client accepts this certificate without verifying the hostname mismatch. For detailed technical information, refer to the Red Hat CVE-2023-4586 Details page.

Detection Methods for CVE-2023-4586

Indicators of Compromise

• Unexpected certificate warnings or changes in TLS certificate fingerprints for Infinispan/Data Grid connections
• Network traffic analysis showing TLS connections being routed through unexpected intermediary hosts
• Anomalous latency patterns in Hot Rod client communications that may indicate traffic interception
• Logs indicating connections to IP addresses that do not match expected Data Grid server addresses

Detection Strategies

• Monitor network traffic for TLS connections from Hot Rod clients that exhibit unusual routing patterns or certificate chains
• Implement certificate pinning at the application level to detect when unexpected certificates are presented
• Deploy network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) to identify potential ARP spoofing or DNS hijacking attempts targeting Data Grid infrastructure
• Review Hot Rod client configuration files to verify TLS settings and identify instances where hostname validation may be disabled

Monitoring Recommendations

• Enable verbose TLS logging on Hot Rod clients to capture certificate details during connection establishment
• Implement centralized logging for all Data Grid cluster communications to identify anomalous connection patterns
• Configure alerts for certificate chain changes or unexpected certificate authorities in client connections
• Monitor for network-level attacks (ARP spoofing, DNS poisoning) that could facilitate MITM exploitation

How to Mitigate CVE-2023-4586

Immediate Actions Required

• Upgrade Red Hat Data Grid and Infinispan Hot Rod client to patched versions as specified in Red Hat Security Advisory RHSA-2023:7676
• Review all applications using Hot Rod client connections to ensure TLS is properly configured with hostname validation enabled
• Audit network infrastructure to ensure Data Grid communications traverse trusted network segments
• Implement network segmentation to limit exposure of Hot Rod client traffic to potential attackers

Patch Information

Red Hat has released a security advisory addressing this vulnerability. Organizations should apply the patches referenced in RHSA-2023:7676 as soon as possible. Additional details about the vulnerability and remediation steps are available in Red Hat Bug Report #2235564.

For environments where immediate patching is not feasible, organizations should prioritize network-level mitigations and enhanced monitoring to detect potential exploitation attempts.

Workarounds

• Implement network-level encryption (such as IPsec or VPN tunnels) between Hot Rod clients and Data Grid servers to provide an additional layer of protection
• Deploy Hot Rod clients and Data Grid servers within isolated network segments to reduce exposure to potential attackers
• Use firewall rules to restrict Hot Rod client connections to known, trusted Data Grid server IP addresses only
• Consider implementing mutual TLS (mTLS) with certificate pinning at the application level as an additional verification mechanism

# Example: Network segmentation using firewall rules to restrict Hot Rod connections
# Allow Hot Rod traffic only to known Data Grid servers
iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 11222 -d <DATA_GRID_SERVER_IP> -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 11222 -j DROP

# Verify TLS configuration in application properties
# Ensure SSL/TLS is enabled with proper hostname verification
# infinispan.client.hotrod.use_ssl=true
# infinispan.client.hotrod.ssl_hostname_validation=true