CVE-2023-1017: TPM 2.0 Module Library RCE Vulnerability

CVE-2023-1017 Overview

An out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0 reference library specification. The flaw resides in the CryptParameterDecryption routine, which allows writing 2 bytes of data past the end of TPM2.0 command buffer boundaries. This memory corruption vulnerability enables attackers with local access to potentially crash the TPM chip or process, render it unusable, or achieve arbitrary code execution within the TPM context.

TPM chips are foundational hardware security components used for cryptographic operations, secure boot validation, and key storage across enterprise and consumer systems. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could undermine the security guarantees provided by TPM-based features including BitLocker disk encryption, Windows Credential Guard, and platform integrity verification.

Critical Impact

Exploitation can lead to denial of service by crashing the TPM chip/process, or arbitrary code execution within the TPM context, compromising hardware-based security guarantees.

Affected Products

• Trusted Computing Group TPM 2.0 (Revision 1.16, 1.38, 1.59)
• Microsoft Windows 10 (versions 1507, 1607, 1809, 20H2, 21H2, 22H2)
• Microsoft Windows 11 (versions 21H2, 22H2)
• Microsoft Windows Server 2016
• Microsoft Windows Server 2019
• Microsoft Windows Server 2022

Discovery Timeline

• 2023-02-28 - CVE-2023-1017 published to NVD
• 2025-11-04 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2023-1017

Vulnerability Analysis

This vulnerability is classified as CWE-787 (Out-of-Bounds Write), a memory corruption flaw that occurs when software writes data outside the intended buffer boundaries. The vulnerable code path exists within the TPM 2.0 Module Library's cryptographic parameter handling implementation.

The CryptParameterDecryption routine fails to properly validate buffer boundaries before performing write operations. When processing specially crafted TPM commands, the routine can write exactly 2 bytes beyond the allocated buffer space. While the overwrite is limited in size, the sensitive nature of TPM memory and operations means even small corruptions can have significant security implications.

Since TPMs operate in an isolated execution environment handling cryptographic secrets and platform attestation, code execution within this context would bypass software-based security controls entirely. The local attack vector requires an attacker to have some level of system access, but the low complexity and lack of user interaction requirements make exploitation feasible once access is obtained.

Root Cause

The root cause is insufficient bounds checking in the CryptParameterDecryption function within the TPM 2.0 reference implementation. The routine processes encrypted parameters from incoming TPM commands but does not adequately verify that decrypted output will fit within the designated buffer space, resulting in a 2-byte buffer overrun.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires local access to the target system with the ability to send commands to the TPM interface. An attacker with low privileges can craft malicious TPM2.0 commands that trigger the out-of-bounds write condition during parameter decryption. The attack does not require user interaction and can be executed programmatically through standard TPM communication interfaces.

The constrained 2-byte overwrite limits immediate arbitrary code execution scenarios, but can reliably achieve denial of service by corrupting adjacent memory structures. In specific memory layouts, the overwrite could corrupt critical TPM state or function pointers, potentially enabling code execution within the TPM's isolated execution environment.

Detection Methods for CVE-2023-1017

Indicators of Compromise

• Unexpected TPM errors or crashes in system event logs indicating hardware communication failures
• TPM-related system services (such as TPM Base Services) failing or restarting unexpectedly
• Applications dependent on TPM functionality (BitLocker, Windows Hello) experiencing authentication or decryption failures
• Evidence of attempts to interact with TPM device interfaces from unusual processes or contexts

Detection Strategies

• Monitor Windows Event Log for TPM-related errors under Microsoft-Windows-TPM-WMI events
• Implement EDR monitoring for unusual access patterns to TPM device drivers and interfaces
• Deploy SentinelOne Singularity platform to detect anomalous process behavior attempting to exploit low-level hardware interfaces
• Audit processes making TPM API calls, particularly those from non-standard execution contexts

Monitoring Recommendations

• Enable verbose logging for TPM operations through Windows Group Policy or registry configuration
• Configure alerts for repeated TPM command failures that may indicate exploitation attempts
• Monitor system stability metrics for unexpected TPM subsystem restarts or initialization events

How to Mitigate CVE-2023-1017

Immediate Actions Required

• Apply the latest firmware updates from your TPM hardware vendor that incorporate the TCG specification fixes
• Install Microsoft security updates addressing this vulnerability across all affected Windows systems
• Audit systems to identify TPM versions and prioritize patching based on exposure and criticality
• Review the TCG Security Advisory for vendor-specific guidance

Patch Information

The Trusted Computing Group has released an updated TPM 2.0 Library Specification that addresses this vulnerability. Microsoft has released security updates for affected Windows versions. System administrators should:

1. Consult the Trusted Computing Group Security Page for specification updates
2. Review the CERT Vulnerability Note VU#782720 for coordinated vendor response information
3. Contact TPM hardware vendors (Intel, AMD, Infineon, STMicroelectronics, etc.) for firmware update availability
4. Apply Windows security updates through Windows Update or WSUS

Workarounds

• Limit local system access to trusted administrators and essential service accounts only
• Implement application control policies to prevent unauthorized software from accessing TPM interfaces
• Consider disabling TPM-dependent features on systems where patching is delayed, with understanding of security trade-offs
• Deploy network segmentation to limit exposure of unpatched systems