Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-105140 Overview
CVE-2026-105140 is a race condition vulnerability [CWE-362] in the Obot platform affecting versions 0.25.0 before 0.25.6 and 0.26.0 before 0.26.1. The flaw resides in the auth provider group refresh logic within the gateway client. When overlapping group refreshes for the same user commit out of order, Obot can persist stale group memberships that were just revoked in the upstream identity provider. Affected users retain revoked group-based access for approximately ten minutes after revocation.
Critical Impact
Users retain revoked group-based access for roughly ten minutes after their identity-provider group membership is removed, enabling continued authorization against resources that should be inaccessible.
Affected Products
- Obot 0.25.0 through 0.25.5
- Obot 0.26.0
- Obot gateway auth provider group refresh component (pkg/gateway/client)
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-07 - CVE-2026-105140 published to NVD
- 2026-10-07 - Last updated in NVD database
- Fixed releases - Obot v0.25.6 and v0.26.1 published on GitHub
Technical Details for CVE-2026-105140
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability is a classic time-of-check / time-of-use race condition in how Obot refreshes a user's group memberships from the configured auth provider. When two refresh operations for the same user execute concurrently, the gateway client has no coalescing or ordering guarantee. The second commit can overwrite the first with older data, re-adding memberships the identity provider has already revoked.
Because the gateway caches the group refresh timestamp, the stale state persists until the next refresh window elapses — about ten minutes. During that window, authorization decisions based on group membership honor the restored, revoked groups.
Root Cause
The root cause is a lack of serialization around auth provider group refreshes combined with database updates that reset the groupsLastCheckedColumn field. Concurrent goroutines performing tx.Updates(identities[i]) could overwrite each other's results and, by updating the group-check timestamp, extend the stale cache. The code paths involved are in pkg/gateway/client/group.go and pkg/gateway/client/identity.go.
Attack Vector
An attacker exploiting this issue needs valid, low-privileged credentials and must trigger overlapping refresh operations for their account. This typically occurs when the user is actively using Obot at the moment their group membership is revoked in the identity provider, or when parallel sessions cause concurrent refresh paths. The race is non-trivial to force reliably, which is reflected in the vulnerability's low severity.
// Patch from pkg/gateway/client/identity.go — omit the group-check column
// so concurrent updates do not reset the group refresh window.
if err := fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt identity: %w", err); err != nil {
return err
}
// Before:
// if err := tx.Updates(identities[i]).Error; err != nil {
// After:
if err := tx.Omit(groupsLastCheckedColumn).Updates(identities[i]).Error; err != nil {
return err
}
Source: GitHub Commit 09e4d5b
// Patch from pkg/gateway/client/client.go — introduce singleflight to
// coalesce concurrent auth provider group refreshes for the same user.
import (
types2 "github.com/obot-platform/obot/apiclient/types"
"github.com/obot-platform/obot/pkg/gateway/db"
"github.com/obot-platform/obot/pkg/gateway/types"
"golang.org/x/sync/singleflight"
"k8s.io/apiserver/pkg/server/options/encryptionconfig"
kclient "sigs.k8s.io/controller-runtime/pkg/client"
)
Source: GitHub Commit 6f81dac
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-105140
Indicators of Compromise
- Successful authorization decisions in Obot that reference group memberships already removed in the upstream identity provider (Okta, Entra ID, Keycloak, etc.).
- Gateway logs showing overlapping auth provider group refresh operations for the same user identifier within a short interval.
- Access to group-restricted resources continuing for up to ten minutes after a revocation event in the identity provider audit log.
Detection Strategies
- Correlate identity provider group-removal events with Obot authorization audit logs. Any Obot access granted via a group that was already revoked upstream indicates the race condition triggered.
- Monitor the Obot database groups_last_checked field relative to upstream revocation times to detect stale refresh windows.
- Review Obot gateway logs for concurrent refresh paths through pkg/gateway/client/group.go for the same subject.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward Obot gateway and audit logs to a centralized SIEM and alert on access decisions that cite groups absent from the latest identity-provider snapshot.
- Baseline the frequency of auth provider group refreshes per user and alert on bursts of concurrent refreshes.
- Track Obot release versions in asset inventory and alert when hosts run 0.25.0–0.25.5 or 0.26.0.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-105140
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Obot to v0.25.6 or v0.26.1 or later, which coalesce refreshes using singleflight and avoid resetting the group refresh window.
- Where feasible, invalidate active Obot sessions for users whose group membership was recently revoked in the identity provider.
- Audit recent access to group-restricted resources against identity-provider revocation events during the vulnerable window.
Patch Information
The fix is implemented in commits 09e4d5b and 6f81dac, released in Obot v0.26.1. The patch introduces golang.org/x/sync/singleflight to coalesce concurrent group refreshes and omits the groupsLastCheckedColumn from identity updates so a concurrent write does not extend a stale refresh window. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-929v-v9hq-5xhr and the VulnCheck Advisory for Obot for full details.
Workarounds
- Shorten the group refresh interval and session lifetime in Obot configuration to reduce the stale-access window where supported.
- Terminate active Obot sessions immediately after revoking group membership in the identity provider.
- Restrict high-sensitivity resources to authorization checks that validate group membership against the identity provider at request time rather than via cached state.
# Upgrade Obot to a fixed release
docker pull ghcr.io/obot-platform/obot:v0.26.1
# Verify the running version
kubectl -n obot get deploy obot -o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].image}'
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

