Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-105139 Overview
CVE-2026-105139 is an authorization bypass vulnerability in Obot, an open-source agent platform, affecting versions 0.26.0 before 0.26.2. The flaw resides in the virtual Model Context Protocol (vMCP) component, where profile-based access controls were enforced only on tools. Authenticated users matching any vMCP profile can reach prompts, resources, and resource templates belonging to components they were not granted access to. Exploitation occurs through the vMCP owner's shared component connection. The weakness is classified as CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization.
Critical Impact
Authenticated Obot users can bypass vMCP profile restrictions to access prompts, resources, and resource templates from MCP components they were never authorized to use.
Affected Products
- Obot 0.26.0
- Obot 0.26.1
- Obot versions prior to 0.26.2
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-07 - CVE-2026-105139 published to NVD
- 2026-10-07 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-105139
Vulnerability Analysis
Obot's vMCP (virtual Model Context Protocol) layer aggregates multiple MCP components behind a single shared connection owned by the vMCP owner. Access to that aggregated surface is gated by profiles that enumerate which components a caller may use. The vulnerability stems from inconsistent enforcement: profile checks were applied when callers invoked tools, but the equivalent checks were missing for prompts, resources, and resourceTemplates. Any authenticated user matching any defined vMCP profile could therefore list and retrieve those objects for components outside their grant.
Because the vMCP owner's connection fronts every component, the gateway returns data from unapproved components once the request bypasses the profile filter. This exposes prompt templates, resource bodies, and resource metadata that the component author expected to remain restricted.
Root Cause
The root cause is incorrect authorization logic in pkg/mcp/vmcp.go. Profile-based filtering was implemented for the tools pathway but omitted for prompts, resources, and resource templates. Related configuration handling in pkg/api/handlers/mcpgateway/oauth/ also required configuration for disabled components, broadening the surface where the gap manifested.
Attack Vector
An authenticated user with any valid vMCP profile sends standard MCP requests such as prompts/list, prompts/get, resources/list, resources/read, or resources/templates/list to the vMCP endpoint. The gateway proxies these calls through the owner's shared connection and returns results from all backing components, ignoring the caller's profile scope.
// Patch excerpt — pkg/api/handlers/mcpgateway/oauth/authorize.go
"github.com/obot-platform/obot/pkg/api/handlers"
v1 "github.com/obot-platform/obot/pkg/storage/apis/obot.obot.ai/v1"
"github.com/obot-platform/obot/pkg/system"
- "github.com/obot-platform/obot/pkg/utils"
- vmcpconfig "github.com/obot-platform/obot/pkg/vmcp"
"github.com/obot-platform/obot/pkg/wait"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
Source: GitHub commit 8d92701. The patch removes the requirement to resolve configuration for disabled components and tightens authorization resolution in the vMCP consent and authorize handlers.
Detect Identity Attacks the Moment Authentication Fails
Singularity™ Identity surfaces credential misuse, lateral movement, and privilege escalation in real time, so you can contain the breach before it spreads.
Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-105139
Indicators of Compromise
- vMCP gateway access logs showing a single authenticated principal issuing prompts/list, resources/list, or resources/templates/list requests that return objects from components outside the user's granted profile.
- Unexpected resources/read or prompts/get calls referencing component identifiers the caller has never previously invoked via tools/call.
- Spikes in cross-component enumeration from low-privilege accounts shortly after Obot 0.26.0 or 0.26.1 deployment.
Detection Strategies
- Correlate the authenticated user identity on each vMCP request with the component identifier of the returned prompt or resource, and alert on mismatches against the user's profile grant.
- Instrument the vMCP handlers in pkg/mcp/vmcp.go with authorization-decision logging so denied-vs-allowed outcomes are auditable per request type.
- Baseline normal prompt and resource access patterns per profile, then flag deviations such as broad enumeration of all components by a single principal.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward Obot gateway and API logs to a centralized analytics pipeline and retain the request_method, principal, profile_id, and component_id fields.
- Monitor the /mcp endpoints exposed by the vMCP owner connection for list-and-read patterns indicative of resource enumeration.
- Review GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-xhpw-65qw-wj6m and the VulnCheck advisory for additional signatures.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-105139
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Obot to version 0.26.2 or later, published in the v0.26.2 release.
- Inventory vMCP profiles and the components they reference; identify any prompts or resources that may have been accessed by unauthorized profiles.
- Rotate any secrets, API keys, or sensitive values that were embedded in prompt templates or resource bodies on affected deployments.
Patch Information
The fix is delivered in Obot v0.26.2 via commit 8d92701c2018a7b9dd6d692498fa5f41fdb912ea. The patch extends profile enforcement in pkg/mcp/vmcp.go so prompts, resources, and resource templates are gated identically to tools, and adjusts OAuth consent and authorize handlers under pkg/api/handlers/mcpgateway/oauth/ to stop requiring configuration for disabled components.
Workarounds
- If upgrade is not immediately possible, restrict vMCP access to trusted operators only and remove shared profiles from untrusted authenticated users.
- Temporarily disable or detach MCP components that expose sensitive prompts or resources from the shared vMCP owner connection.
- Place the Obot gateway behind an authenticating reverse proxy that enforces per-user access control lists at the HTTP layer.
# Verify installed Obot version and upgrade
obot version
# Pull the fixed release image
docker pull ghcr.io/obot-platform/obot:v0.26.2
# Restart the deployment with the patched image
kubectl set image deployment/obot obot=ghcr.io/obot-platform/obot:v0.26.2
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

