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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-105138

CVE-2026-105138: Obot Information Disclosure Vulnerability

CVE-2026-105138 is an information disclosure vulnerability in Obot versions 0.12.0 through 0.26.1 that exposes static credentials to authenticated users. This post covers the technical details, affected versions, and mitigation.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-105138 Overview

CVE-2026-105138 is an insufficiently protected credentials vulnerability [CWE-522] in the Obot platform. Versions 0.12.0 through 0.26.1 expose static secrets configured on Model Context Protocol (MCP) catalog entries. Authenticated basic users who are granted access to a catalog entry can call GET /api/all-mcps/entries/{entry_id} and receive plaintext API keys or tokens. Attackers can then reuse these credentials against backend services the admins never intended to share.

Critical Impact

Low-privileged authenticated users can retrieve plaintext administrator-supplied API keys and tokens from MCP catalog entries, enabling lateral abuse of downstream services.

Affected Products

  • Obot platform versions 0.12.0 through 0.26.1
  • MCP catalog entry API endpoint /api/all-mcps/entries/{entry_id}
  • Deployments relying on static configuration values set by admins or power users

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-07 - CVE CVE-2026-105138 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-07 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-105138

Vulnerability Analysis

Obot is an open-source platform for building and running MCP-based agent workflows. Admins and power users configure MCP catalog entries with static configuration values, which often include API keys, bearer tokens, or service credentials used by backend integrations. The platform's access control model allows admins to grant basic users entry-level access to a catalog item so they can invoke the associated MCP server.

The vulnerable handler at pkg/api/handlers/mcp.go serializes the full catalog entry manifest, including the Config values, when responding to GET /api/all-mcps/entries/{entry_id}. The authorization check at pkg/api/authz/resources.go permits any user with entry access to read the resource. Static secrets stored inside the manifest therefore flow back to the requester in cleartext, bypassing the intent of role separation between admins and consumers.

Root Cause

Static configuration values were persisted directly on the catalog entry object rather than in a credential store. The response model did not distinguish between non-sensitive configuration and secret material. Any caller with read access to the entry received the raw secret in the JSON payload.

Attack Vector

An attacker needs valid Obot credentials and an access control rule that grants at least basic access to a target MCP catalog entry. The attacker issues an authenticated HTTP GET request against /api/all-mcps/entries/{entry_id} and parses the returned manifest for config entries that contain secret values. Harvested keys can then be replayed against the upstream SaaS, cloud, or internal API that originally issued them.

go
// Patch excerpt - apiclient/types/mcpserver.go
 Config []MCPConfig `json:"config,omitempty"`

+// StaticConfigurationRevision identifies the credential holding the values of Static
+// configuration. It is assigned by Obot; values supplied by clients are ignored.
+StaticConfigurationRevision string `json:"staticConfigurationRevision,omitempty"`
+
 Resources *MCPResourceRequirements `json:"resources,omitempty"`
go
// Patch excerpt - apiclient/types/vmcp.go
 for _, config := range component.CatalogEntry.Manifest.Config {
-    if config.Required && config.Value == "" && config.SecretBinding == nil {
+    if config.Required && !config.Static && config.SecretBinding == nil {
         if policy := configurationKeys[config.Key]; policy == "" || policy == VMCPConfigurationPolicyProhibited {
             return fmt.Errorf("component %q required configuration %q cannot be prohibited", component.Name, config.Key)
         }

Source: Obot commit 644a1fd. The fix moves static configuration values into the credential store and references them by StaticConfigurationRevision instead of embedding plaintext in the catalog entry manifest.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-105138

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unusual authenticated GET requests to /api/all-mcps/entries/{entry_id} from basic user accounts.
  • Backend services reporting authentication from unexpected source IPs or outside normal Obot egress ranges.
  • Non-admin accounts enumerating multiple catalog entries in a short time window.

Detection Strategies

  • Review Obot HTTP access logs for repeated or scripted calls to /api/all-mcps/entries/ by non-admin principals.
  • Correlate Obot audit events with downstream API logs to spot credential reuse from outside the Obot runtime.
  • Hunt for responses from the catalog entry endpoint that are larger than expected, indicating full manifest exposure.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose request logging on the Obot API gateway and ship logs to a centralized analytics pipeline.
  • Alert on access control rule changes that grant basic users entry access to catalog items containing static configuration.
  • Monitor backend services for use of credentials outside expected automation windows or from unknown clients.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-105138

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Obot to version 0.26.2 or later, which stores static catalog configuration in the credential store.
  • Rotate every API key, token, or secret that was previously set as a static configuration value on an MCP catalog entry.
  • Audit existing access control rules and revoke basic user grants to catalog entries holding sensitive secrets.

Patch Information

The fix is included in Obot Release v0.26.2. Technical details are documented in GitHub Advisory GHSA-q5wf-87f5-cxgq and the VulnCheck Advisory on Obot Credentials. The patch commit 644a1fd introduces a StaticConfigurationRevision field so sensitive values are referenced from the credential store rather than embedded in the manifest.

Workarounds

  • Remove static secrets from MCP catalog entries and replace them with SecretBinding references where supported.
  • Restrict catalog entry access control rules to admin and power user roles until the upgrade is applied.
  • Place the Obot API behind an authenticating reverse proxy that denies non-admin access to /api/all-mcps/entries/ paths.
bash
# Pin Obot to the patched release in a Helm or docker-compose deployment
# Example: docker-compose.yml
services:
  obot:
    image: ghcr.io/obot-platform/obot:v0.26.2
    restart: unless-stopped

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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