Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-114662 Overview
CVE-2026-114662 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in Obot versions prior to 0.26.0. The flaw resides in the CLI login flow, where attackers can choose their own token request identifiers. An unauthenticated attacker can create a token request via POST /api/token-request, send the resulting login link to a signed-in user, and then retrieve the non-expiring API key generated when the victim completes the flow. Successful exploitation leads to full account takeover and persistent access to the victim's data and privileges within Obot. The vulnerability is tracked under CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery.
Critical Impact
Unauthenticated network attackers can steal long-lived API keys and take over any Obot user account that interacts with a crafted login link.
Affected Products
- Obot platform versions prior to 0.26.0
- Obot CLI login flow (/api/token-request endpoint)
- Deployments exposing Obot's authentication endpoints to untrusted networks
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-22 - CVE-2026-114662 published to NVD
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-114662
Vulnerability Analysis
Obot's CLI login flow issues long-lived API keys after a user authenticates against a token request. The server accepts attacker-supplied identifiers when creating these token requests. Because the identifier is predictable and chosen by the requester, an unauthenticated attacker can register a token request, deliver the associated login URL to a victim, and poll for the issued API key once the victim signs in. The resulting credential does not expire, so the attacker retains persistent access to the account until the key is revoked. The weakness falls under the CSRF class (CWE-352) because the victim's authenticated browser session is used to authorize an action that benefits the attacker.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper authorization and trust in client-supplied state within the POST /api/token-request endpoint. Obot does not bind token request identifiers to the originating client, nor does it validate that the user completing the login flow is the same entity that initiated the request. There is also no interactive confirmation that the login grant is intended for a CLI session owned by the authenticated user. These missing controls allow an attacker to pre-register a token request ID and later retrieve the credential issued to a different user.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires network access to the Obot API and a signed-in victim willing to click a crafted link. The attacker calls POST /api/token-request with a chosen request ID, constructs the matching login URL, and delivers it through phishing, chat, or embedded content. When the victim visits the URL and completes authentication, Obot binds a non-expiring API key to the attacker-controlled request ID. The attacker then fetches the API key through the token request status endpoint and uses it to impersonate the victim against the Obot API. The attack requires user interaction but no attacker-side credentials or privileges.
No verified public proof-of-concept code is available. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-2qcm-3gv6-2mfc and the VulnCheck API Key Theft Advisory for additional technical details.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-114662
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected POST /api/token-request calls originating from unauthenticated clients or unusual source IPs.
- API keys appearing on user accounts that were not created from the user's own CLI session.
- Successful API requests to Obot immediately following user authentication from a different geolocation or user agent.
- Login links shared through email or messaging platforms containing externally generated token request identifiers.
Detection Strategies
- Review Obot application logs for token request creations that are not followed by activity from the same client fingerprint.
- Correlate /api/token-request creation events with subsequent /api/token-request status polling from distinct source IPs.
- Flag any newly issued non-expiring API keys and alert when they are used from IP ranges not previously associated with the account.
- Hunt for suspicious outbound referrers directing users to Obot authentication URLs embedded with pre-generated identifiers.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable verbose audit logging on all authentication and token issuance endpoints in Obot.
- Forward Obot application and reverse-proxy logs to a centralized analytics platform for correlation.
- Monitor API key usage patterns and alert on first-use anomalies against baseline behavior per account.
- Track rate and distribution of POST /api/token-request calls to identify brute-force or scripted abuse.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-114662
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade all Obot deployments to version 0.26.0 or later without delay.
- Revoke all existing API keys issued through the CLI login flow and require users to re-authenticate.
- Audit account activity for the period preceding the upgrade and investigate any API key usage that cannot be attributed to the legitimate owner.
- Notify end users to avoid clicking Obot login links received from untrusted sources.
Patch Information
The vulnerability is fixed in Obot version 0.26.0. Administrators should consult the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-2qcm-3gv6-2mfc for upgrade instructions and the VulnCheck advisory for additional remediation guidance. Review release notes for any configuration changes introduced alongside the fix.
Workarounds
- Restrict network access to the Obot API so that POST /api/token-request is reachable only from trusted CLI sources.
- Place Obot behind an authenticating reverse proxy that enforces session binding on token issuance endpoints.
- Disable or heavily restrict the CLI login flow until the upgrade is applied in environments where exposure cannot be reduced.
- Shorten API key lifetimes through operational policy and rotate keys frequently where configuration permits.
# Configuration example: block external access to the token-request endpoint
# using an Nginx reverse proxy until Obot is upgraded to 0.26.0
location = /api/token-request {
allow 10.0.0.0/8; # internal CLI subnet
allow 192.168.0.0/16; # internal admin subnet
deny all;
proxy_pass http://obot_backend;
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

