Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-103758 Overview
CVE-2026-103758 is an authorization bypass vulnerability affecting Obot versions 0.21.1 through 0.24.1. The flaw stems from the checkUI deny list omitting the /mcp-connect-composite/ route. Authenticated basic-role users holding a composite Model Context Protocol (MCP) ID can proxy requests through mcpGateway.Proxy to invoke tools on MCP servers that should be restricted by Access Control Rules. The weakness maps to CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization.
Critical Impact
Authenticated low-privilege users can bypass Access Control Rules and invoke tools on MCP servers that should be inaccessible to them, breaking tenant isolation and exposing sensitive integrations.
Affected Products
- Obot 0.21.1
- Obot versions between 0.21.1 and 0.24.1
- Obot 0.24.1
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-01 - CVE-2026-103758 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- 2026-10-01 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-103758
Vulnerability Analysis
Obot is an open-source platform that brokers access to MCP servers through a gateway component. Access Control Rules in Obot are intended to restrict which users may reach which MCP servers and tools. The checkUI middleware enforces route-level access by evaluating requests against a deny list of protected paths.
The vulnerability exists because the deny list does not include the /mcp-connect-composite/ route. Requests to that route therefore skip the authorization checks that other MCP endpoints apply. A user who has authenticated with a basic role can send a request containing a composite MCP ID, and the server forwards the call through mcpGateway.Proxy to the target MCP server. The proxy executes the tool invocation without validating whether Access Control Rules permit the caller to reach the backend server.
Root Cause
The root cause is an incomplete deny list in route-level authorization logic. The checkUI function enforces access on known MCP endpoints but was not updated when the /mcp-connect-composite/ route was introduced. This is a classic authorization gap where a new feature was shipped without corresponding changes to the central access control enforcement path.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires network access to the Obot application and valid credentials for a basic-role account. The attacker constructs a request to the /mcp-connect-composite/ route carrying a composite MCP ID that references a restricted MCP server. The gateway proxies the request and the attacker can invoke tools, read data, or trigger actions on MCP servers that Access Control Rules were meant to protect.
No verified exploit code is public. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-6fwv-3h4c-37j9 and the VulnCheck Advisory on Obot Authorization Bypass for the maintainer analysis.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-103758
Indicators of Compromise
- HTTP requests to the /mcp-connect-composite/ path originating from basic-role user sessions.
- MCP tool invocations recorded in gateway logs where the calling user has no Access Control Rule granting access to the target MCP server.
- Spikes in mcpGateway.Proxy activity tied to composite MCP IDs across multiple user accounts.
Detection Strategies
- Correlate Obot access logs with the Access Control Rule configuration and alert when a user reaches an MCP server that is not explicitly granted.
- Hunt for any request to /mcp-connect-composite/ prior to upgrading to a fixed version, as legitimate basic-role traffic to this route should be reviewed.
- Baseline normal composite MCP ID usage per user and alert on deviations such as new composite IDs appearing for existing accounts.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward Obot application and gateway logs to a centralized SIEM for retention and query.
- Enable audit logging on MCP tool invocations so that caller identity, composite MCP ID, and target server are captured together.
- Review authentication logs for basic-role accounts that suddenly exercise MCP functionality they did not use before.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-103758
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Obot to a release later than 0.24.1 that includes the checkUI deny list fix for the /mcp-connect-composite/ route.
- Audit existing basic-role accounts and revoke composite MCP IDs that are not required for business function.
- Review Access Control Rules and confirm that the principle of least privilege is applied to every MCP server integration.
Patch Information
Refer to the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-6fwv-3h4c-37j9 for the maintainer-recommended fixed version and release notes. The VulnCheck Advisory on Obot Authorization Bypass provides additional context on affected versions.
Workarounds
- Restrict network access to the Obot application so that only trusted users can reach the /mcp-connect-composite/ route.
- Place a reverse proxy or Web Application Firewall in front of Obot and block requests to /mcp-connect-composite/ for user roles that do not require it.
- Temporarily disable composite MCP IDs for basic-role users until the upgrade is complete.
# Example reverse-proxy rule to block the vulnerable route pending upgrade
location /mcp-connect-composite/ {
return 403;
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

