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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-101064

CVE-2026-101064: Obot MCP Server SSRF Vulnerability

CVE-2026-101064 is an SSRF vulnerability in Obot that enables privileged users to make unauthorized requests to internal services and cloud metadata endpoints. This post covers technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-101064 Overview

CVE-2026-101064 is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Obot versions prior to v0.23.0. The flaw resides in the remote Model Context Protocol (MCP) server registration feature. Obot does not validate destination URLs supplied during registration, allowing privileged users to point requests at arbitrary internal endpoints.

Attackers holding Power User or higher roles can coerce Obot into contacting internal services and cloud instance metadata endpoints. Response data surfaces in error messages, enabling disclosure of credentials, session tokens, and other sensitive infrastructure data. The weakness maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery.

Critical Impact

Authenticated privileged users can extract cloud metadata credentials and probe internal network services through Obot's MCP registration endpoint.

Affected Products

  • Obot platform versions prior to v0.23.0
  • Deployments exposing the remote MCP server registration interface
  • Cloud-hosted Obot instances with access to instance metadata services (IMDS)

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-09-27 - CVE-2026-101064 published to NVD
  • 2026-09-28 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-101064

Vulnerability Analysis

Obot exposes functionality to register remote MCP servers by URL. The registration handler accepts a user-supplied URL and performs an outbound HTTP request to validate or interact with the target MCP endpoint. The handler does not apply destination allowlisting, DNS pinning, or IP range filtering before issuing the request.

An authenticated user with the Power User role or higher can submit URLs targeting loopback addresses, private RFC1918 ranges, link-local addresses, or cloud metadata services such as 169.254.169.254. When the remote endpoint returns a non-MCP response, Obot includes the response body or headers inside error messages returned to the caller. This behavior converts a blind SSRF primitive into a readable one.

Successful exploitation returns IAM role credentials from AWS IMDS, GCP service account tokens, or Azure managed identity tokens depending on the hosting environment. Attackers can also enumerate internal HTTP services, Redis instances, or Kubernetes API endpoints reachable from the Obot workload.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing destination validation on URLs accepted by the MCP registration workflow. The code trusts privileged users to supply only legitimate external MCP endpoints and does not enforce network-layer egress constraints. Error handling further compounds the issue by echoing upstream response content back to the requester.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network access to the Obot web interface or API and valid credentials for an account at Power User privilege or above. The attacker registers a remote MCP server with a crafted URL pointing to an internal resource and reads the resulting error message to recover response data. No user interaction from other operators is required.

For technical reproduction details, see the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-jgh3-fggc-mcpm and the VulnCheck advisory for SSRF in Obot.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-101064

Indicators of Compromise

  • Outbound HTTP requests from the Obot workload to 169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal, or fd00:ec2::254
  • MCP server registration events referencing loopback, private, or link-local destinations
  • Error log entries containing cloud metadata JSON fields such as AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, or access_token
  • Repeated registration attempts from a single Power User account against varying internal hostnames

Detection Strategies

  • Review Obot audit logs for mcp_server_create or equivalent registration events and flag URLs resolving to non-routable address space
  • Correlate Power User role assignments with MCP registration activity in a short time window
  • Alert on process-level network connections from the Obot service to metadata IP addresses or internal subnets not required by application logic

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Capture egress NetFlow or VPC flow logs from the Obot host and baseline expected destinations
  • Enable IMDSv2 session tokens on AWS workloads and monitor IMDS access denials as an exploitation signal
  • Forward Obot application error logs to a central analytics pipeline and alert on substrings matching credential patterns

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-101064

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Obot to version v0.23.0 or later on all deployments
  • Audit the roster of users holding Power User and Administrator roles and revoke unnecessary assignments
  • Rotate any cloud credentials, API tokens, or secrets reachable from the Obot workload's network position
  • Review MCP server registrations created before the upgrade and remove entries pointing to internal addresses

Patch Information

The maintainers fixed CVE-2026-101064 in Obot v0.23.0. The patched release adds destination validation to the remote MCP server registration handler. Refer to the GitHub Security Advisory for release notes and upgrade guidance.

Workarounds

  • Restrict egress from the Obot workload using network policies that deny traffic to 169.254.169.254, RFC1918 ranges, and loopback addresses
  • Enforce IMDSv2 with hop limit of 1 on AWS EC2 instances hosting Obot to block proxied metadata requests
  • Temporarily remove Power User privileges from accounts that do not require MCP registration until the patch is applied
  • Place an egress proxy in front of Obot that enforces a strict allowlist of approved external MCP server hostnames
bash
# Example Kubernetes NetworkPolicy denying metadata egress from Obot pods
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: obot-block-metadata
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app: obot
  policyTypes:
    - Egress
  egress:
    - to:
        - ipBlock:
            cidr: 0.0.0.0/0
            except:
              - 169.254.169.254/32
              - 10.0.0.0/8
              - 172.16.0.0/12
              - 192.168.0.0/16

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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