Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-101062 Overview
CVE-2026-101062 is an authorization flaw in the Obot platform affecting versions at or below v0.22.1 when running with OBOT_SERVER_ENABLE_AUTHENTICATION=true. Obot exposes OAuth dynamic client registration without authentication and without restricting the redirect URIs a client may register. The authorization flow auto-completes for already logged-in users and skips any consent screen. An attacker who registers a malicious client and lures a logged-in victim to a single crafted authorization URL receives an authorization code at an attacker-controlled redirect URI. The resulting token is accepted broadly against Obot APIs because audience validation was not enforced. The issue is classified as [CWE-863] Incorrect Authorization.
Critical Impact
An attacker can mint access and refresh tokens carrying the victim's full group set, then read or modify any resource the victim can access until the token is revoked.
Affected Products
- Obot platform versions <= v0.22.1
- Obot deployments running with OBOT_SERVER_ENABLE_AUTHENTICATION=true
- MCP (Model Context Protocol) OAuth integrations served by Obot
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-27 - CVE-2026-101062 published to NVD
- 2026-09-30 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-101062
Vulnerability Analysis
Obot implements an OAuth 2.0 authorization server that supports dynamic client registration. The registration endpoint accepts client registrations from unauthenticated callers and places no constraints on redirect URI values. This combination lets any party register a client whose redirect URI points at an attacker-controlled host.
The authorization endpoint compounds the problem by auto-completing authorization for a user who already holds a valid Obot session. No consent screen is presented, so the victim is given no opportunity to review or deny the request. A single victim-initiated GET to a crafted /authorize URL is sufficient to deliver an authorization code to the attacker.
The token exchanged via the MCP OAuth flow embeds the victim's full group set in the JWT payload. Obot validated only the iss (issuer) claim and ignored the aud (audience) claim, so a token minted for one MCP server is accepted as a bearer credential against unrelated Obot API endpoints.
Root Cause
Two authorization defects combine. First, dynamic client registration is unauthenticated and unrestricted, violating the OAuth 2.0 guidance that redirect URIs be constrained for public clients. Second, token validation checks the issuer but not the audience, so tokens are not scoped to the resource they were issued for.
Attack Vector
An attacker registers an OAuth client with a redirect_uri on a domain they control. The attacker crafts an /authorize URL referencing that client and sends it to a logged-in Obot user through phishing or an embedded link. The browser follows the request, Obot auto-approves the flow without consent, and the authorization code is delivered to the attacker's callback. The attacker exchanges the code at the token endpoint for an access token and refresh token, then calls arbitrary Obot API endpoints as the victim. The vulnerability requires user interaction limited to visiting the crafted URL while authenticated.
No public exploit code or proof-of-concept has been published alongside the advisory.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-101062
Indicators of Compromise
- OAuth dynamic client registrations (POST /register or equivalent) originating from unexpected IP addresses or user agents.
- Registered clients with redirect_uris pointing to external domains not operated by the organization.
- Authorization codes issued to clients whose redirect URIs resolve outside the trusted service boundary.
- Token exchange events where the resulting JWT is subsequently presented to API endpoints unrelated to the originally requested MCP server.
Detection Strategies
- Audit the Obot client registration store for clients created before upgrading to v0.23.0 and flag any with externally hosted redirect URIs.
- Correlate authorization code issuance with downstream API calls to detect tokens being used against endpoints outside the requested MCP audience.
- Alert on JWTs where the aud claim does not match the resource receiving the bearer token.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Centralize Obot authentication, authorization, and token exchange logs in a security data lake for retrospective hunting.
- Monitor for refresh token usage patterns inconsistent with the user's known client inventory.
- Track outbound redirects from the Obot authorization endpoint and alert on domains outside an allowlist.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-101062
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade all Obot deployments to v0.23.0 or later, which adds a consent screen, scopes MCP OAuth tokens to the MCP involved in the request, and enforces audience validation.
- Revoke all outstanding access and refresh tokens issued by vulnerable versions.
- Enumerate and delete any dynamically registered OAuth clients that were not created by trusted administrators.
Patch Information
The maintainers released v0.23.0 with three fixes: a user-facing consent screen for authorization requests, audience binding so MCP OAuth tokens are only accepted by the MCP server named in the request, and strict aud claim validation on bearer tokens. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-xwmw-prc4-v3cr and the VulnCheck Advisory on OAuth Bypass for full details.
Workarounds
- Place Obot behind a reverse proxy that blocks unauthenticated requests to the OAuth dynamic client registration endpoint until the patch is applied.
- Temporarily disable dynamic client registration if upgrading immediately is not feasible.
- Restrict network egress from the Obot host so that redirect URIs resolving to unknown external domains cannot complete the OAuth flow.
# Example reverse proxy rule to block unauthenticated client registration
# (nginx) - adapt the path to the deployed registration endpoint
location /oauth/register {
if ($http_authorization = "") { return 401; }
proxy_pass http://obot_upstream;
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

