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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-111765

CVE-2026-111765: A2A Java SDK Credential Disclosure Flaw

CVE-2026-111765 is an information disclosure vulnerability in the A2A Java SDK that exposes API keys and authentication tokens through redirect handling. This article covers technical details, affected versions, and mitigation.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-111765 Overview

The A2A Java SDK, the official Java implementation of the Agent2Agent (A2A) Protocol, contains a credential disclosure flaw in its Android HTTP client. In versions 1.3.0.Final through 1.3.1.Final, the AndroidA2AHttpClient synchronous POST path overrides a disabled-redirect setting with the PostBuilder default value of followRedirects=true. When combined with authentication interceptors that attach nonstandard credential headers, this allows API keys and tokens to leak to attacker-controlled authorities during cross-origin redirects. The issue is tracked under [CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials] and resolved in version 1.3.2.Final.

Critical Impact

Autonomous A2A clients can disclose complete API keys or authentication tokens to unintended authorities via HTTP redirect, with no human interaction required.

Affected Products

  • A2A Java SDK 1.3.0.Final
  • A2A Java SDK 1.3.1.Final
  • extras/http-client-android module (AndroidA2AHttpClient)

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-20 - CVE-2026-111765 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-111765

Vulnerability Analysis

The A2A Java SDK provides transport layers (JSONRPCTransport and RestTransport) that use interceptors to attach authentication headers before invoking the Android HTTP client's synchronous post() method. The AndroidA2AHttpClient.createConnection() method attempts to disable redirects for credential safety. However, the synchronous POST code path constructs an AndroidPostBuilder whose default followRedirects field is true, which overrides the disabled setting and reintroduces redirect-following behavior.

Android's repackaged OkHttp strips the standard Authorization header on cross-authority redirects. It does not strip the nonstandard headers permitted by AuthInterceptor: X-API-Key, API-Key, X-Auth-Token, and X-Authentication. When a redirect targets a different authority, OkHttp forwards these headers unchanged, disclosing the complete configured credential to the redirect destination.

Root Cause

The defect is a residual issue from an earlier credential-redirect fix. The AndroidPostBuilder inner class initialized its followRedirects boolean to true, silently overriding the connection-level setting. The transport layer never issued an explicit followRedirects(false) call on the builder, so interceptor-produced headers traveled with any 3xx redirect emitted by the server.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires that redirect or front-door behavior is compromised separately from the credential-handling component, or that these components operate in different trust domains. A fully malicious initial origin already receives the credential on the first request and does not need the redirect. Autonomous A2A agents following server-driven workflows require no user interaction. The impact is limited to credential disclosure; the advisory explicitly excludes integrity impact, availability impact, code execution, or host compromise.

java
// Patch: default PostBuilder to not follow redirects
// File: extras/http-client-android/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/client/http/android/AndroidA2AHttpClient.java
  private static class AndroidPostBuilder extends AndroidBuilder<PostBuilder>
      implements PostBuilder {
    private String body = "";
-   private boolean followRedirects = true;
+   private boolean followRedirects = false;

    @Override
    public PostBuilder body(String body) {

Source: GitHub Commit 3ae82912

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111765

Indicators of Compromise

  • Outbound HTTP 3xx redirect responses from A2A agent endpoints that redirect to authorities outside the configured A2A peer allowlist.
  • Egress requests from Android A2A clients carrying X-API-Key, API-Key, X-Auth-Token, or X-Authentication headers to unexpected hostnames.
  • Authentication log entries showing valid API keys used from source addresses that do not match the legitimate A2A agent infrastructure.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect dependency manifests (pom.xml, build.gradle) for a2a-java versions 1.3.0.Final or 1.3.1.Final and the http-client-android artifact.
  • Deploy TLS-terminating proxies to log the Host header, destination authority, and presence of nonstandard auth headers on outbound A2A traffic.
  • Audit server-side A2A endpoints for any configuration that emits 3xx responses to third-party domains.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Alert on API key usage from source IP ranges or ASNs not associated with sanctioned A2A deployments.
  • Correlate agent-initiated outbound requests with downstream credential-reuse patterns on upstream APIs.
  • Enable DNS and HTTP egress logging for workloads running the A2A Java SDK and route events to a centralized data lake for retrospective hunts.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111765

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade all A2A Java SDK deployments to version 1.3.2.Final or later.
  • Rotate any API keys or tokens that were configured in AuthInterceptor on affected versions, particularly those that may have transited through redirect-capable paths.
  • Audit A2A agent peer configurations to restrict outbound requests to known-good authorities.

Patch Information

The fix is published in GitHub Release v1.3.2.Final. The remediation changes the default value of AndroidPostBuilder.followRedirects from true to false and hardens AuthInterceptor against header injection. Review the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-4fpj-g9jf-9rgg and the related GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-9rhm-2h4x-jwmx for complete remediation guidance.

Workarounds

  • Explicitly call followRedirects(false) on every PostBuilder constructed through AndroidA2AHttpClient until the upgrade is complete.
  • Place A2A egress behind an outbound proxy that denies 3xx responses to unauthorized authorities.
  • Prefer OAuth bearer tokens via the standard Authorization header, which Android's OkHttp strips on cross-authority redirects, over nonstandard key headers.
bash
# Verify the installed a2a-java version with Maven
mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=org.a2aproject:a2a-java-sdk-client-http-android

# Enforce upgrade in pom.xml
# <dependency>
#   <groupId>org.a2aproject</groupId>
#   <artifactId>a2a-java-sdk-client-http-android</artifactId>
#   <version>1.3.2.Final</version>
# </dependency>

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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