Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-111761 Overview
CVE-2026-111761 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability [CWE-918] in the A2A Java SDK, the official Java SDK for the Agent2Agent (A2A) Protocol. Versions prior to 1.3.0.Final ship a BasePushNotificationSender in server-common that transmits task data to the URL in TaskPushNotificationConfig without destination validation, scheme restrictions, or redirect bounds. An unauthenticated attacker can register an arbitrary webhook destination and force the server to issue requests from its own network position. The vulnerability affects deployments with push notifications enabled, which is the default configuration.
Critical Impact
Unauthenticated attackers can coerce the A2A server to send task data to loopback, private, link-local, cloud-metadata, IPv6 unique-local, unspecified, or multicast destinations.
Affected Products
- A2A Java SDK server-common component prior to 1.3.0.Final
- JdkA2AHttpClient implementations (follow redirects by default)
- VertxA2AHttpClient implementations (follow redirects by default)
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-20 - CVE-2026-111761 published to NVD
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-111761
Vulnerability Analysis
The A2A Java SDK push notification subsystem accepts caller-supplied URLs and uses them verbatim when dispatching task status and artifact updates. InMemoryPushNotificationConfigStore.setInfo stores the destination without inspection, and onCreateTaskPushNotificationConfig performs no validation. An attacker registers a destination through an inline SendMessage configuration or by calling CreateTaskPushNotificationConfig against an existing task. The server then issues outbound HTTP requests to the attacker-chosen target whenever task state changes.
Because both JdkA2AHttpClient and VertxA2AHttpClient follow HTTP redirects, any creation-time destination check can be bypassed by hosting a webhook that returns a 3xx response pointing to internal infrastructure. The redirect also converts the POST into a GET and drops the request body. The sender discards the fetched response and does not surface delivery outcomes, so this is a blind SSRF with no response read-back.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing destination validation across the push notification pipeline. The code trusts URLs provided by unauthenticated callers, does not enforce scheme allow-lists, does not bound redirects, and relies only on hostname-level checks that fail against DNS rebinding. No credentials or user interaction are required to exploit the flaw.
Attack Vector
A network-based attacker calls the public A2A API to register a push notification destination pointing to an internal resource. Target classes include 127.0.0.1, RFC1918 ranges, link-local addresses, cloud metadata endpoints such as 169.254.169.254, IPv6 unique-local addresses, the unspecified address, and multicast ranges where routing permits. Direct POST delivery pushes attacker-influenced task data into internal services. A redirected POST-to-GET request still reaches internal endpoints but without the body.
# Security patch - new validation properties introduced in 1.3.0.Final
# Source: https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/commit/b855b2ae37e4bf23f73e7746ce166fbc5a0b8b5b
a2a.push-notification.enabled=true
# Push notification URL validation: restrict schemes
a2a.push-notification.url.allowed-schemes=https,http
# Explicit opt-in required to allow private/loopback targets
a2a.push-notification.url.allow-private-network-targets=true
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111761
Indicators of Compromise
- Outbound HTTP requests from A2A server processes to loopback, RFC1918, or 169.254.169.254 destinations.
- TaskPushNotificationConfig entries containing URLs resolving to internal, metadata, or multicast addresses.
- Webhook destinations that return HTTP 3xx responses redirecting to internal hosts.
- Unauthenticated CreateTaskPushNotificationConfig or inline SendMessage requests from untrusted sources.
Detection Strategies
- Inventory A2A Java SDK deployments and flag any version prior to 1.3.0.Final with push notifications enabled.
- Log every push notification URL at registration time and compare against an internal network block-list.
- Correlate task creation events with outbound HTTP destinations originating from the A2A server host.
- Alert on HTTP redirects observed in push notification delivery that cross private or metadata address boundaries.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Monitor egress traffic from A2A server hosts for connections to cloud metadata, loopback, and private ranges.
- Capture and retain the full URL set stored in InMemoryPushNotificationConfigStore for forensic review.
- Instrument BasePushNotificationSender with structured logs on each outbound call, including final resolved IP.
- Review authentication posture on the A2A API; the default deployment permits unauthenticated callers.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111761
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade the A2A Java SDK to version 1.3.0.Final or later across all deployments.
- Disable push notifications (a2a.push-notification.enabled=false) until the upgrade is complete.
- Enforce authentication on all A2A endpoints that accept TaskPushNotificationConfig input.
- Place A2A servers in network segments that deny egress to metadata and internal management ranges.
Patch Information
The fix is available in A2A Java SDK v1.3.0.Final. The patch introduced in Pull Request #1096 adds URL scheme allow-lists, private network target restrictions, and explicit followRedirects control on HTTP client builders. Review the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-q78c-5jjq-57g8 and the commit diff for implementation specifics.
Workarounds
- Set a2a.push-notification.url.allowed-schemes=https to block non-TLS targets once upgraded.
- Leave a2a.push-notification.url.allow-private-network-targets=false (default after patch) in production.
- Place an egress proxy in front of the A2A server to filter outbound destinations and reject redirects to private ranges.
- Resolve webhook hostnames at validation time and pin the resolved address through delivery to defeat DNS rebinding.
# Minimal hardened configuration for A2A Java SDK >= 1.3.0.Final
# Source: https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/commit/b855b2ae37e4bf23f73e7746ce166fbc5a0b8b5b
a2a.authorization.required=true
a2a.push-notification.enabled=true
a2a.push-notification.url.allowed-schemes=https
a2a.push-notification.url.allow-private-network-targets=false
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

