Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-111762 Overview
The A2A Java SDK, the official Java implementation of the Agent2Agent (A2A) Protocol, writes sensitive push notification credentials to server logs when protobuf deserialization fails. The RestHandler.parseRequestBody method in transport/rest/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/transport/rest/handler/RestHandler.java logs the full JSON request body at SEVERE level whenever JsonFormat.parser().merge() throws InvalidProtocolBufferException. Requests to /v1/tenants/{tenant}/tasks/{taskId}/pushNotificationConfigs can contain bearer tokens in the token and authentication.credentials fields. A valid JSON body that fails strict protobuf parsing is sufficient to leak those secrets in cleartext. The issue is fixed in version 1.3.0.Final.
Critical Impact
Attackers with access to server logs or a log aggregation system can retrieve bearer tokens and forge task status updates to a client's push notification endpoint.
Affected Products
- A2A Java SDK versions prior to 1.3.0.Final
- Deployments with push notifications enabled (createTaskPushNotificationConfiguration enabled)
- A2A compat-0.3 REST transport handler (RestHandler_v0_3.java)
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-20 - CVE-2026-111762 published to NVD
- 2026-10-20 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-111762
Vulnerability Analysis
This is an Information Exposure Through Log Files issue classified under [CWE-532]. The REST transport handler calls JsonFormat.parser().merge(body, builder) to deserialize JSON request bodies into protobuf message builders. When strict parsing rejects an unknown field or encounters a schema mismatch, the parser throws InvalidProtocolBufferException. The exception handler logs the entire raw request body at SEVERE severity before raising InvalidParamsError.
Push notification configuration requests legitimately carry authentication secrets. The token field and the authentication.credentials object are intended for use when the server calls back to a client's push notification endpoint. Writing the raw body to logs persists these secrets in cleartext across every logging sink, including centralized log aggregation systems.
Root Cause
The handler conflates diagnostic logging with input validation. The exception path assumes the request body is safe to log because it failed parsing, but the body contains attacker-supplied or client-supplied secrets regardless of validity. The log message uses the {0} placeholder bound directly to body, with no field redaction or structured filtering.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires local access to logs or to a downstream log pipeline (AV:L). An authenticated client submits a push notification configuration containing valid bearer credentials, but with a trivially malformed JSON payload, such as an unknown field under strict parsing. The server rejects the request and writes the credentials to the log. An attacker reading the logs recovers the bearer token and uses it to send forged task status updates to the client's push endpoint, impersonating the server.
validate(body);
JsonFormat.parser().merge(body, builder);
} catch (InvalidProtocolBufferException e) {
- log.log(Level.SEVERE, "Error parsing JSON request body: {0}", body);
+ log.log(Level.SEVERE, "Error parsing JSON request body (length={0})",
+ body != null ? body.length() : 0);
log.log(Level.SEVERE, "Parse error details", e);
throw new InvalidParamsError("Failed to parse request body: " + e.getMessage());
}
Source: GitHub Commit 88827105. The patch replaces the full-body log with a length-only log entry, preserving diagnostic value without exposing secrets.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111762
Indicators of Compromise
- Log entries at SEVERE level containing the string Error parsing JSON request body: followed by a JSON body
- Logged JSON payloads containing token, authentication, or credentials fields from /pushNotificationConfigs requests
- Unexpected task status updates arriving at client push notification endpoints from unrecognized sources
Detection Strategies
- Grep historical server logs and log aggregation indexes for the pre-patch log message pattern to identify prior credential exposure
- Correlate failed InvalidProtocolBufferException events on /v1/tenants/{tenant}/tasks/{taskId}/pushNotificationConfigs with subsequent anomalous callbacks to client push endpoints
- Audit log retention and access control lists to identify which identities could have read exposed bearer tokens
Monitoring Recommendations
- Alert on any SEVERE log entries from RestHandler or RestHandler_v0_3 that contain JSON structural characters
- Enable detection content in your SIEM or data lake to flag plaintext bearer tokens in log streams
- Monitor push notification endpoints for authentication attempts using tokens that have been superseded or rotated
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111762
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade the A2A Java SDK to version 1.3.0.Final or later across all services using the REST transport
- Rotate every bearer token and credential submitted to /v1/tenants/{tenant}/tasks/{taskId}/pushNotificationConfigs on vulnerable builds
- Purge or restrict access to historical logs and log aggregation indexes that may contain leaked push notification payloads
Patch Information
The fix is published as A2A Java SDK 1.3.0.Final. See the GitHub Release v1.3.0.Final, the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-x32g-jvvm-4725, and the fix GitHub Commit 88827105. The patch logs only the body length instead of the body contents in both RestHandler.java and the compat-0.3 variant RestHandler_v0_3.java.
Workarounds
- If upgrading immediately is not possible, disable push notifications so createTaskPushNotificationConfiguration requests do not reach the vulnerable parser
- Reduce the logger level for org.a2aproject.sdk.transport.rest.handler.RestHandler below SEVERE to suppress the body log entry
- Enforce strict access controls on log files and aggregation platforms, limiting read access to a minimal set of operators
# Example: suppress the vulnerable log statement via java.util.logging configuration
org.a2aproject.sdk.transport.rest.handler.RestHandler.level = OFF
org.a2aproject.sdk.compat03.transport.rest.handler.RestHandler_v0_3.level = OFF
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

