Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-111764 Overview
The A2A Java SDK, the official Java implementation of the Agent2Agent (A2A) Protocol, contains a missing authorization flaw [CWE-862] in versions prior to 1.3.0.Final. The default InMemoryTaskStore configuration performs no authorization checks on task reads. The no-argument constructor sets authorizationProvider to null, and InMemoryTaskStore.get(String taskId) returns the stored task without verifying the caller or owner. In multi-caller deployments using the default wiring, any caller who knows or guesses another caller's task ID can retrieve task status, context ID, message history, and artifacts. The default reference transport endpoints do not enforce authentication, so an unauthenticated remote attacker can reach the vulnerable path.
Critical Impact
Unauthenticated network attackers can read arbitrary A2A tasks, including message history and artifacts, by guessing or discovering task IDs.
Affected Products
- A2A Java SDK versions prior to 1.3.0.Final
- Applications using DefaultRequestHandler.builder().build() without an authorization decorator
- Spring and CDI integrations that rely on the default InMemoryTaskStore wiring
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-20 - CVE-2026-111764 published to the National Vulnerability Database
- 2026-10-20 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-111764
Vulnerability Analysis
The A2A Java SDK exposes task state through the InMemoryTaskStore component. Task retrieval relies on an authorization pipeline implemented by TaskAuthorizationProvider and enforced via AuthorizationRequestHandlerDecorator. When neither is wired, task reads bypass all ownership checks. The default no-argument constructor leaves authorizationProvider as null, which disables ownership validation inside InMemoryTaskStore.get(String taskId).
Because the reference transport endpoints do not enforce authentication, the exposure is reachable from the network without credentials. Information disclosed includes task status, context identifiers, full message history, and generated artifacts — data that frequently contains prompts, intermediate agent reasoning, and sensitive business context.
Root Cause
The root cause is an insecure default: fail-open authorization. The SDK required applications to explicitly install a TaskAuthorizationProvider and AuthorizationRequestHandlerDecorator to enforce access control. Developers who used the documented builder patterns or CDI defaults received a store that returned any task on request, regardless of caller identity.
Attack Vector
An unauthenticated attacker sends a task read request to the A2A endpoint with a target taskId. Task identifiers may be enumerated, leaked through logs, or guessed in deployments that use predictable identifier schemes. The server returns the full task object without checking the caller against the task owner.
# Patch excerpt — compat-0.3/tck/src/main/resources/application.properties
quarkus.log.file.path=target/tck-test.log
quarkus.log.file.level=DEBUG
quarkus.log.console.level=INFO
+
+# Authorization is not configured in this application
+a2a.authorization.required=false
Source: GitHub Commit efb4e98
The fix enforces a fail-closed default. Applications must now explicitly opt out of authorization via a2a.authorization.required=false, or supply a working authorization provider. See Pull Request #1095 for the full change set.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111764
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected GET or RPC calls to A2A task-read endpoints referencing task IDs that were not issued to the requesting caller.
- Access logs showing high-volume task ID enumeration from a single source address or user agent.
- Response payloads containing contextId, history, or artifacts fields returned to anonymous or unauthenticated clients.
Detection Strategies
- Inventory running A2A Java SDK versions and flag any instance below 1.3.0.Final.
- Inspect application wiring for DefaultRequestHandler.builder().build() without a corresponding AuthorizationRequestHandlerDecorator.
- Add application-layer logging of the authenticated principal associated with each task read, and alert when the principal is absent.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Monitor A2A transport endpoints for anonymous requests and establish a baseline for expected task-read volume per caller.
- Alert on sequential or dictionary-style task ID access patterns consistent with enumeration.
- Capture outbound responses from A2A services into a central data lake to retain forensic evidence of information disclosure events.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111764
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade the A2A Java SDK to version 1.3.0.Final or later across all services and build pipelines.
- Audit application code for direct use of InMemoryTaskStore without a configured TaskAuthorizationProvider.
- Rotate or invalidate task identifiers that may have been exposed, and review historical access logs for enumeration activity.
- Restrict A2A transport endpoints behind an authenticated reverse proxy until the upgrade is deployed.
Patch Information
The issue is fixed in A2A Java SDK v1.3.0.Final. The release enforces a fail-closed authorization default: applications that do not configure a TaskAuthorizationProvider must explicitly set a2a.authorization.required=false to acknowledge the risk. See GHSA-qw47-mcm5-934w for the full advisory.
Workarounds
- Implement and register a TaskAuthorizationProvider that validates caller identity against task ownership before any task read.
- Wrap the DefaultRequestHandler with AuthorizationRequestHandlerDecorator whether using CDI, Spring, or manual construction.
- Place the A2A service behind an authenticated gateway that enforces mTLS or token-based authentication at the transport layer.
- Use high-entropy, non-sequential task identifiers to reduce the practicality of enumeration while patches are rolled out.
# Enforce authorization in A2A Java SDK 1.3.0.Final and later
a2a.authorization.required=true
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

