Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-109204 Overview
CVE-2026-109204 is an improper authorization vulnerability [CWE-640] in LogicalDOC Community Edition through version 9.3. The flaw resides in the PswRecovery servlet, which issues password recovery tickets without binding them to the requesting user. An attacker with a low-privileged account can request a recovery ticket for their own identity, then replay that ticket against any userId, including administrators. Successful exploitation resets the victim's password, locks the account owner out, and discloses the victim's email address. The issue is tracked under a VulnCheck advisory and was addressed in a vendor commit on the project's public repository.
Critical Impact
Authenticated attackers can take over administrator accounts by reusing a self-issued password recovery ticket against arbitrary user identifiers.
Affected Products
- LogicalDOC Community Edition versions up to and including 9.3
- The vulnerable PswRecovery servlet shipped with the logicaldoc-webapp module
- Deployments using the Community Edition password recovery workflow
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-12 - CVE-2026-109204 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- 2026-10-13 - Last updated in NVD
Technical Details for CVE-2026-109204
Vulnerability Analysis
LogicalDOC's password recovery flow generates a one-time ticket that users present along with a new password. The server-side implementation in PswRecovery.java validates that the ticket exists and has not expired, but it does not verify that the ticket was originally issued for the userId submitted in the reset request. This decoupling of ticket ownership from the password change operation turns the mechanism into a universal credential reset primitive. The issue is categorized under weak password recovery mechanism for forgotten passwords [CWE-640].
Root Cause
The root cause is a missing authorization check between the recovery ticket and the target account. The handler at the referenced line in PswRecovery.java treats the ticket as a bearer token for the recovery subsystem rather than as a credential scoped to a specific user. Because any authenticated low-privileged user can request a legitimate ticket for their own account, the attacker holds a valid, server-signed artifact that the application accepts for arbitrary identifiers.
Attack Vector
The attack is network-reachable and requires only low privileges. An attacker first triggers the password recovery flow for their own account and captures the generated ticket. They then submit a password reset request to the PswRecovery endpoint supplying the captured ticket together with the userId of a target such as an administrator. The server accepts the request, writes the attacker-chosen password to the target account, and returns the target's email address. The legitimate owner is locked out, and the attacker gains administrative access.
No verified exploit code is published. See the VulnCheck advisory for LogicalDOC and the vulnerable source in PswRecovery.java for technical details.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-109204
Indicators of Compromise
- Password change events on administrator accounts correlated with recovery ticket submissions from unrelated low-privileged user sessions.
- Multiple PswRecovery requests from the same source IP targeting different userId values within a short time window.
- Unexpected account lockouts or password change notifications sent to administrator mailboxes.
- Login failures from legitimate administrators immediately after successful password reset events.
Detection Strategies
- Parse LogicalDOC web application logs for PswRecovery endpoint invocations and compare the authenticated session user with the submitted userId parameter.
- Alert when a recovery ticket issued for one user is redeemed to change the password of a different user.
- Baseline normal password recovery volume per account and flag deviations, particularly against privileged roles.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward LogicalDOC application and access logs to a centralized logging platform for correlation with authentication events.
- Monitor administrator account authentication patterns for sudden password rotations followed by logins from new IP addresses or user agents.
- Enable email delivery monitoring for password reset notifications to detect bursts targeting multiple user accounts.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-109204
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade LogicalDOC Community Edition to a release that includes the fix in commit afc8554e.
- Invalidate all outstanding password recovery tickets after upgrade.
- Force password rotation for administrator and privileged accounts and review their recent activity.
- Audit user account changes and email address disclosures that occurred before patching.
Patch Information
The LogicalDOC project addressed the vulnerability in commit afc8554e6654865295bffc8f080c7cb899caf057 in the logicaldoc/community repository. The fix binds the recovery ticket to the user that requested it, so the server rejects reset attempts where the submitted userId does not match the ticket owner. Administrators should track the maintainer guidance in GitHub Discussion #119 and the VulnCheck advisory for release packaging details.
Workarounds
- Restrict network reachability to the LogicalDOC web interface using firewall rules or a reverse proxy allowlist until the patch is applied.
- Temporarily disable the password recovery feature or route recovery requests through an administrator-mediated process.
- Require multi-factor authentication at the identity provider layer so a stolen password alone does not grant administrative access.
- Monitor and rate-limit requests to the PswRecovery endpoint at the proxy layer to constrain abuse windows.
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

