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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-109201

CVE-2026-109201: LogicalDOC Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-109201 is an authorization bypass flaw in LogicalDOC Community Edition that lets authenticated users access and modify unauthorized documents through SOAP operations. This post covers technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-109201 Overview

CVE-2026-109201 is a missing authorization vulnerability [CWE-862] in LogicalDOC Community Edition through version 9.3. The flaw resides in the SoapDocumentService endpoint, where several document operations fail to verify that the authenticated caller has permission on the target document. Any authenticated user can invoke copy, getExtractedText, deleteVersion, reindex, deleteLink, or restore against sequential document IDs through SOAP or the /services/rest/document REST interface. This allows attackers to disclose, tamper with, or delete documents stored by other users.

Critical Impact

Authenticated users can read, modify, or destroy arbitrary documents across the LogicalDOC tenancy by iterating document IDs through unprotected web service operations.

Affected Products

  • LogicalDOC Community Edition versions through 9.3
  • SoapDocumentService SOAP endpoint
  • /services/rest/document REST endpoint

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-12 - CVE-2026-109201 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-13 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-109201

Vulnerability Analysis

LogicalDOC exposes document operations through both SOAP and REST interfaces backed by SoapDocumentService. Several of these operations accept a docId parameter but do not call the permission-check routines that enforce per-document access control. An authenticated low-privilege user can therefore operate on documents owned by other users or stored in folders they cannot normally access.

The affected operations include copy (document disclosure through duplication into an attacker-controlled folder), getExtractedText (direct content disclosure), deleteVersion and deleteLink (destructive tampering), reindex (integrity and availability impact), and restore. Because document identifiers are sequential integers, enumeration is trivial.

Root Cause

The root cause is the absence of an authorization check equivalent to checkDocumentPermission on sensitive document-service entry points. The service relied on session authentication alone and did not validate whether the caller held the required permission (READ, WRITE, DELETE) on the requested document ID. This is a classic Insecure Direct Object Reference pattern governed by [CWE-862: Missing Authorization].

Attack Vector

The vulnerability is reachable over the network by any user with valid LogicalDOC credentials. An attacker authenticates, then issues SOAP or REST requests to the document service while iterating docId values. No user interaction is required and attack complexity is low. The patch adds a checkDocumentPermission helper in AbstractService.java and updates the REST client in RestDocumentClient.java to propagate a new PermissionException from deleteVersion and related calls.

java
// Patch: logicaldoc-webservice/src/main/java/com/logicaldoc/webservice/AbstractService.java
protected void checkDocumentPermission(Permission permission, long userId, long docId)
        throws PersistenceException, PermissionException {
    checkDocumentPermission(permission, UserDAO.get().findById(userId, true), docId);
}

protected void checkMenu(User user, long menuId) throws PermissionException {
    MenuDAO dao = MenuDAO.get();
    if (!dao.isReadAllowed(menuId, user.getId())) {
        // ...
    }
}

Source: LogicalDOC commit 648047ee

java
// Patch: logicaldoc-webservice/src/main/java/com/logicaldoc/webservice/rest/client/RestDocumentClient.java
/**
 * @throws PermissionException User without DELETE permission
 */
public void deleteVersion(long docId, String version)
        throws AuthenticationException, WebserviceException, PersistenceException, PermissionException {
    WebClient.client(proxy).accept(MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON);
    proxy.deleteVersion(docId, version);
}

Source: LogicalDOC commit 648047ee

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-109201

Indicators of Compromise

  • SOAP or REST requests to /services/rest/document invoking copy, getExtractedText, deleteVersion, reindex, deleteLink, or restore from low-privilege user sessions.
  • Sequential enumeration patterns against the docId parameter from a single authenticated session.
  • Unexpected document copies appearing in folders owned by non-administrative users.
  • Audit log entries showing version deletions or reindex operations on documents the acting user does not own.

Detection Strategies

  • Alert when a single authenticated session issues document-service calls referencing more than a threshold of distinct docId values within a short window.
  • Correlate web service access logs with LogicalDOC permission tables to flag operations where the acting user lacks folder-level access to the referenced document.
  • Hunt for HTTP 200 responses to deleteVersion or deleteLink calls originating from non-admin accounts.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose logging on the LogicalDOC web services layer and forward logs to a centralized SIEM.
  • Track document integrity metrics such as unexpected version deletions, reindex events, and new copies in sensitive folders.
  • Baseline normal API usage per role and alert on deviations, especially burst activity against document IDs.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-109201

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade LogicalDOC Community Edition to a release that includes commit 648047ee0ec95c294bb983e511fed60dbc67977f or later.
  • Audit document access and modification logs for prior abuse of the affected operations.
  • Rotate credentials for low-privilege accounts if logs indicate suspicious document enumeration.

Patch Information

The fix is implemented in LogicalDOC commit 648047ee, which introduces a checkDocumentPermission helper in AbstractService.java and enforces it across the affected document-service operations. The REST client signatures in RestDocumentClient.java were updated to surface the new PermissionException. Additional context is available in the VulnCheck advisory and the vendor discussion thread.

Workarounds

  • Restrict network access to the /services/rest/document and SOAP SoapDocumentService endpoints to trusted integration hosts only.
  • Disable the web services layer in context.properties if no external integrations require it.
  • Enforce strong account hygiene and remove unused LogicalDOC user accounts to reduce the authenticated attack surface.
bash
# Example: restrict access to LogicalDOC web services at the reverse proxy
# nginx snippet - allow only trusted integration subnet
location /services/ {
    allow 10.10.20.0/24;
    deny all;
    proxy_pass http://logicaldoc_backend;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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