Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-109202 Overview
CVE-2026-109202 is a missing authorization vulnerability [CWE-862] in LogicalDOC Community Edition through version 9.3. The flaw resides in the zip-export servlet, which fails to validate folder-level permissions when authenticated users request a ZIP archive of a folder's contents. An attacker with a valid low-privilege account can supply an arbitrary folderId parameter to /zip-export and receive all documents from restricted folders. The underlying method ZipExport.addFolderDocuments() bypasses both READ and DOWNLOAD permission checks, breaking the document management system's access control model.
Critical Impact
Any authenticated LogicalDOC user can exfiltrate the contents of folders they are not authorized to access, including sensitive business documents stored in restricted repositories.
Affected Products
- LogicalDOC Community Edition versions up to and including 9.3
- logicaldoc-core module containing the vulnerable ZipExport.java
- logicaldoc-webapp module exposing the ExportZip servlet
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-12 - CVE-2026-109202 published to NVD
- 2026-10-13 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-109202
Vulnerability Analysis
LogicalDOC exposes a servlet endpoint at /zip-export that packages the contents of a folder into a downloadable ZIP archive. The servlet accepts a folderId parameter directly from the request and passes it to ZipExport.addFolderDocuments() in logicaldoc-core. This method enumerates and streams documents without invoking the authorization layer that normally gates folder access.
The permission model in LogicalDOC relies on per-folder READ and DOWNLOAD flags enforced at the service layer. By skipping those checks, the export path becomes an insecure direct object reference. Any authenticated session, regardless of role or group membership, can enumerate folderId values and extract documents. Confidentiality impact is high while integrity and availability remain unaffected.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing authorization enforcement [CWE-862] within the ZIP export workflow. The vulnerable call site at ZipExport.java#L233 iterates folder contents without delegating to the permission checker. The companion servlet ExportZip.java#L57 likewise accepts the user-supplied folder identifier without verifying that the authenticated user has READ or DOWNLOAD rights on the target folder.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires only a valid, low-privilege account on the target LogicalDOC instance. The attacker issues an authenticated HTTP request to the /zip-export endpoint with a folderId parameter pointing to a restricted folder. The server responds with a ZIP archive containing every document in that folder. Attackers can brute-force sequential folderId values to systematically harvest the entire document store.
// Patch excerpt from logicaldoc-webservice/src/main/java/com/logicaldoc/webservice/AbstractService.java
// Introduces a permission check helper used by the fixed export paths
protected void checkDocumentPermission(Permission permission, long userId, long docId)
throws PersistenceException, PermissionException {
checkDocumentPermission(permission, UserDAO.get().findById(userId, true), docId);
}
protected void checkMenu(User user, long menuId) throws PermissionException {
MenuDAO dao = MenuDAO.get();
if (!dao.isReadAllowed(menuId, user.getId())) {
// ...
}
}
Source: GitHub Commit 648047e
Detect Identity Attacks the Moment Authentication Fails
Singularity™ Identity surfaces credential misuse, lateral movement, and privilege escalation in real time, so you can contain the breach before it spreads.
Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-109202
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected HTTP GET or POST requests to /zip-export with varying folderId values from a single authenticated session.
- Large ZIP responses served from LogicalDOC to accounts that do not normally perform bulk exports.
- Access log entries showing a user retrieving documents from folders where that user has no interactive history.
Detection Strategies
- Correlate authentication logs with /zip-export traffic to flag users exporting folders outside their assigned workspaces.
- Alert on sequential or enumerated folderId parameter values from the same session, indicating ID brute-forcing.
- Baseline normal ZIP export volume per user and alert on deviations in request count or response size.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable verbose access logging on the LogicalDOC web tier and forward logs to a centralized analytics platform.
- Monitor outbound bandwidth from LogicalDOC servers for abnormal spikes tied to /zip-export responses.
- Review user-session activity reports for cross-folder access patterns that violate least-privilege expectations.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-109202
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade LogicalDOC Community Edition to a version containing commit 648047e or later.
- Audit existing user accounts and disable or reduce privileges for inactive and shared logins.
- Review web and application logs for prior requests to /zip-export and investigate any suspicious folderId enumeration.
Patch Information
The vendor addressed the issue in commit 648047e in the LogicalDOC community repository. The patch introduces checkDocumentPermission() helpers and enforces READ and DOWNLOAD permission validation in the ZIP export path. Additional context is available in the VulnCheck Advisory for LogicalDoc and GitHub Community Discussion #119.
Workarounds
- Restrict network access to the LogicalDOC /zip-export endpoint via a reverse proxy or WAF rule until patching is complete.
- Temporarily disable the ZIP export feature for non-administrative roles if the deployment supports feature-level restrictions.
- Enforce strong authentication and short session lifetimes to limit the window in which a compromised account can abuse the endpoint.
# Example NGINX reverse-proxy rule to block /zip-export until patched
location /zip-export {
deny all;
return 403;
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

