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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-102076

CVE-2026-102076: Siemens Building Controllers DoS Vulnerability

CVE-2026-102076 is a denial of service vulnerability in Siemens APOGEE and TALON building automation controllers caused by improper input validation. This article covers the technical details, affected versions, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-102076 Overview

CVE-2026-102076 is a stack-based buffer overflow [CWE-121] affecting Siemens APOGEE and TALON building automation controllers. The affected web service does not properly validate user-supplied input in upload code. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send crafted network traffic to the controller web interface to trigger a denial of service condition.

The vulnerability affects controllers deployed in commercial building management systems where availability of HVAC, lighting, and environmental controls directly impacts facility operations.

Critical Impact

Unauthenticated remote attackers can disrupt building automation controllers over the network without user interaction, impacting availability of HVAC and facility control systems.

Affected Products

  • APOGEE MBC (PPC) and MEC (PPC) controllers with BACnet or P2 Ethernet (all versions)
  • APOGEE PXC Compact and PXC Modular with BACnet (all versions before V3.5.7) and P2 Ethernet (all versions before V2.8.21)
  • TALON TC Compact and TC Modular with BACnet (all versions before V3.5.7)

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-13 - CVE-2026-102076 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-15 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-102076

Vulnerability Analysis

The flaw resides in the web service component embedded in APOGEE and TALON field controllers. The upload code path accepts attacker-controlled input and copies it onto a fixed-size stack buffer without enforcing length constraints. When the input exceeds the buffer boundary, adjacent stack memory and control structures are corrupted.

The resulting corruption crashes the controller process and interrupts automation functions managed by the device. Because the web service is reachable over the network and no authentication is required, exploitation can occur directly from any host that can reach the device management interface.

Siemens field controllers like these typically sit on operational technology (OT) segments. Exposure of the management interface to adjacent corporate networks or improperly segmented environments increases exploitability.

Root Cause

The root cause is improper input validation in the upload handler of the device web service, classified as a stack-based buffer overflow [CWE-121]. The handler does not verify the size of user-supplied data before writing it to a bounded stack buffer, violating secure coding practices for length-checked copy operations.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network access to the controller web service. The attacker sends a specially crafted upload request containing oversized input to the vulnerable endpoint. No credentials, user interaction, or prior foothold is required. The confirmed impact is loss of availability through controller crash; integrity and confidentiality are not reported as affected.

The vulnerability mechanism is described in prose because no public proof-of-concept code is available. See the Siemens Security Advisory SSA-333035 for vendor technical details.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-102076

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected reboots, watchdog resets, or process crashes on APOGEE PXC, MBC, MEC, or TALON TC controllers
  • Loss of BACnet or P2 Ethernet communications from affected controllers without a corresponding network event
  • Anomalous HTTP POST or upload requests to controller web interfaces originating from unexpected sources
  • Repeated TCP resets or malformed HTTP transactions logged by OT firewalls in front of controllers

Detection Strategies

  • Inventory all APOGEE and TALON controllers and compare firmware versions against the fixed baselines (V3.5.7 for BACnet, V2.8.21 for P2 Ethernet)
  • Deploy network monitoring on OT segments to flag oversized HTTP upload payloads directed at controller management interfaces
  • Correlate controller availability loss events with upstream HTTP request logs to identify crash-triggering traffic

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Ingest syslog, SNMP traps, and BACnet device status telemetry into a centralized data lake for continuous availability monitoring
  • Alert on new or unauthorized sources attempting to reach TCP ports used by the controller web service
  • Baseline normal upload activity to the building management system and alert on deviations in payload size or frequency

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-102076

Immediate Actions Required

  • Update APOGEE PXC Compact and PXC Modular (BACnet) and TALON TC Compact and TC Modular (BACnet) controllers to V3.5.7 or later
  • Update APOGEE PXC Compact and PXC Modular (P2 Ethernet) controllers to V2.8.21 or later
  • Restrict network access to controller web services to trusted engineering workstations only
  • Place affected controllers behind OT-aware firewalls and enforce strict segmentation from IT networks

Patch Information

Siemens has released fixed firmware versions V3.5.7 for BACnet variants of PXC Compact, PXC Modular, TALON TC Compact, and TALON TC Modular. For P2 Ethernet variants of PXC Compact and PXC Modular, firmware V2.8.21 or later addresses the issue. APOGEE MBC (PPC) and MEC (PPC) product lines have no listed fixed version; refer to the Siemens Security Advisory SSA-333035 for the latest guidance.

Workarounds

  • Block external access to the controller web service at perimeter and OT boundary firewalls
  • Limit management access to a dedicated engineering VLAN with explicit allow-lists
  • Disable the web service on controllers where it is not operationally required
  • Follow Siemens operational guidelines for industrial security as outlined in advisory SSA-333035
bash
# Example firewall rule to restrict controller web access to an engineering subnet
iptables -A FORWARD -s 10.20.30.0/24 -d <controller_ip> -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -d <controller_ip> -p tcp --dport 80 -j DROP

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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