Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-102073 Overview
CVE-2026-102073 affects multiple Siemens APOGEE and TALON building automation controllers. The web service in these devices fails to properly validate the length of user-controllable input. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this flaw over the network to read portions of device memory or trigger a denial-of-service condition. The weakness is categorized as an integer underflow [CWE-191]. Siemens published advisory SSA-333035 to track the issue.
Critical Impact
Unauthenticated remote attackers can read device memory or crash building automation controllers used in critical facility infrastructure.
Affected Products
- APOGEE MBC (PPC) BACnet and P2 Ethernet (all versions)
- APOGEE MEC (PPC) BACnet and P2 Ethernet (all versions)
- APOGEE PXC Compact and Modular BACnet (all versions < V3.5.7) and P2 Ethernet (all versions < V2.8.21)
- TALON TC Compact and Modular BACnet (all versions < V3.5.7)
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-13 - CVE-2026-102073 published to the National Vulnerability Database
- 2026-10-15 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-102073
Vulnerability Analysis
The flaw resides in the web service component exposed by APOGEE and TALON controllers. The service accepts user-controllable input without properly validating its length. When processing a crafted request, the controller performs arithmetic on size values that can wrap below zero, producing an integer underflow. The resulting miscalculation causes the service to read beyond intended memory bounds or crash the handler.
Successful exploitation yields two distinct outcomes. An attacker can retrieve fragments of device memory, which may contain configuration data, session artifacts, or protocol state. Alternatively, the malformed input can terminate the web service and interrupt operational technology (OT) workflows that rely on the controller.
Root Cause
The root cause is an integer underflow [CWE-191] in the controller web service input-length handling path. The code performs a size calculation on attacker-supplied data without a lower-bound check. When the computed length wraps to a very large value, downstream buffer operations read or process memory outside intended boundaries.
Attack Vector
The attack vector is network-based and requires no authentication or user interaction. An attacker with reachability to the controller web service sends a crafted HTTP request containing malformed length fields. The controller must be exposed on a reachable network segment. Building automation networks that bridge IT and OT environments expand the exposure surface.
No verified public exploit code is available at this time. See the Siemens Security Advisory SSA-333035 for technical specifics.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-102073
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected web service restarts or process crashes on APOGEE or TALON controllers
- Abnormally large or malformed HTTP requests targeting controller management interfaces
- Spikes in traffic to controller web ports from unknown source addresses
- Gaps in BACnet or P2 Ethernet telemetry correlating with web service disruptions
Detection Strategies
- Baseline normal HTTP request sizes and content lengths to controller web services and alert on outliers
- Inspect perimeter and OT segmentation logs for unauthenticated HTTP requests reaching building automation devices
- Correlate controller availability events with inbound network traffic to identify DoS attempts
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward controller syslog, firewall, and OT network telemetry to a centralized analytics platform for correlation
- Monitor east-west traffic between IT networks and the building automation VLAN for unauthorized flows
- Track firmware versions across the APOGEE and TALON fleet to confirm patch coverage
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-102073
Immediate Actions Required
- Inventory all APOGEE and TALON controllers and identify devices running vulnerable firmware
- Restrict network access to controller web services using firewall rules and VLAN segmentation
- Block external internet reachability to building automation controllers
- Monitor affected controllers for signs of crashes or anomalous HTTP traffic
Patch Information
Siemens has released fixed firmware for a subset of affected products. Upgrade APOGEE PXC Compact and Modular BACnet variants to V3.5.7 or later, and the P2 Ethernet variants to V2.8.21 or later. Upgrade TALON TC Compact and Modular BACnet to V3.5.7 or later. For APOGEE MBC and MEC (PPC) product lines, no fix is listed in the advisory; apply compensating controls. Refer to the Siemens Security Advisory SSA-333035 for the authoritative upgrade matrix.
Workarounds
- Place controllers behind a dedicated OT firewall and permit management traffic only from authorized engineering workstations
- Disable the web service on controllers where it is not operationally required
- Apply Siemens' operational guidelines for industrial security and the defense-in-depth concept for building automation networks
- Use a VPN or jump host for any remote administration of controller web interfaces
# Example firewall rule to restrict controller web access to a trusted management subnet
iptables -A FORWARD -s 10.10.50.0/24 -d <controller_ip> -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -d <controller_ip> -p tcp --dport 80 -j DROP
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

