Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-100627 Overview
Capgo (Cap-go/capgo.app) server backend contains an authorization flaw in the API-key bundle promotion path exposed by Supabase functions. The PUT /bundle endpoint, reachable with all and write API keys, dispatches to setChannel and calls checkPermission without forwarding the request's channel_id. Because the omitted scope is passed to rbac_check_permission_direct as SQL NULL, per-channel allow and deny overrides are never evaluated. An API principal with app-level channel.promote_bundle permission can promote bundles to channels protected by explicit deny overrides. The flaw is confirmed on main at commit de66fa51e7ff2f50283cc1455c3d80ab3eb0ae43. This issue is tracked as [CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key].
Critical Impact
An attacker holding a low-privileged write or all API key with the app_developer or app_uploader role can bypass per-channel deny overrides and promote arbitrary bundles to production or restricted channels, altering public.channels.version for the target channel.
Affected Products
- Capgo (Cap-go/capgo.app) server backend
- Supabase functions implementing setChannel and PUT /bundle
- Confirmed at commit de66fa51e7ff2f50283cc1455c3d80ab3eb0ae43 on main and likely earlier versions
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-26 - CVE-2026-100627 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- 2026-09-30 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-100627
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability resides in Capgo's bundle promotion flow served by Supabase functions. The PUT /bundle endpoint is accessible to API keys scoped as all or write and routes requests to the setChannel handler. setChannel invokes checkPermission(c, 'channel.promote_bundle', { appId: body.app_id }) and does not pass the request's channel_id into the authorization context. The missing field becomes a SQL NULL when forwarded to rbac_check_permission_direct.
The backend evaluates channel-scope overrides only when p_channel_id IS NOT NULL. With a NULL scope, the function returns a decision based purely on app-level grants. Any principal holding app-level channel.promote_bundle is approved, including the default app_developer and app_uploader roles. The handler then updates public.channels.version for the supplied channel_id, validating the target channel only after authorization completes.
Root Cause
The root cause is an incomplete propagation of authorization context. The caller fails to pass the channel_id scope into the permission check, and the role-based access control (RBAC) stored procedure treats the absent scope as unconditional app-level approval. Deny overrides configured on individual channels are never consulted because the gating condition p_channel_id IS NOT NULL short-circuits override evaluation.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires a valid Capgo API key with write or all scope, which is routinely issued to developer and uploader roles. The attacker sends a PUT /bundle request specifying an app_id, a channel_id protected by a per-channel deny override, and a bundle to promote. The server returns success and updates public.channels.version, pushing the attacker-selected bundle to clients subscribed to the restricted channel. No user interaction or elevated privileges beyond the default roles are required.
The vulnerability mechanism is described in prose above. No verified proof-of-concept code is published. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-633x-9x77-77gf and the Vulncheck Advisory on Capgo RBAC Bypass for the complete technical analysis.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-100627
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected updates to public.channels.version for channels that have explicit per-channel deny overrides configured.
- PUT /bundle requests from API keys associated with app_developer or app_uploader roles targeting production or restricted channels.
- Successful bundle promotions where the acting principal lacks a channel-scope allow override but holds only app-level channel.promote_bundle.
- Divergence between the bundle shipped to end users and the bundle approved by the channel's intended release workflow.
Detection Strategies
- Audit Supabase function logs for setChannel invocations where channel_id is present in the request body but absent from the authorization context passed to rbac_check_permission_direct.
- Correlate channels table modifications with the API key, role, and channel_id of each PUT /bundle request, flagging mismatches with per-channel policies.
- Instrument rbac_check_permission_direct to log calls where p_channel_id is NULL for channel.promote_bundle checks.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable database audit logging on public.channels for UPDATE operations and alert on changes to channels with configured deny overrides.
- Monitor API key usage patterns for sudden bundle promotion activity to channels outside the key owner's historical scope.
- Track issuance and usage of write and all scoped API keys and rotate credentials for roles that do not require promotion capabilities.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-100627
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict or revoke write and all API keys for users who do not require bundle promotion, reducing the pool of principals that can trigger the vulnerable path.
- Review and tighten the default app_developer and app_uploader role grants for channel.promote_bundle until a patched release is available.
- Enforce out-of-band approval for promotions to production or sensitive channels through CI/CD gating rather than relying solely on backend RBAC.
- Audit public.channels.version history for unauthorized changes since the vulnerable commit was deployed.
Patch Information
No patched version is available at the time of publication. Monitor the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-633x-9x77-77gf for fix availability. A corrected implementation must forward body.channel_id into the checkPermission scope and ensure rbac_check_permission_direct evaluates per-channel overrides whenever the request targets a specific channel.
Workarounds
- Patch the local deployment of setChannel to pass channelId: body.channel_id into checkPermission alongside appId, forcing channel-scope evaluation.
- Modify rbac_check_permission_direct to deny channel.promote_bundle when p_channel_id is NULL and the request originates from the bundle promotion path.
- Validate the target channel_id and apply per-channel deny policies before invoking the authorization check, not after.
- Temporarily disable the PUT /bundle endpoint for API-key principals and require session-authenticated promotions through the web console.
# Configuration example - no vendor-published mitigation configuration is available.
# Refer to the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-633x-9x77-77gf for upstream guidance.
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

