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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-100618

CVE-2026-100618: Capgo Authorization Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-100618 is an authorization bypass flaw in Capgo that allows attackers to manipulate image storage paths and overwrite protected resources. This post explains its technical details, affected versions, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-100618 Overview

Capgo (capgo.app) contains an authorization flaw in the app icon update path that enables cross-tenant object rewrites through a privileged background worker. The PUT /app/:id endpoint accepts a user-controlled icon value, normalizes it, and stores it in public.apps.icon_url without verifying that the referenced storage path belongs to the target app's own image namespace. An authenticated holder of an app-limited write API key can abuse this gap to coerce the service-role worker into rewriting private storage objects the key cannot otherwise access. All versions are affected, and no patched release was available at the time of the advisory.

Critical Impact

Attackers with a low-privilege app-scoped API key can overwrite out-of-scope private storage objects (such as organization logos) via a privileged worker running with Supabase service-role credentials.

Affected Products

  • Capgo (capgo.app) - all versions
  • PUT /app/:id endpoint accepting the icon field
  • on_app_update trigger invoking cleanStoredImageMetadata() via supabaseAdmin()

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-09-26 - CVE-2026-100618 published to NVD
  • 2026-09-30 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-100618

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability is an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) classified under [CWE-639]. The PUT /app/:id endpoint accepts a client-supplied icon path and writes it into public.apps.icon_url. The server normalizes the value but never confirms that the object path lies within the target app's image namespace (for example, org/{owner_org}/{app_id}/...).

Updating apps.icon_url fires the on_app_update trigger. Its worker reads record.icon_url and invokes cleanStoredImageMetadata(), which executes with service-role credentials via supabaseAdmin(). The worker downloads the referenced object and re-uploads it with upsert: true, bypassing Supabase Storage Row Level Security (RLS).

Root Cause

The root cause is missing cross-tenant authorization on a user-controlled storage path. Server-side logic trusts the submitted icon value and persists it without validating that the path prefix matches the authenticated caller's app or organization namespace. A privileged worker then operates on that path with elevated credentials.

Attack Vector

An authenticated attacker holding an app-limited write API key issues a PUT /app/:id request against an app they legitimately control, supplying an icon value that points to a victim object outside their namespace (such as another organization's logo path). When the trigger fires, the service-role worker downloads and re-uploads that object with upsert: true, effectively rewriting the private object. The attacker never interacts with Supabase Storage directly, so Storage RLS does not block the operation. See the VulnCheck Advisory on Privilege Escalation for full exploitation mechanics.

// No verified proof-of-concept code is published.
// Refer to the GitHub Security Advisory and VulnCheck advisory for exploit details.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-100618

Indicators of Compromise

  • apps.icon_url values whose path prefix does not match the owning org/{owner_org}/{app_id}/ namespace of the updating app.
  • Storage object modifications performed by the service-role worker where the object owner differs from the API key's organization.
  • PUT /app/:id requests from app-limited API keys containing icon values that reference foreign tenant paths.

Detection Strategies

  • Audit public.apps rows for icon_url values pointing outside the expected per-app namespace and alert on mismatches.
  • Log and compare the authenticated principal of each PUT /app/:id call against the path prefix of the submitted icon value.
  • Correlate on_app_update worker activity with the originating API key's scope to identify cross-tenant writes.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose logging on the cleanStoredImageMetadata() worker, capturing source path, destination path, and acting credential.
  • Monitor Supabase Storage object versioning events for unexpected upsert: true operations on organization logos or shared assets.
  • Alert on sudden overwrites of long-lived private objects immediately following apps table updates.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-100618

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict issuance of app-limited write API keys until a patched version is released.
  • Add server-side validation on PUT /app/:id to reject any icon value whose normalized path does not start with the target app's own org/{owner_org}/{app_id}/ prefix.
  • Review audit logs for anomalous icon_url updates and reconcile affected storage objects from backup.

Patch Information

No patched version was available at the time of the advisory. Monitor the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-669c-gwrr-hc53 for remediation updates.

Workarounds

  • Enforce a path allow-list check inside the on_app_update trigger worker so cleanStoredImageMetadata() refuses objects outside the record's namespace.
  • Replace upsert: true with explicit insert semantics inside the worker to prevent silent overwrites.
  • Temporarily disable the on_app_update trigger action that re-uploads icon storage objects if business impact is tolerable.
bash
# Example server-side guard (pseudocode) rejecting out-of-namespace icon paths
# before writing apps.icon_url
expected_prefix="org/${OWNER_ORG}/${APP_ID}/"
case "$ICON_PATH" in
  "$expected_prefix"*) echo "accept" ;;
  *) echo "reject: cross-tenant icon path"; exit 1 ;;
esac

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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