Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-100621 Overview
Capgo (capgo.app) contains an incomplete access-control enforcement issue in its over-the-air (OTA) update delivery pipeline [CWE-284]. The vulnerability affects all versions of the Capgo application, and no patch is available at the time of publication. The flaw lives in the enforce_encrypted_bundle_trigger and check_encrypted_bundle_on_insert content-lock logic defined in supabase/schemas/prod.sql. Rows whose previous storage_provider value is r2-direct are exempted from the content lock, leaving delivery-critical columns mutable. An attacker holding a Capgo API key with bundle write or upload permissions can tamper with bundle metadata served through the /updates endpoint.
Critical Impact
Attackers with valid bundle-upload API keys can modify checksum, session_key, manifest, and other delivery-critical fields of OTA bundles, causing altered content to be served to end-user devices.
Affected Products
- Capgo (capgo.app) — all versions
- Supabase schema component supabase/schemas/prod.sql
- Backend update endpoint supabase/functions/_backend/utils/pg.ts
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-26 - CVE-2026-100621 published to NVD
- 2026-09-30 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-100621
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability combines two independent weaknesses in Capgo's bundle delivery pipeline. The first weakness is in the content lock implemented by enforce_encrypted_bundle_trigger and check_encrypted_bundle_on_insert. These database triggers are intended to enforce post-upload immutability of app_versions rows. However, both triggers exempt rows whose previous storage_provider value is r2-direct. While a row remains in that state, delivery-critical columns stay mutable, including name, app_id, session_key, key_id, storage_provider, r2_path, external_url, checksum, manifest, and native_packages.
The second weakness is in the channel-to-version join used by the /updates endpoint in supabase/functions/_backend/utils/pg.ts. The query filters only deleted versions and fails to exclude r2-direct versions. As a result, r2-direct rows remain OTA-selectable and reachable by client devices requesting updates.
Root Cause
The root cause is incomplete access-control enforcement in the content-lock logic. The database triggers were added to harden app_versions against a prior metadata-tampering issue, but the exemption for r2-direct state creates a bypass path. The /updates query lacks a matching exclusion, so mutated rows are reachable through the OTA selection flow.
Attack Vector
An attacker needs a Capgo API key with bundle write or upload permission. The attacker creates or maintains a bundle version in the r2-direct state, assigns it to a channel, and then issues direct PostgREST requests to modify the exempted columns. Because the /updates endpoint does not filter out r2-direct versions, the mutated metadata is served to devices during OTA selection. Modified checksum and session_key values can cause clients to accept altered bundle content, defeating the integrity guarantees of the earlier hardening.
No verified proof-of-concept code is published. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-5rg9-rhwj-wj76 and the VulnCheck Advisory on Capgo App for additional technical context.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-100621
Indicators of Compromise
- app_versions rows with storage_provider set to r2-direct that have been assigned to active OTA channels.
- Unexpected PostgREST PATCH or UPDATE requests targeting app_versions columns such as checksum, session_key, manifest, or r2_path.
- Divergence between the checksum or manifest recorded at upload time and the values currently stored for a bundle version.
Detection Strategies
- Audit the Capgo database for app_versions rows in the r2-direct state and correlate them with channel assignments.
- Enable PostgREST request logging and alert on write operations against app_versions originating from bundle-upload API keys.
- Compare bundle metadata served by /updates against an out-of-band record of expected checksums and session keys.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Monitor API key usage patterns for anomalous volumes of bundle write or upload operations.
- Review channel-to-version assignments on a scheduled basis to detect unauthorized promotions of r2-direct bundles.
- Alert on any modification of session_key, checksum, or manifest fields after the initial bundle upload transaction.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-100621
Immediate Actions Required
- Rotate or revoke Capgo API keys that hold bundle write or upload permissions and restrict new key issuance until a fix is confirmed.
- Audit all app_versions rows currently in the r2-direct state and remove or quarantine any that are assigned to production channels.
- Validate client-side bundle verification and signing to ensure devices reject bundles with mismatched integrity metadata.
Patch Information
No patch is available at the time of publication. Monitor the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-5rg9-rhwj-wj76 for upstream remediation. A complete fix must address both the content-lock exemption in enforce_encrypted_bundle_trigger and check_encrypted_bundle_on_insert, and the missing r2-direct exclusion in the /updates channel-version join in supabase/functions/_backend/utils/pg.ts.
Workarounds
- Modify the content-lock triggers to remove the r2-direct exemption, or disallow new app_versions rows from entering the r2-direct state in production environments.
- Update the /updates endpoint query to exclude rows where storage_provider = 'r2-direct', matching the deleted-version filter already in place.
- Apply least-privilege scoping to API keys so that only trusted automation can create or modify bundle versions, and log every bundle write operation for post-hoc review.
# Configuration example
# Review documentation from the upstream vendor for exact mitigation syntax.
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

