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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-100619

CVE-2026-100619: Capgo Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-100619 is an authentication bypass flaw in Capgo that allows attackers to inject malicious manifest entries through trusted worker paths, enabling OTA poisoning. This post explains its impact, technical details, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-100619 Overview

CVE-2026-100619 affects Capgo (capgo.app), an over-the-air (OTA) update platform for Capacitor applications. The vulnerability allows an authenticated principal with app-scoped write permissions to bypass a RESTRICTIVE row-level security (RLS) policy that protects the public.manifest table. Attackers abuse an indirect write path through public.app_versions.manifest on versions whose storage_provider is r2-direct. An async worker then inserts attacker-controlled entries into public.manifest using the service-role Supabase client. The resulting poisoned manifest is served to clients through the /updates endpoint, enabling OTA manifest poisoning. All versions are affected, and no patch was available at the time of publication.

Critical Impact

Attackers holding app-scoped upload or write API keys can poison OTA update manifests, causing client applications to download attacker-controlled files from arbitrary s3_path destinations.

Affected Products

  • Capgo (capgo.app) OTA update service
  • public.app_versions and public.manifest tables within Capgo-managed Supabase projects
  • Capacitor applications consuming the Capgo /updates endpoint

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-09-26 - CVE-2026-100619 published to NVD
  • 2026-09-30 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-100619

Vulnerability Analysis

The flaw sits at the intersection of two trust boundaries in Capgo's backend. A RESTRICTIVE RLS policy blocks user principals from inserting directly into public.manifest. However, the content-lock check for bundle integrity does not cover versions with storage_provider set to r2-direct. An attacker holding an upload, write, or all-scoped API key, or an authenticated user with write rights on an app, can therefore update public.app_versions.manifest on such a version.

The on_version_update async worker reads record.manifest from this update and trusts its contents. The worker then uses the service-role Supabase client to insert the attacker-supplied file_name, file_hash, and s3_path values into public.manifest, bypassing the RLS protection entirely. When a release channel subsequently points to the crafted version, the /updates endpoint returns the poisoned entry as a client-facing download_url. This categorizes the issue as an incorrect privilege assignment weakness [CWE-266].

Root Cause

The root cause is privilege transfer between untrusted and service-role contexts. The RLS policy enforces write restrictions at the direct table level, but the async worker executes with elevated service-role privileges without re-validating that the manifest content originated from a trusted source. The missing content-lock enforcement for r2-direct storage providers compounds the issue.

Attack Vector

An attacker needs an app-scoped API key with upload, write, or all rights, or an authenticated session with write rights on a target app. The attacker creates or targets a version with storage_provider = 'r2-direct', then updates app_versions.manifest with controlled file_name, file_hash, and s3_path values. The async worker propagates these values into public.manifest. Once a channel points to the crafted version, every client fetching /updates receives the attacker's download_url and executes the delivered OTA payload.

No code example is published; see the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-443r-w5p8-rhr2 and the VulnCheck Advisory on Capgo OTA Manifest for additional technical detail.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-100619

Indicators of Compromise

  • Rows in public.app_versions where storage_provider = 'r2-direct' that were modified by non-admin principals.
  • New entries in public.manifest whose s3_path points to buckets or prefixes outside the Capgo-controlled storage namespace.
  • /updates responses returning download_url values that do not match previously signed or hash-locked bundle locations.
  • Activity from app-scoped API keys with upload, write, or all rights performing updates against app_versions.manifest.

Detection Strategies

  • Audit the on_version_update worker logs for inserts into public.manifest triggered by non-service principals in the originating update.
  • Compare file_hash values returned by /updates against hashes recorded at bundle upload time and alert on mismatches.
  • Correlate API key usage with version updates and flag any key that writes to app_versions.manifest on r2-direct versions.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable database-level audit logging on public.app_versions and public.manifest with a focus on UPDATE and INSERT operations.
  • Monitor channel reassignments that point production channels to recently modified versions.
  • Track outbound download traffic from clients to validate that s3_path destinations remain within approved storage domains.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-100619

Immediate Actions Required

  • Rotate all app-scoped API keys that carry upload, write, or all rights and restrict issuance to trusted principals only.
  • Freeze or disable versions configured with storage_provider = 'r2-direct' until the content-lock gap is closed.
  • Review every row in public.manifest and remove entries that cannot be matched to a legitimate upload event.
  • Pin production channels to known-good versions and audit recent channel pointer changes.

Patch Information

No patch was available at the time of publication. Monitor the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-443r-w5p8-rhr2 for upstream fix availability and apply the vendor update as soon as it is released.

Workarounds

  • Extend the bundle content-lock check to cover r2-direct storage providers so that app_versions.manifest cannot be updated post-publication.
  • Harden the on_version_update worker to re-validate manifest provenance before inserting into public.manifest, rather than trusting record.manifest.
  • Restrict write permissions on app_versions.manifest to service-role contexts only and remove user-facing write paths.
  • Require client-side verification of file_hash against an out-of-band signed manifest before executing OTA payloads.
bash
# Configuration example
# Vendor-neutral guidance: no official mitigation configuration published.
# Review the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-443r-w5p8-rhr2 for updates.

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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