Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-100619 Overview
CVE-2026-100619 affects Capgo (capgo.app), an over-the-air (OTA) update platform for Capacitor applications. The vulnerability allows an authenticated principal with app-scoped write permissions to bypass a RESTRICTIVE row-level security (RLS) policy that protects the public.manifest table. Attackers abuse an indirect write path through public.app_versions.manifest on versions whose storage_provider is r2-direct. An async worker then inserts attacker-controlled entries into public.manifest using the service-role Supabase client. The resulting poisoned manifest is served to clients through the /updates endpoint, enabling OTA manifest poisoning. All versions are affected, and no patch was available at the time of publication.
Critical Impact
Attackers holding app-scoped upload or write API keys can poison OTA update manifests, causing client applications to download attacker-controlled files from arbitrary s3_path destinations.
Affected Products
- Capgo (capgo.app) OTA update service
- public.app_versions and public.manifest tables within Capgo-managed Supabase projects
- Capacitor applications consuming the Capgo /updates endpoint
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-26 - CVE-2026-100619 published to NVD
- 2026-09-30 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-100619
Vulnerability Analysis
The flaw sits at the intersection of two trust boundaries in Capgo's backend. A RESTRICTIVE RLS policy blocks user principals from inserting directly into public.manifest. However, the content-lock check for bundle integrity does not cover versions with storage_provider set to r2-direct. An attacker holding an upload, write, or all-scoped API key, or an authenticated user with write rights on an app, can therefore update public.app_versions.manifest on such a version.
The on_version_update async worker reads record.manifest from this update and trusts its contents. The worker then uses the service-role Supabase client to insert the attacker-supplied file_name, file_hash, and s3_path values into public.manifest, bypassing the RLS protection entirely. When a release channel subsequently points to the crafted version, the /updates endpoint returns the poisoned entry as a client-facing download_url. This categorizes the issue as an incorrect privilege assignment weakness [CWE-266].
Root Cause
The root cause is privilege transfer between untrusted and service-role contexts. The RLS policy enforces write restrictions at the direct table level, but the async worker executes with elevated service-role privileges without re-validating that the manifest content originated from a trusted source. The missing content-lock enforcement for r2-direct storage providers compounds the issue.
Attack Vector
An attacker needs an app-scoped API key with upload, write, or all rights, or an authenticated session with write rights on a target app. The attacker creates or targets a version with storage_provider = 'r2-direct', then updates app_versions.manifest with controlled file_name, file_hash, and s3_path values. The async worker propagates these values into public.manifest. Once a channel points to the crafted version, every client fetching /updates receives the attacker's download_url and executes the delivered OTA payload.
No code example is published; see the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-443r-w5p8-rhr2 and the VulnCheck Advisory on Capgo OTA Manifest for additional technical detail.
Detect Identity Attacks the Moment Authentication Fails
Singularity™ Identity surfaces credential misuse, lateral movement, and privilege escalation in real time, so you can contain the breach before it spreads.
Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-100619
Indicators of Compromise
- Rows in public.app_versions where storage_provider = 'r2-direct' that were modified by non-admin principals.
- New entries in public.manifest whose s3_path points to buckets or prefixes outside the Capgo-controlled storage namespace.
- /updates responses returning download_url values that do not match previously signed or hash-locked bundle locations.
- Activity from app-scoped API keys with upload, write, or all rights performing updates against app_versions.manifest.
Detection Strategies
- Audit the on_version_update worker logs for inserts into public.manifest triggered by non-service principals in the originating update.
- Compare file_hash values returned by /updates against hashes recorded at bundle upload time and alert on mismatches.
- Correlate API key usage with version updates and flag any key that writes to app_versions.manifest on r2-direct versions.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable database-level audit logging on public.app_versions and public.manifest with a focus on UPDATE and INSERT operations.
- Monitor channel reassignments that point production channels to recently modified versions.
- Track outbound download traffic from clients to validate that s3_path destinations remain within approved storage domains.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-100619
Immediate Actions Required
- Rotate all app-scoped API keys that carry upload, write, or all rights and restrict issuance to trusted principals only.
- Freeze or disable versions configured with storage_provider = 'r2-direct' until the content-lock gap is closed.
- Review every row in public.manifest and remove entries that cannot be matched to a legitimate upload event.
- Pin production channels to known-good versions and audit recent channel pointer changes.
Patch Information
No patch was available at the time of publication. Monitor the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-443r-w5p8-rhr2 for upstream fix availability and apply the vendor update as soon as it is released.
Workarounds
- Extend the bundle content-lock check to cover r2-direct storage providers so that app_versions.manifest cannot be updated post-publication.
- Harden the on_version_update worker to re-validate manifest provenance before inserting into public.manifest, rather than trusting record.manifest.
- Restrict write permissions on app_versions.manifest to service-role contexts only and remove user-facing write paths.
- Require client-side verification of file_hash against an out-of-band signed manifest before executing OTA payloads.
# Configuration example
# Vendor-neutral guidance: no official mitigation configuration published.
# Review the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-443r-w5p8-rhr2 for updates.
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

