Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-82930 Overview
CVE-2026-82930 is a missing authentication vulnerability [CWE-306] in the mH-DEVELOPER smart home module from FIF. The authorization middleware does not verify tokens, so all HTTP API and WebSocket endpoints are reachable without credentials. An unauthenticated attacker on the local area network (LAN) can query the endpoints, retrieve system information, and send raw control commands to building automation devices. The issue affects versions prior to 3.0.30 and is fixed in version 3.0.30.
Critical Impact
An adjacent-network attacker can manipulate building automation devices without authentication, including lighting, HVAC, and other controls managed through the smart home module.
Affected Products
- mH-DEVELOPER smart home module versions prior to 3.0.30
- FIF building automation deployments integrating the mH-DEVELOPER module
- Networked HTTP API and WebSocket interfaces exposed by the module on the LAN
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-28 - CVE-2026-82930 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- 2026-09-28 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-82930
Vulnerability Analysis
The mH-DEVELOPER module exposes a REST-style HTTP API and a WebSocket channel used to query device state and send control commands. The server implements an authorization middleware layer that is expected to validate bearer tokens on each inbound request. In the vulnerable builds, the middleware does not perform token verification. Requests proceed to the handler regardless of whether a valid token is present.
Because enforcement is absent at the middleware level, every downstream endpoint inherits the flaw. This includes endpoints that read system configuration and endpoints that write device state. An attacker who can reach the service on the LAN gains the same effective privilege as a legitimate authenticated client. The vendor addressed the issue in version 3.0.30.
Root Cause
The root cause is a missing authentication check in the request processing pipeline [CWE-306]. The authorization middleware is present but non-functional: it does not validate the token claim, signature, or expiry before passing the request to protected routes. Both HTTP and WebSocket entry points share this middleware, so the gap is symmetric across transport types.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires network adjacency to the module, typically a position on the same LAN segment or routed internal network. The attacker enumerates the HTTP API or opens a WebSocket connection and issues control messages without providing credentials. No user interaction and no prior privilege are required. Impact ranges from disclosure of system information to direct manipulation of connected building automation devices.
No verified exploit code is available at this time. See the CERT.PL advisory for related technical details on the mH-DEVELOPER product line.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-82930
Indicators of Compromise
- HTTP requests to mH-DEVELOPER API endpoints without an Authorization header or with a malformed bearer token that still receive 2xx responses
- WebSocket upgrade requests originating from unexpected LAN hosts that are not provisioned management workstations
- Unexpected state changes in building automation devices (lighting, HVAC, relays) not correlated with scheduled automations or operator sessions
Detection Strategies
- Capture traffic to the mH-DEVELOPER module and alert on requests that lack a valid bearer token but receive non-401 responses
- Baseline the set of hosts that normally communicate with the module and alert on new source IPs or MAC addresses initiating API or WebSocket sessions
- Correlate device command events with authenticated operator activity to identify unauthorized control actions
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward module and network logs to a centralized logging or SIEM platform for retention and correlation
- Monitor LAN segments hosting the module for unauthorized scanning of the HTTP API port and WebSocket endpoint
- Alert on firmware version strings below 3.0.30 reported during asset discovery scans
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-82930
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade the mH-DEVELOPER smart home module to version 3.0.30 or later as the primary remediation
- Inventory all deployed instances across sites to confirm patch coverage, including redundant and backup modules
- Restrict LAN access to the module to a dedicated management VLAN while rollout is in progress
Patch Information
The vendor fixed the vulnerability in mH-DEVELOPER version 3.0.30. Operators should obtain the update from FIF through the official distribution channel referenced on the FIF mH-DEVELOPER product page. Validate the upgrade by confirming that unauthenticated requests to the HTTP API and WebSocket endpoints return 401 Unauthorized after patching.
Workarounds
- Place the module behind a firewall rule that restricts HTTP API and WebSocket ports to specific trusted management hosts
- Segment building automation networks from general user, guest, and IoT VLANs to reduce adjacent-network reachability
- Disable or block the WebSocket endpoint at the network layer if it is not required for current operations
# Example network ACL restricting access to the mH-DEVELOPER module
# Replace <module_ip>, <api_port>, <ws_port>, and <mgmt_subnet> with site values
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -d <module_ip> --dport <api_port> -s <mgmt_subnet> -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -d <module_ip> --dport <ws_port> -s <mgmt_subnet> -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -d <module_ip> --dport <api_port> -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -d <module_ip> --dport <ws_port> -j DROP
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

