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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-82929

CVE-2026-82929: mH-DEVELOPER Smart Home SSH Key Vulnerability

CVE-2026-82929 is an information disclosure vulnerability in mH-DEVELOPER smart home module caused by hard-coded SSH host keys. Attackers can perform man-in-the-middle attacks and intercept credentials. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact analysis, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-82929 Overview

The mH-DEVELOPER smart home module ships with hard-coded Secure Shell (SSH) host keys embedded in its firmware. Every device in the field uses the same key material, with no per-device key generation at provisioning or first boot. An attacker who extracts these keys from any single firmware image can impersonate the SSH service on any other device. Clients connecting over SSH will trust the rogue server without any warning, enabling man-in-the-middle (MITM) interception of sessions and credentials. The issue is tracked under [CWE-321: Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key] and was corrected in version 3.0.30.

Critical Impact

Shared SSH host keys allow attackers to impersonate any mH-DEVELOPER device on the network and intercept administrative credentials passed through trusted SSH sessions.

Affected Products

  • mH-DEVELOPER smart home module firmware versions prior to 3.0.30
  • Deployments relying on the embedded SSH service for remote administration
  • Installations where SSH clients persist the shared host key as trusted

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-09-28 - CVE CVE-2026-82929 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-09-28 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-82929

Vulnerability Analysis

The mH-DEVELOPER module embeds SSH host private keys directly in the firmware image distributed to every unit. Because the keys are static across the product line, possession of a single firmware release reveals the private key material protecting SSH sessions on every deployed device.

The SSH host key is the server's identity anchor. Clients record the key on first connection under known_hosts and trust it on subsequent sessions. When all devices share the same key, an attacker-controlled host presenting that key is indistinguishable from the legitimate server. Credentials typed into the session, including administrative passwords and command output, flow through the attacker's position.

The fix in version 3.0.30 introduces per-device key generation so that each unit presents unique host key material.

Root Cause

The root cause is the use of hard-coded cryptographic keys [CWE-321]. Firmware builds include a prebuilt SSH host key pair rather than invoking a key-generation routine on first boot. No provisioning step rotates the key based on device-specific entropy such as serial number, MAC address, or hardware random number generator (RNG) output.

Attack Vector

An attacker first obtains the firmware image, extracts the SSH private key, and stages a rogue SSH server using that key. The attacker then redirects client traffic to the rogue server through techniques such as ARP spoofing, DNS poisoning, or control of upstream network infrastructure. Clients accept the forged server because the presented host key matches the one previously trusted. The attacker captures credentials, injects commands, and relays traffic to the legitimate device to avoid detection. The attack is network-reachable and requires no user interaction beyond the client initiating its normal SSH session.

See the CERT.pl Security Advisory for additional context on the vendor's remediation and the broader advisory covering related issues.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-82929

Indicators of Compromise

  • Multiple mH-DEVELOPER devices presenting identical SSH host key fingerprints across different network segments or customer sites
  • Unexpected SSH host key fingerprints that match the fingerprint extracted from the vulnerable firmware image
  • Short-lived SSH sessions terminated after credential submission, consistent with credential harvesting followed by proxying

Detection Strategies

  • Enumerate SSH host key fingerprints from each device using ssh-keyscan and compare across the fleet; duplicates indicate the vulnerable key is still in use
  • Compare observed fingerprints against the known hard-coded value derived from firmware analysis of releases prior to 3.0.30
  • Monitor for ARP table changes, duplicate MAC addresses, or unexpected gateway advertisements that could support SSH session redirection

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Alert on SSH authentication events originating from unexpected source addresses targeting mH-DEVELOPER management interfaces
  • Log and review all firmware versions deployed across the smart home infrastructure to confirm the patched release is in use
  • Baseline SSH host key fingerprints after upgrade and alert on any subsequent change not tied to a planned maintenance window

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-82929

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade all mH-DEVELOPER smart home modules to firmware version 3.0.30 or later
  • Regenerate SSH host keys on each device after upgrade to ensure the shared key material is replaced with unique per-device keys
  • Remove the previously trusted hard-coded fingerprint from every client known_hosts file and re-establish trust against the new per-device fingerprints
  • Rotate any credentials that were used to authenticate to affected devices while the shared key was in place

Patch Information

The vendor addressed the issue in firmware version 3.0.30, which introduces per-device SSH host key generation. Refer to the CERT.pl Security Advisory and the FIF Developer product page for release details.

Workarounds

  • Restrict SSH access to the module through a management VLAN or firewall rules that limit source addresses to trusted administrator hosts
  • Tunnel SSH sessions over a virtual private network (VPN) to reduce exposure to on-path attackers until patching is complete
  • Disable the SSH service on devices where remote shell access is not operationally required
bash
# Compare SSH host key fingerprints across devices to identify shared keys
for host in $(cat devices.txt); do
  echo "=== $host ==="
  ssh-keyscan -t rsa,ed25519 "$host" 2>/dev/null | ssh-keygen -lf -
done | sort -u

# After upgrading to firmware 3.0.30, remove stale entries and retrust
ssh-keygen -R <device-ip>
ssh <user>@<device-ip>

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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