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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-111934

CVE-2026-111934: Coder IP Spoofing Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-111934 is an IP spoofing flaw in Coder that allows attackers to bypass rate limits and falsify audit logs by manipulating X-Forwarded-For headers. This article covers technical details, affected versions, and mitigation.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-111934 Overview

CVE-2026-111934 is an IP spoofing vulnerability in Coder versions prior to 2.34.7. The flaw resides in the ExtractRealIPAddress middleware, which trusts the leftmost client-supplied value in the X-Forwarded-For header instead of the client IP appended by a trusted reverse proxy. Attackers behind an appending proxy can forge arbitrary IP addresses to bypass per-IP rate limits on login, one-time passcode, and password validation endpoints. The same technique enables falsification of IP addresses recorded in audit logs, obscuring attacker activity. The weakness is categorized as CWE-348: Use of Less Trusted Source.

Critical Impact

Attackers can bypass per-IP rate limiting to perform brute-force attacks against authentication endpoints and spoof source IPs in audit logs.

Affected Products

  • Coder versions prior to 2.34.7
  • Deployments where Coder sits behind an appending reverse proxy
  • Environments relying on ExtractRealIPAddress middleware for rate limiting or audit attribution

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-17 - CVE-2026-111934 published to the National Vulnerability Database
  • 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-111934

Vulnerability Analysis

The ExtractRealIPAddress middleware in Coder is responsible for determining the real client IP address of incoming HTTP requests. In vulnerable versions, the middleware extracts the leftmost value from the X-Forwarded-For header. That leftmost value is client-controlled and can be set arbitrarily by any upstream requester.

When Coder runs behind a reverse proxy that appends the connecting client IP to X-Forwarded-For rather than replacing the header, the trustworthy value is the rightmost entry added by the proxy. Trusting the leftmost value therefore allows attackers to inject any address they choose. This directly undermines security controls that are keyed by source IP, including authentication rate limits and audit logging.

Root Cause

The root cause is an insecure parsing decision in the IP extraction logic. The middleware does not distinguish between proxy-appended values and attacker-supplied values in the X-Forwarded-For chain. There is no configuration enforcing the number of trusted proxies or validating that upstream hops are expected sources, as described in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-vprw-xcrv-287h.

Attack Vector

An unauthenticated remote attacker sends HTTP requests to a Coder deployment and includes a crafted X-Forwarded-For header containing a spoofed address as the leftmost value. The reverse proxy appends the attacker's real IP to the right. Coder reads the leftmost spoofed value and treats it as the client identity. The attacker can rotate the spoofed value on every request to defeat per-IP rate limits on /api/v2/users/login, one-time passcode endpoints, and password validation endpoints, enabling credential brute-force. The same forgery pollutes audit log entries, hindering incident response. See the VulnCheck Advisory for Coder IP Spoofing for additional detail.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111934

Indicators of Compromise

  • Authentication failures distributed across many unique leftmost X-Forwarded-For values but originating from a small set of upstream proxy IPs
  • X-Forwarded-For headers containing private, reserved, or implausible address ranges in the leftmost position
  • Sudden spikes in failed login, OTP, or password validation attempts without corresponding rate-limit enforcement
  • Audit log entries attributing actions to IPs that never appear in reverse proxy access logs

Detection Strategies

  • Compare the leftmost X-Forwarded-For value in Coder audit logs against the connecting IP recorded by the reverse proxy for the same request
  • Alert on authentication endpoints receiving high request volumes from a narrow set of true upstream IPs regardless of reported client IP
  • Correlate OTP and password validation failures by proxy-observed source rather than by Coder-reported client IP

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Centralize reverse proxy access logs and Coder audit logs for cross-source correlation
  • Baseline normal X-Forwarded-For chain length and alert on anomalies
  • Monitor failed authentication rates on /api/v2/users/login and related endpoints after upgrading to confirm rate limiting is enforced correctly

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111934

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Coder to version 2.34.7 or later
  • Audit reverse proxy configurations to confirm whether proxies append to or replace the X-Forwarded-For header
  • Review authentication and audit logs for evidence of brute-force attempts predating the patch
  • Rotate credentials for any accounts showing suspicious authentication activity

Patch Information

The vendor has released a fix in Coder 2.34.7. The patched middleware selects the client IP based on trusted proxy configuration rather than the leftmost X-Forwarded-For value. Review the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-vprw-xcrv-287h for the full remediation guidance.

Workarounds

  • Configure the upstream reverse proxy to overwrite rather than append the X-Forwarded-For header, discarding attacker-supplied values
  • Strip or normalize inbound X-Forwarded-For headers at the network edge before they reach Coder
  • Enforce authentication rate limiting at the reverse proxy or Web Application Firewall layer using the proxy-observed source IP
  • Restrict exposure of Coder authentication endpoints to known networks until the upgrade is applied
bash
# Example NGINX configuration to overwrite X-Forwarded-For at the edge
location / {
    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr;
    proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
    proxy_pass http://coder_upstream;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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