Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-111927 Overview
CVE-2026-111927 is an improper hostname validation flaw in Coder, a cloud development environment platform. The vulnerability resides in the GetWorkspaceProxyByHostname function, which uses a SIMILAR TO SQL pattern that performs a prefix match on workspace-proxy access URLs. Any domain that is a string prefix of a legitimate workspace-proxy URL is treated as a trusted proxy. Attackers who own such a domain can lure an authenticated victim to a crafted /api/v2/applications/auth-redirect link, capture the redirected application_connect API key, and replay it to access the victim's workspace apps. The flaw is tracked under CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials.
Critical Impact
Attackers can steal workspace application API keys from authenticated users and gain unauthorized access to their development workspaces and the applications hosted within them.
Affected Products
- Coder versions before 2.29.20
- Coder versions 2.33.0 before 2.33.12 and 2.34.0 before 2.34.8
- Coder versions 2.35.0 before 2.35.4
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-17 - CVE-2026-111927 published to NVD
- 2026-10-21 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-111927
Vulnerability Analysis
Coder resolves incoming workspace-proxy requests by matching the request hostname against stored workspace-proxy access URLs. The lookup is implemented with a PostgreSQL SIMILAR TO pattern that performs a prefix comparison rather than an exact match. As a result, any hostname that happens to be a string prefix of a configured proxy access URL is accepted as a legitimate proxy identity.
An authenticated user who follows a crafted /api/v2/applications/auth-redirect link is redirected to the attacker-controlled domain with an application_connect API key appended. The attacker captures the token server-side and replays it against the Coder API to connect to the victim's workspace applications. Because the credential is scoped to application connections, the attacker gains the same workspace-app access that the victim possessed at the time of the redirect.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper input validation in GetWorkspaceProxyByHostname. The SIMILAR TO pattern used to look up a workspace proxy by hostname lacks an anchored full-string match. Hostname comparisons must be exact or performed against a normalized canonical form. Treating a prefix as a valid proxy identity breaks the trust boundary between arbitrary external domains and legitimate workspace proxies.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires an attacker-controlled domain whose name forms a prefix of a legitimate workspace-proxy access URL. The attacker then delivers a crafted /api/v2/applications/auth-redirect URL to an authenticated Coder user through phishing or any social-engineering channel. When the victim follows the link, Coder issues an application_connect API key and redirects the browser to the attacker domain with the key in the request. The attacker captures the token and replays it to the Coder API to access the victim's workspace apps. User interaction is required, which is reflected in the CVSS vector.
No verified public exploit code is available. Technical details are described in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-h58h-qvv5-xvwg and the VulnCheck advisory on credential theft.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-111927
Indicators of Compromise
- Requests to /api/v2/applications/auth-redirect with redirect_uri or hostname parameters pointing to domains that are string prefixes of configured workspace-proxy access URLs.
- Outbound HTTP redirects from Coder to external domains carrying an application_connect query parameter or token.
- Workspace application sessions originating from source IP addresses that do not match the user's historical access patterns.
Detection Strategies
- Audit Coder access logs for auth-redirect requests and verify the destination hostname exactly matches a configured workspace-proxy URL.
- Compare captured proxy hostnames against the allow-listed set of workspace proxies using an exact string match, flagging any prefix-only matches.
- Correlate application_connect token issuance events with subsequent API usage from unexpected network locations.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable verbose audit logging on Coder API endpoints that issue application credentials and forward logs to a centralized data lake.
- Alert on redirects from the Coder authentication flow to domains outside the organization's registered proxy inventory.
- Monitor for sudden spikes in application_connect key issuance per user, which may indicate active credential harvesting.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111927
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Coder to version 2.29.20, 2.33.12, 2.34.8, or 2.35.4 or later, depending on the installed release branch.
- Rotate any application_connect API keys that may have been issued before the patch was applied.
- Review workspace-proxy access URL configurations and confirm no attacker-controlled domain shares a prefix with legitimate proxy hostnames.
Patch Information
Coder has published fixed releases 2.29.20, 2.33.12, 2.34.8, and 2.35.4. The patch replaces the prefix-based SIMILAR TO lookup in GetWorkspaceProxyByHostname with an exact hostname match. Review the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-h58h-qvv5-xvwg for complete remediation details and release notes.
Workarounds
- Restrict the Coder deployment to internal network paths so unauthenticated attackers cannot deliver crafted redirect links from the public internet.
- Register workspace-proxy access URLs using long, unpredictable hostnames that are unlikely to be prefix-matched by registrable domains.
- Educate users to avoid clicking Coder authentication links received from untrusted sources until the patched version is deployed.
# Example: verify installed Coder version against patched releases
coder version
# Upgrade to a patched release (example for Linux tarball install)
# Replace <version> with 2.29.20, 2.33.12, 2.34.8, or 2.35.4
curl -fsSL https://coder.com/install.sh | sh -s -- --version <version>
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

