Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-111933 Overview
CVE-2026-111933 is a user enumeration vulnerability in Coder, an open-source cloud development environment platform. The flaw resides in the userpassword.Compare() function, which substitutes a placeholder hash derived from the string hunter2 when a stored password hash is empty. Unauthenticated attackers can submit login requests using the password hunter2 and distinguish between HTTP 403 and 401 responses. This differential response reveals valid account names and exposes the authentication provider of single sign-on (SSO) only users. The issue is tracked under CWE-203: Observable Discrepancy.
Critical Impact
Unauthenticated attackers can enumerate valid Coder accounts and identify SSO-only users by observing response code differences, enabling targeted phishing and credential-stuffing campaigns.
Affected Products
- Coder versions prior to 2.29.17
- Coder versions 2.30.0 through 2.32.6 and 2.33.0 through 2.33.7
- Coder versions 2.34.0 and 2.34.1
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-17 - CVE-2026-111933 published to NVD
- 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-111933
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability resides in Coder's password comparison logic. When a user record exists but has no stored password hash, such as users provisioned exclusively through SSO, the userpassword.Compare() function substitutes a placeholder bcrypt hash derived from the string hunter2. This substitution was intended to normalize comparison timing but inadvertently creates a side channel. Submitting a login request with the password hunter2 against a valid SSO-only account causes the comparison to succeed at the hash layer, which then triggers an HTTP 403 response because the user is not permitted to authenticate via password. Non-existent accounts return HTTP 401. The classification falls under CWE-203: Observable Discrepancy.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper handling of empty password hashes in the authentication path. By using a deterministic placeholder value tied to a well-known string, the implementation produced response behavior that differs based on account existence and provisioning method. The vulnerability does not grant authentication, but it discloses account metadata to unauthenticated callers.
Attack Vector
An unauthenticated attacker sends HTTP POST requests to the Coder login endpoint containing a candidate username and the literal password hunter2. By observing whether the server returns HTTP 403 (valid SSO-only account) or HTTP 401 (invalid account or password-authenticated account with a different password), the attacker enumerates valid usernames and identifies which users rely on SSO. The information gathered supports downstream phishing targeting the SSO identity provider and credential-stuffing against enumerated accounts.
No verified public exploit code is available at this time. For technical details, refer to the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-8fxq-53rx-ph5f and the VulnCheck Advisory for Coder User Enumeration.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-111933
Indicators of Compromise
- Repeated login attempts to Coder authentication endpoints using the password string hunter2.
- Elevated volumes of HTTP 401 responses interleaved with HTTP 403 responses from a single source IP.
- Login traffic iterating through sequential or dictionary-based username lists from unauthenticated clients.
Detection Strategies
- Parse Coder access logs for POST requests to /api/v2/users/login with abnormal username diversity from one source.
- Alert on authentication response code transitions where the same client receives mixed 401 and 403 responses within a short window.
- Correlate failed authentication events with downstream SSO identity provider login attempts for the same usernames.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward Coder authentication logs to a centralized analytics platform and baseline normal login failure rates per source IP.
- Monitor rate of distinct usernames attempted per client over sliding time windows to catch enumeration behavior.
- Enable alerting on authentication requests that submit the literal password hunter2 while patches are being deployed.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111933
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Coder to version 2.29.17, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, or 2.34.2 or later, matching the applicable release branch.
- Place Coder login endpoints behind a web application firewall or reverse proxy with rate limiting on /api/v2/users/login.
- Review authentication logs for enumeration activity dating back to the deployment of affected versions.
Patch Information
The Coder maintainers released fixes in versions 2.29.17, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2. The patch removes the hunter2 placeholder substitution and normalizes authentication responses so that account existence cannot be inferred from response codes. Full remediation details are published in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-8fxq-53rx-ph5f.
Workarounds
- Enforce aggressive rate limits on the Coder login endpoint to slow enumeration attempts until patching completes.
- Block or alert on authentication requests that submit the password value hunter2.
- Restrict access to Coder login endpoints to trusted networks or VPN ranges where feasible.
# Example reverse proxy rate limit (nginx)
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=coder_login:10m rate=5r/m;
location /api/v2/users/login {
limit_req zone=coder_login burst=5 nodelay;
proxy_pass http://coder_backend;
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

