Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-111815 Overview
Apache Traffic Server contains a flaw that allows TLS session resumption across Server Name Indication (SNI) virtual hosts without re-verifying a client certificate required by the resumed host's verify_client STRICT policy. An attacker can establish a TLS session with one virtual host and resume it against a different virtual host that mandates mutual TLS, effectively bypassing the client certificate requirement.
The issue affects Apache Traffic Server versions 8.0.0 through 8.1.11, 9.0.0 through 9.2.15, 10.0.0 through 10.1.4, and 10.2.0. The flaw is tracked under [CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation].
Critical Impact
Attackers can bypass mutual TLS authentication on protected virtual hosts by resuming a TLS session established with a less-restrictive SNI host.
Affected Products
- Apache Traffic Server 8.0.0 through 8.1.11
- Apache Traffic Server 9.0.0 through 9.2.15
- Apache Traffic Server 10.0.0 through 10.1.4, and 10.2.0
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-111815 published to NVD
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-111815
Vulnerability Analysis
Apache Traffic Server supports multiple virtual hosts behind a single listener, differentiating them with SNI. Operators can enforce mutual TLS on a per-host basis by configuring verify_client STRICT in sni.yaml. This policy requires each client to present a valid X.509 certificate before establishing an encrypted channel.
The server also supports TLS session resumption through session IDs and session tickets. Resumption lets clients skip the full handshake, reusing cryptographic material and authentication state from an earlier connection. The vulnerability stems from Traffic Server treating resumed sessions as fully authenticated without re-checking that the resumed session satisfies the destination host's client certificate policy.
An attacker first completes a handshake with an SNI host that does not require a client certificate. On the resumed connection the attacker switches the SNI value to a protected virtual host configured with verify_client STRICT. Traffic Server accepts the resumption and routes the request to the protected host, skipping the certificate validation that the policy requires.
Root Cause
The root cause is a missing enforcement check during session resumption. Client certificate validation state is bound to the original handshake rather than being re-evaluated against the SNI-selected virtual host configuration on each resumed connection. This matches the CWE-295 classification for improper certificate validation.
Attack Vector
Exploitation is network-based and requires no privileges or user interaction. An attacker needs network access to the Traffic Server listener and the ability to initiate TLS connections against at least one SNI host that does not require mutual TLS. The attacker reuses the resulting session ticket or session ID while presenting the SNI of a protected virtual host. Technical details are available in the Apache Security Mailing List Thread.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-111815
Indicators of Compromise
- TLS connections to protected virtual hosts that complete without a Certificate message in the handshake log.
- Requests reaching an SNI host configured with verify_client STRICT where the connection shows a resumed session identifier originating from a different SNI host.
- Access log entries on mutually-authenticated virtual hosts that lack a client certificate subject or fingerprint field.
Detection Strategies
- Enable verbose TLS handshake logging in Traffic Server and alert on resumed sessions where the current SNI differs from the SNI recorded during initial session establishment.
- Correlate upstream request logs against access logs to identify requests on protected hosts that are missing an associated client certificate attribute.
- Compare the version string of running Traffic Server instances against the fixed releases 9.2.16, 10.1.5, and 10.2.1 during asset inventory sweeps.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Monitor sni.yaml policy violations by shipping Traffic Server access and event logs to a centralized analytics backend for correlation.
- Baseline the ratio of full handshakes to resumed sessions per virtual host, and alert on anomalous spikes in resumption against hosts that mandate verify_client STRICT.
- Track outbound traffic from protected backend applications for unexpected session or user activity that could indicate authentication bypass.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111815
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Apache Traffic Server to version 9.2.16, 10.1.5, or 10.2.1 based on the deployed major release line.
- Audit sni.yaml for every virtual host that specifies verify_client STRICT and confirm those hosts are not reachable from unauthenticated listeners during patching.
- Rotate any client authentication credentials or backend trust material that may have been exposed through requests reaching protected hosts without certificate validation.
Patch Information
The Apache Traffic Server project has released fixes in versions 9.2.16, 10.1.5, and 10.2.1. Version 8.x is no longer receiving security updates and operators on that branch should migrate to a supported release line. Patch details are published in the Apache Security Mailing List Thread.
Workarounds
- Disable TLS session resumption on listeners that host virtual servers using verify_client STRICT, removing the resumption path that enables the bypass.
- Isolate virtual hosts requiring mutual TLS onto dedicated listener ports or separate Traffic Server instances so that session state cannot be shared with less-restrictive hosts.
- Restrict network access to protected virtual hosts via upstream firewalls or allowlists until the patched version is deployed.
# Example: disable TLS session tickets and session cache on sensitive listener
# records.config
CONFIG proxy.config.ssl.session_cache INT 0
CONFIG proxy.config.ssl.session_cache.size INT 0
CONFIG proxy.config.ssl.server.session_ticket.enable INT 0
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

