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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-111812

CVE-2026-111812: Apache Traffic Server Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-111812 is an authentication bypass flaw in Apache Traffic Server that allows clients to force signing of attacker-chosen AWS request headers under proxy credentials. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-111812 Overview

CVE-2026-111812 is an authorization flaw [CWE-863] in the origin_server_auth plugin shipped with Apache Traffic Server (ATS). The plugin signs outbound AWS requests using the proxy's own credentials. A client can force the plugin to sign attacker-chosen request headers under those credentials. This allows the client to influence authenticated requests sent to the origin service.

The flaw affects Apache Traffic Server versions 8.0.0 through 8.1.11, 9.0.0 through 9.2.15, 10.0.0 through 10.1.4, and 10.2.0. Fixed releases are 9.2.16, 10.1.5, and 10.2.1.

Critical Impact

An unauthenticated network client can coerce the proxy into generating valid AWS signatures over attacker-controlled headers, undermining the integrity of requests reaching the origin.

Affected Products

  • Apache Traffic Server 8.0.0 through 8.1.11
  • Apache Traffic Server 9.0.0 through 9.2.15
  • Apache Traffic Server 10.0.0 through 10.1.4, and 10.2.0

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-111812 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-111812

Vulnerability Analysis

The origin_server_auth plugin computes AWS Signature authentication for requests the proxy forwards to an S3-compatible origin. The plugin determines which request headers to include in the signed string based on client-supplied input. Because the plugin does not restrict the header set to a trusted allowlist, a remote client can inject headers that get folded into the canonical request and signed with the proxy's long-lived AWS credentials.

The result is a classic authorization boundary failure. The proxy acts as a confused deputy, applying its privileged credentials to content chosen by an untrusted party. Downstream services that validate signatures accept the request as if the proxy intentionally authored it.

The scope impact extends beyond the vulnerable component itself, since the signed requests travel to a separate AWS or S3-compatible system under the proxy's identity.

Root Cause

The plugin fails to enforce a server-controlled set of signed headers. Instead, it accepts header selection influenced by the inbound request. There is no isolation between client-controlled metadata and the authentication envelope the proxy constructs.

Attack Vector

An attacker sends a crafted HTTP request to a proxy running a vulnerable version of origin_server_auth. The request includes headers the attacker wants signed. The plugin includes those headers in the AWS canonical request and signs the payload using the proxy's secret key. The upstream origin treats the resulting request as authentic.

No authentication is required and no user interaction is needed. The attack is executed over the network against the proxy's listening port. See the Apache Mailing List Thread for the project's advisory.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111812

Indicators of Compromise

  • Outbound AWS requests from the ATS host containing x-amz-* headers or canonical header lists that do not match the plugin's documented configuration.
  • Origin-side S3 access logs showing signed requests with unexpected header fields attributed to the proxy's access key.
  • Inbound HTTP requests to ATS carrying unusual or attacker-controlled headers that mirror the AWS signing header set.

Detection Strategies

  • Inventory ATS deployments and confirm whether the origin_server_auth plugin is loaded in plugin.config.
  • Compare the version strings reported by traffic_server -V against the fixed releases 9.2.16, 10.1.5, and 10.2.1.
  • Review proxy access logs for anomalous header patterns on requests that terminate at AWS or S3-compatible endpoints.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable detailed logging on the upstream S3 endpoint and alert on signed requests containing header names outside an approved list.
  • Monitor for sudden changes in the shape of outbound authenticated requests from ATS instances.
  • Correlate inbound client headers with outbound signed headers to identify header pass-through patterns indicative of exploitation.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111812

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Apache Traffic Server to version 9.2.16, 10.1.5, or 10.2.1 depending on the current branch in use.
  • If the origin_server_auth plugin is not required, remove it from plugin.config and restart the service.
  • Rotate the AWS access key and secret key configured for the plugin, since prior requests may have been coerced using those credentials.

Patch Information

The Apache Traffic Server project has released fixes in versions 9.2.16, 10.1.5, and 10.2.1. Users on the 8.x branch should migrate to a supported 9.x or 10.x release, as no fixed 8.x version is listed. Refer to the Apache Mailing List Thread for the official announcement.

Workarounds

  • Disable the origin_server_auth plugin until the upgrade can be applied.
  • Restrict the IAM permissions associated with the plugin's AWS credentials to the minimum bucket and action scope needed.
  • Place a filtering layer in front of ATS to strip client-supplied headers that could influence AWS signing before they reach the proxy.
bash
# Configuration example: disable the plugin in plugin.config
# Comment out or remove the origin_server_auth entry
# origin_server_auth.so /etc/trafficserver/s3_auth_v4.config

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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