Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-111814 Overview
CVE-2026-111814 is an improper certificate validation flaw [CWE-295] in Apache Traffic Server (ATS). The default outbound session-sharing policy can reuse a pooled TLS session that was authenticated with one client certificate for a transaction configured to present a different client certificate. This breaks the mutual TLS trust boundary between upstream origins and allows transactions to execute under an identity they were never configured to use.
The flaw affects Apache Traffic Server versions 9.0.0 through 9.2.15, 10.0.0 through 10.1.4, and 10.2.0. The Apache Software Foundation released fixes in versions 9.2.16, 10.1.5, and 10.2.1.
Critical Impact
Pooled TLS sessions authenticated with one client certificate can be reused for requests intended to present a different certificate, undermining mutual TLS origin authentication.
Affected Products
- Apache Traffic Server 9.0.0 through 9.2.15
- Apache Traffic Server 10.0.0 through 10.1.4
- Apache Traffic Server 10.2.0
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-111814 published to NVD
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-111814
Vulnerability Analysis
Apache Traffic Server maintains an outbound session pool so that connections to upstream origins can be reused across client transactions. The default session-sharing policy keys pooled sessions in a way that does not account for the client certificate presented during the original TLS handshake.
When a new transaction is routed to the same origin, ATS can select a pooled session that was authenticated with a different client certificate than the one configured for the new transaction. The upstream origin continues to treat the connection as authenticated under the original certificate identity, while ATS believes it is sending the request under a different identity.
The issue is scoped to integrity and confidentiality of the upstream authentication context. The attack surface is network-reachable and requires no privileges or user interaction, as reflected in the CVSS 4.0 vector.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper certificate validation [CWE-295] in the outbound session-sharing logic. The pooling key does not incorporate the client certificate identity associated with the TLS session. Any session matching the origin tuple becomes a candidate for reuse, regardless of which certificate authenticated it.
Attack Vector
An operator configures ATS to present different client certificates for different upstream transactions, for example to represent different tenants or trust boundaries. When concurrent or sequential transactions target the same origin, ATS may dispatch a transaction over a pooled session authenticated with the wrong certificate. The upstream server applies authorization decisions based on the original certificate, allowing requests to execute under an unintended identity. See the Apache List Discussion Thread for additional technical context.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-111814
Indicators of Compromise
- Upstream access logs showing requests authenticated under a client certificate that does not match the ATS routing configuration for that transaction.
- Audit trails on origin servers recording actions attributed to a certificate identity that should not have initiated them.
- Unexpected session reuse patterns in ATS traffic.out logs when proxy.config.http.server_session_sharing.pool is at its default value.
Detection Strategies
- Compare the client certificate serial or subject recorded by the upstream origin against the certificate ATS was configured to present per route or remap rule.
- Enable detailed TLS session logging on ATS and correlate pooled session IDs with the client certificate used at handshake time.
- Review ATS configuration for use of the default outbound session-sharing policy combined with multiple client certificates for the same origin.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Alert on origin-side authentication logs where the presenting certificate deviates from the expected per-tenant or per-route certificate mapping.
- Monitor ATS versions in deployment inventories to flag hosts running 9.0.0–9.2.15, 10.0.0–10.1.4, or 10.2.0.
- Track EPSS and vendor advisory updates for changes in exploitability signal.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111814
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Apache Traffic Server to version 9.2.16, 10.1.5, or 10.2.1 as applicable to your release branch.
- Inventory all ATS instances that present more than one client certificate to the same upstream origin and prioritize them for patching.
- Review upstream origin logs for evidence of requests authenticated under an unintended client certificate.
Patch Information
The Apache Software Foundation fixed the issue in Apache Traffic Server 9.2.16, 10.1.5, and 10.2.1. Refer to the Apache List Discussion Thread for release details and backport guidance.
Workarounds
- Change the outbound session-sharing policy so that pooled sessions are not shared across transactions that may use different client certificates, for example by setting proxy.config.http.server_session_sharing.pool to a value that isolates sessions per transaction context.
- Segregate upstream traffic that uses distinct client certificates onto separate ATS instances or separate origin tuples so that session pools cannot cross certificate boundaries.
- Disable outbound session reuse for origins that rely on mutual TLS authentication until patched versions are deployed.
# Configuration example: disable outbound session sharing in records.config
CONFIG proxy.config.http.server_session_sharing.pool STRING none
CONFIG proxy.config.http.server_session_sharing.match STRING both
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

